Word and Sentence : Two Perspectives

Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein

Edited by
Sibajiban Bhattacharyya

SHOUT
SHARE
IT

Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein

Word and Sentence : Two Perspectives

Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein

Edited by

Sibajiban Bhattacharyya

Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein

Bhartṛhari (450-500 A.D.) holds a unique position in the history of both theory of grammar and general agamic philosophy. He is the best exponent of the 'sphota' theory and an outstanding writer on the philosophy of language. He has written a commentary on *Mahābhāṣya* of Patanjali of which a portion only is extant. Bhartṛhari's verses are very popular even now – the *Nītiśataka* on politics and ethics, *Śṛngaraśataka* on passionate love and *Vairāgyaśataka* on renunciation. The most important thesis of Bhartṛhari is about the relationship between the word and sentence. The meaning of the word is not arrived at by putting together the meanings of each word that constitutes it; not does the sentence as a whole have a meaning which can be explained by the real meaning of words. On the other hand, the meaning of sentence is indivisible, but may be explained by meanings of the real words that constitute it. Ludwig Wittgenstein born in Vienna, (1889-1951) is one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century; is best known mainly for his two treatises The *Tractatus* (1922) and the *Philosophical Investigations* (1953). His *Tractatus* is best explained as a synthesis of the theory of truth-functions and the notion that language is a picture of reality. For Wittgenstein also, the meaningful unit is not a word but a sentence. Though Bhartṛhari of the East and Wittgenstein of the West say that there is a public component in the meaning of a word, they speak differently about the presence and the role of the mental in the meaningful use of a word. Both the perspectives, Wittgenstein's rational and Bhartṛhari's intuitive, are verifiable. Similarly, Wittgenstein's perspective with its open-endedness gives full scope to creativity and in Bhartṛhari's perspective, creativity is within a pattern or framework and is meaningful.

Rupees One Hundred fifty

Word and Sentence : Two Perspectives

Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein

The sculpture reproduced on the end paper depicts a scene where three soothsayers are interpreting to King Suddhodana the dream of Queen Maya, mother of Lord Buddha. Below them is seated a scribe recording the interpretation. This is perhaps the earliest available pictorial record of the art of writing in India.

From Nagarjunakonda, Second Century A.D.
Courtesy : National Museum, New Delhi.

Word and Sentence : Two Perspectives

Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein

Edited by

Sibajiban Bhattacharyya

Sahitya Akademi

Word and Sentence : Two Perspectives : Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein : Seminar papers, edited by Sibajiban Bhattacharya, Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi (2004), Rs. 150.

SAHITYA AKADEMI
Rabindra Bhavan, 35, Ferozeshah Road, New Delhi 110 001

Sales : 'Swati', Mandir Marg,
New Delhi 110 001

Regional Offices :
Jeewan Tara Building, 4th Floor, 23A/44X,
Diamond Harbour Road, Kolkata 700 053

Central College Campus, University Library Building,
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Veedhi, Bangalore 560 001

172, Mumbai Marathi Grantha Sangrahalaya Marg,
Dadar, Mumbai 400 014

Chennai Office :
Main Building, Guna Buildings (Second Floor),
443 (304), Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai 600 018

© Sahitya Akademi
First Edition, 2002
Reprint, 2004

ISBN 81-260-1414-8

Rupees One Hundred Fifty

Website : http://www.sahitya-akademi.org

Printed at Nagri Printers, Naveen Shahdara, Delhi-32

Preface

These proceedings of a seminar on Word and Sentence : Two Perspectives : Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein, held in Rabindra Bhavan in New Delhi from December 12 to 14, 1994, include all papers presented in the seminar, held under the joint sponsorship of the Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi and Indian Institute of Advanced studies, Shimla. Professer K.J. Shah planned and organized the seminar, but his sudden death prevented us from obtaining his help and guidance in the conduct of the seminar. In the seminar some speakers and all commentators on the papers made only oral presentations which were unfortunately not recorded. So these oral presentations could not be included in this volume. We are fortunate that Professor K.J. Shah circulated, before his death, a long letter stating his ideas on the subject of the seminar. We have included it in this volume.

These papers written by scholars of repute will hopefully interest all readers and researchers of the subject.

We dedicate this volume to the loving memory of Professor K.J. Shah.

—S. Bhattacharyya

Kolkata

Contents

Preface 5

Word and sentence : Two prespectives : Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein
—K.G. Shah 9

Welcome Speech
—Indra Nath Choudhuri 18

Key-note Address
—Vidya Niwas Misra 21

Understanding Bhartṛhari : A Modern Perspective
—Hiranmoy Banerjee 27

Word and Sentence : Wittgenstein, Bhartṛhari and Jagadiśa
—S. Bhattacharyya 34

The 'glory' and impenetrability of the Peacock-egg : Eternalism versus Conventionalism about the Word-Meaning Relationship
—Arindam Chakravarty 45

Wittgenstein on Language : Some Remarks
—D.P. Chattopadhyaya 55

The Sentence as Freedom
—Probal Dasgupta 63

Word and Meaning : Identical ?
—V.N. Jha 67

What has Bhartṛhari got to say on Language?
—Ashok R. Kelkar 78

Speech as an Ongoing Activity Comparing Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein
—Lachman M. Khubchandani 104

Alternative Conceptions of Sentence and Conflicting Perspectives of Language
—P.K. Mukhopadhyay 123

Meaning Holism in Wittgenstein and Bhartṛhari : A Study in Two Semantic Perspectives
—R.C. Pradhan 134

Sphoṭa Theory Vis-a-Vis Picture Theory
—M. Sreemannarayana Murti 162

Word and Sentence : Two Perspectives : Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein

K.J. Shah

The seminar proposes to discuss of the issues considered in the first and second *Kāṇḍas* of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*. The issues for discussion are articulated keeping in mind the philosophy of language in recent time, especially the work of Wittgenstein. This is a difficult exercise *considering the difference in time, language, approach and the perspective.* For instance, 'word' as used in the two perspectives has at least two different shades of meaning, if not two different meanings. And these different meanings (may) become clear in the context of the discussion of the two perspectives, and not by any formulation before-hand, however careful. This has to be continuously borne in mind, in order to understand the two perspectives and their possibilities and limitations.

This exercise is not undertaken to establish the truth of one or the other perspectives; though someone might be persuaded one way or the other. However, it is hoped that putting the two perspectives in dialogue would enable one to see the limitations and possibilities of each of them. This would pave the way to a meaningful use of the text, the perspective in our teaching and research.

In the following I shall present the perspective of Bhartṛhari in some detail and attempt to make his thought intelligible. I shall not present Wittgenstein's thought in any detail, assuming that Wittgenstein's thought is generally well-known in its broad outline. This is not to say that what is said here is the true or the only understanding of either of the perspectives, but that it presents at least one plausible understanding of each of them.

1. Let me begin with Bhartṛhari's understanding of the meaning of a word, as I would like to put it, the necessary conditions, of the meaningfulness of a word. (In Bhartṛhari, *śabda* can mean a word, or a sentence, or the language as a whole). According to Bhartṛhari the necessary conditions of the meaningfulness of a word are (See I. 44 ff). It is necessary to have the word in the intellect in the *paśyanti* form of language. (There is a controversy wheher Bhartṛhari accepted *parā* or not. But we need go into that controversy now).
2. It is necessary to have the spoken word or the word in the *vaikhari* form.
3. It is necessary to have the word in the *madhyamā* stage which mediates between the word in the intellect and the spoken word. (The ability is *pratibhā* which differs from individual to individual)
4. The object referred to by the spoken word is connected with an action. The examples are 'bring the cow', 'eat the curds' etc.

Some Comments

What is important here is that in this process there is *sphoṭa* (manifestation—articulation of which is in the intellect). But whether the *sphoṭa* is in the intellect, or at the oral level (See I. 75, I. 102), one could say either. Let us say that *sphoṭa* is in the intellect. This is without sequence and indivisible. But at the *vaikhari* level there is *apparently* sequence, and there is more than one word.

The most important thesis of Bhartṛhari is about the relationship between the sentence and the apparently many words that make up the sentence :

The meaning of a word is not arrived at by putting together the meanings of each word that constitutes it (denial of *abhihitānvayavāda)*; nor does the sentence as a whole have meaning which can be explained by the real meanings of words, (denial of *anvitābhidāhnavāda)*. On the other hand, the meaning of sentence is

indivisible, but may be explained by meanings of the ureal words (parts) that constitute it.

All these three views may be expressed in the one Sanskrit formula :

I. पद प्रकृति संहिता (padaprakrtī samhitā), interpreted in two ways as a *tatpuruṣa* compounds, and two, as a *bhuvrīhī* compound. As a *bhuvrīhī* compound, it means that of which word is the essence.' It is the words that directly or indirectly make up the sentence. The first two views, the *abhihitānyavāda* and the *anvitābhihanavāda,* fall into this category. As a *tatpuruṣa* compound, it means 'the word the essence of which is *samhitā* - the sentence, language as whole' (or the Veda). This is the *sphoṭavāda.*

(For Wittgenstein also, the meaningful unit is not a word (unless a single word is a sentence) but a sentence. But what are his reasons for saying so; and what according to him is the relation between the word and sentence?)

II. There is also an agreement between Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein, that the meaning of the word even when it refers to a mental object has a public component. (However there are important differences between Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein in reasons for this component).

(See *Vākyapadīyam* I. 126 and 127)

I. 126 : For all beings, word is the sign for external and internal objects. For all beings consciousness cannot go beyond the power of words. (But what happens in dreams?)

See I. 127 : In the world of distinctions during wakefulness, the agent engages in activity with the help of language; when the distinctions are not perceived (as in a dream) language itself is the object in action.

III. The role of the mental : Though Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein say that there is a public component in the meaning of a word, they speak differently about the presence and the role of the mental in the meaninful use of a word.

For Bhartṛhari, the word in the intellect the *sphoṭa,* intuition, is necessary for the meaninful use of a word. (The word in the intellect is part of the unity of language in the intellect).

(1) The spoken word which is used with reference to the object connected with an action has a mental component, which is different in the case of different individuals, and different in the same individual at different times. However, these individual differences are connected with the same in the intellect, and this is what beings about communication. (See II. 116 : Even though meaning of a sentence is without differentiation, divisions are brought about by the difference in the background of their authors. On this subject there have been many views among ancient thinkers.) (Bhartṛhari mentions twelve different kinds of views, II. 114-137).

(2) *Wittgenstein* : However, as we said above, Wittgenstein speaks differently in this matter. He does not deny the presence of the mental, but he denies to it any significant role in the meaningful use of a word. Then how does Wittgenstein provide for the relationship between the use of the same word by different individuals or by the some individual at different times?

(i) What is the non-significant role that Wittgenstein gives to the mental? (a) For Wittgenstein the flash of intuition cannot be understanding of the word which makes the use of the word meaningful, because before it is used it needs to be projected from the mind to the external word. But there is not only one manifestation — projection – which is necessarily connected by a rule to the intuition – there could be more than one possible projection which may be connected by some rule or other to the intuition. So the projection is the understanding - not the intuition. The intuition is at best the expression of confidence that one could do it.

And as far as the background of the user (see II 116 above) is concerned, it is not necessary - or it could by anything. It does not play the role of connecting the word in the intellect and the word in use.

(ii) But then how does Wittgenstein relate the different uses?

(a) Family resemblance.

(b) The relationship of the different uses to a language game, that means, to a structure of rules.

And thus it might be claimed the need for an entity like mind is not necessary, or is not significant.

(3) However, questions can be raised whether Wittgenstein has succeeded in achieving this. Even if one thinks that the complete open-endedness of family resemblance is contained by the concept of the language game, the question remains about the ground of the language game. And in so far as Wittgenstein says that it is : "this is what we human beings are"—intuition, a mental factor, is brought back into the picture.

Suppose one says that as between the language game and the intuition, language game is primary and intuition secondary, (I think this is unclear and said for the *sake* of saying) it will still leave the problem of the relationship between different language games. When different language games conflict, say, the language game of ethics and that of aesthetics, the decision is a subjective one - and so ultimately reason breaks down.

But does not Bhartṛhari just accept the unity of language? Is it an assumption, or an insight or an understanding? Before considering this question, we shall mention two other problems arising from the twofold meaning of words. (I. 44)

IV. (1) *Universals and particulars :*

As we have seen, Bhartṛhari speaks of the two meanings of the word, the word in the intellect and the word which is used in relation to an object connected with an action. (It is indeed very important to note that the 'outside' reality with which word is connected is not object, not state of affairs but action). Thus the word in the intellect gives unity to the variety of uses of the word. The account of the

relation between the universal and the particular is stated in II. 122 -124.

I. 122. The word expressive of the universal, does not express the varieties of the particular which is necessarily understood when the word expressess the universal (primarily).

I. 123. An expressive word (like *ghaṭa* - a jar) does not denote the shapes and forms of a jar as it rests only on the general idea (that is common to all the jars). One, however, inevitably understands them.

I. 124. An action expressed by a word is never seen except with (the means necessary for) its accomplishment. The understanding of the means (*prayoga*) comes subsequently. The same is true of the meaning of words.

Comments : Here the word, which is in the intellect of both the speaker and the listener gives unity; the instances can be very dissimilar indeed : "As action expressed by a word is never seen except with the means necessary for its accomplishment." But 'action' can be a series of actions, accomplishments in the case of such words as love, hate, heroism, democracy, secularism, etc. A point always to remember (and it gives scope for creativity).

IV. (2) *Grammar and Philosophy :*

The second problem is suggested by the consideration of the question : "is the word used in speech universal or is it particular?" Some say it is universal, then it is universal embodied in a particular instance; some say it is particular, then it refers to a particular which is an instance of a universal. Either of these two accounts will be all right.

See I. 67 - 74 (Explanation without translation). The accounts of the word in the intellect and the spoken raises a number of issues.

What does the word in use express, the form of the word or the particular word? ..... It is suggested that there are grounds for either of the two alternative answers. The practice of the grammarians has been based on these different views. What the main view is to some, is to others the reverse.

This raises the problem : What is the relationship between ammar and philosophy? Does grammar point to philosophical tegories or philosophical understanding is expressed by grammar t necessarily in a particular way; giving rise to differences in ammatical understanding.

Intuition and Reason : Now we get back to the problems we left the end of III. (1) What is the ground for speaking of the word in e intellect? (See II. 440, 441. The reference is to be quoted from e commentry on this text).

The understanding is that the words in the intellect form a unity. t this does not have power without external manifestion in a rational m. But if so, why is this unity required? Without this unity; the sons could be many and changing, and they will lack direction.

This is the foundation of both intuition and reason : intuition thout reason lacks power and reason without intuition lacks ection. (Give reference from the first *kāṇḍa*)

But what is the basis of this unity? Is the answer :

This is what we human beings are? No. For the basis of unity e I. 132 - 135.

I. 132. No *āgama* can be said to be without an author. Whenever the *āgamas* are destroyed, it is said the Vedas continue as seed.

I. 133. But when no *agamas* are there, how will the seed be ailable? It is available because people do not deviate from the nduct laid down by *śruti* and *smṛti*.

I. 134. If *dharma,* the conduct of the *śiṣṭa* or the serious sciplined) man is the reason for knowledge, *śruti* is what gives owledge. (If *dharma* is the cause of knowledge, *śruti* is the cause *dharma.*)

I 135. Thus reasoning which does not go against the *vedas,* is authority for those who are not seers.

I 136. This is so because by logic or argument there are many ys of interpretation.

Thus the basis of unity is *dharma :* the discipline in relation to the others in the pursuit of wealth, power and pleasure, and in relation to oneself in the pursuit of one's inclination and desires.

But what is *dharma? Śruti, smṛti, sadācāra* and *ātmatuṣṭi* are the sources of *dharma* and also the characterstics of *dharma.* (See *Manusmṛti*)

In the unwritten tradition, the unity is seen by the sages, it is the *śruti :* the written tradition is concerned with *smṛti, sadācāra* and *ātmatuṣṭi* - and is the field where duality is in search of unity (See III. 138, 139).

II. 138, The cognitions and words of people who have not seen the truth, being full of mistakes and deceptions are unreliable.

II. 139, Nor can the vision of the sages, based on truth be brought into human transactions, for it is not the basis of the use of words.

(Only when someone progresses toward unity, he is free from mistakes and deception, and his actions approximate to the vision of the sages.)

Thus, what is possible is not certain knowledge of reality (which is really unreal and conditioned), but a certain, near certain attainment of the goal, and that is self-knowledge (in *anubhava, vicāra* and *acāra).*

VI. *The Two Perspectives :*

1. It might be said that the modern - the Wittgensteinian perspective is rational, whereas Bhartṛhari's is intuitive. But as against this it might be said, that the rational perspective breaks down at two points (a) a language game is its own justification : "that is what we human beings are," (b) A conflict between two language games cannot be resolved rationally. And Bhartṛhari's perspective is not without the support of reason. If the intuition is not to be powerless it has to have a possible rational manifestation; and efforts at approaching it. And it has a justification for resolving a conflict between two language games.

2. One might say that Wittgenstein's account is verifiable, whereas Bhartṛhari's is not. With relevant considerations helped by our first point in this section, we can see that this is not so.

3. One might say that the modern Wittgensteinian perspective with its open endedness gives full scope to creativity. Whereas Bhartṛhari's perspective does not. In Bhartṛhari's perspective, creativity is within a pattern or framework and meaningful. And it is constructive. And we do not know where the creativity of the modern perspective will lead us.

4. It might be said that Wittgensteinian perspective is secular, whereas Bhartṛhari's is religious : consider the dominant position of Brahman. But here Brahman is the principle of unity which is the starting point as also the goal. And it dose not lay down the specific rules, it embodies a method of understanding any language.

Conclusion : I think the issues articulated above are some of the important theoretical issues in intellectual debate today. The discussion of these issues will give a place to Bhartṛhari in modern studies and research. And I believe, it will give us a greater understanding of our own thought and also the modern thought.

❐

Welcome Speech

Indra Nath Choudhuri

This closed seminar on Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein jointly organised by the Sahitya Akademi and the Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Shimla, is dedicated to the memory of late Prof. K.J. Shah who was the true spirit behind it. He approached the President of the Akademi for this seminar in collaboration with the Indian Institute of Advanced Studies and drew an elaborate plan for a meaningful dialogue among the scholars on Word and Sentence with reference to Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein. Prof. Shah took pains in preparing a lengthy note on Word and Sentence : Two Perspectives : Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein. He concluded that the Wittgenstein's perspective is rational, whereas Bhartṛhari's is intuitive. There is no doubt that Bhartṛhari's notion of 12th is a divine act not a matter of social convention. Bhartṛhari is a spiritual essentialist. On the contrary the Bauddha Madhyamikas accept it as a matter of convention, a social constract. For Wittginstein also language is a matter of convention. He is a conventionalist.

But what is interesting that Prof. K.J. Shah in its note says that the rational perspective breaks down at two points (a) a language game is its own justification : that is what we human beings are, (b) A conflict between two language games cannot be resolved rationally.

Then Prof. Shah says that Bhartṛhari's perspective is not without the support of reason. If the intuition is not to be powerless it has to have a possible rational manifestation. Both the perspectives, Wittgenstein's rational and Bhartṛhari's intuitive are verifiable. Similarly Wittgensteinians's perspective with its open endness gives full scope to creativity and in Bhartṛhari's perspective creativity is within a pattern or framework and meaningful.

For Prof. Shah Bhartṛhari's perspective is like Wittgenstein

secular though some call it religious because of the term Brahman. Brahman is not a religious construct. But here Brahman is the principle of unity which is the starting point as also the goal. And it does not lay down the specific rules, it embodies a method of understanding any language. However this kind of an effort in finding out elements of commanality can be seriously questioned particularly when the main conceptal aparatus of Wittgenstein and that of Bhartṛthari are so widely different or mutually exclusive. But then Prof. Shah says that what he says is not to say that what is said here is the true or the only understading of either of the perspectives, but that it presents at least one plausible understanding of each of them.

Prof. Mrinal Miri, Director, Indian Institute of Advanced Study informed me after the death of Prof. Shah that until almost the last moment of his life, Prof. Shah was thinking about the theme of the seminar and of its minutest organisational details. Prof. Shah's concern about the state of philosophy in India and how best to breathe new life into it, had a quality of authenticity and freshness about it, which we are sure will make an impact on future philosophical thinking in the country.

The Akademi and the Indian Institute of Advanced Study thought that the best way of paying a tribute to Prof. Shah's contribution to Indian thought would be to go ahead with our Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein seminar as planned.

I welcome Professor Anantha Murthy, President of the Akademi who is presiding over the inaugural session. We are requesting him to inaugurate the seminar also. This being the first public meeting which he is presiding over after his receiving the Jnanpith Award. I take this opportunity to publically congratulate him. I also welcome Professor Vidya Niwas Misra and Professor D.P. Chattopadhyay who are presenting Key-note addresses focussing on Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein respectively. Both Professor Misra and Professor Chattopadhyay are scholars of repute and I am sure they will set the pace for a fruitful discussion on the theme of the seminar.

I also welcome the learned paper readers which include Professor Kapil Kapoor, Professor Kamlesh Datta Tripathi, Professor R.C. Pradhan, Professor Arindam Chakravarti, Professor Sibajiban Bhattacharya, Professor Hiranmoy Banerjee, Professor Lachman Khubchandani, Professor Ashok Kelkar, Professor P.K. Mukhopadhyay, Professor Raghunathacharya, Professor Sreemannarayan Murti and Professor Prabol Dasgupta. Professor P.K. Sen and Prof. Daya Krishna are presiding over different sessions. I also welcome them and also the participants who have come from different parts of the country to participate in the seminar which will discuss some of the important theoretical issues in intellectual debate today. The discussion of these issues will give a place to Bhartṛhari in modern studies and research. And I believe, it will give us a greater understanding of our own thought and also the modern thought.

❐

Key-note Address

Vidya Niwas Misra

Bhartṛhari holds a unique position in the history of both, theory of grammar (or better theory of language) and general āgamic philosophy. He has written a commentary on *Mahābhāṣya* of Patanjali of which a portion only is extant. He is also ascribed as a writer of three *satakas,* though there is divergence of views of his being the author of all these works. Howsoever, Bhartṛhari is a renowned name mentioned with reverence by his successors in the philosophical as well as the grammatical traditions.

Amongst the philosophers who have mentioned his name the prominent ones are Bhavya and Kamalaśīla, Buddhist, Abhinavagupta, Somānandanātha, Utpaladeva, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Sankarācārya, Kumārila Bhatta, Vācaspati Miśra, Pārthasārathi Miśra and Śāntarakṣita. As regards the grammatical tradition, he has been quoted and discussed by almost all his successors. As Bhartṛhari precedes Jayāditya and Vāmana the co-authors of Kāśika (650 A.D.), Dianāga (480 A.D.) and Harisvāmin (528 A.D.) he can be ascribed an approximate date in the fifth century A.D. He wrote himself a gloss on the first section of V.P. (*Vākyapadīya*). The other two sections were commented upon by Helarāja and Puṇyarāja. Some portion of the second section was commented upon by Bhartṛhari himself. The third section is incomplete or a part of it at least is lost to us, as attested by Puṇyaraja. Bhartṛhari was initiated into the tradition by *Vasarata,* as attested by the commentary of Puṇyarāja on the second section.

Bhartṛhari calls his work Vākyapadiya a compendium of *āgama* (*āgama saṅgraha*) received from his Guru and in the first section he lays down the foundation of a universal theory of not only language but also all human behaviour.

So much so by way of introduction on basic information, the present seminar addresses itself to a comparison between two parallel trends, the Indian grammatical perception of language of which Bhartṛhari is a central figure and the positivist school of which Wittgenstein is a leading exponent. What is common between them is apparently the diction, language is the limit of my universe which had been worded by Bhartṛhari. All cognition is illumined only when pierced by *Word* (*śabda*). But the commonality stops here. The starting point in Bhartṛhari is not articulate speech, but the underlying will to re-create or to re-shape a total psycho-socio-physical reality into a supramental reality tacitly accepted by a people. For Wittgenstein (so far as I think) the spoken word or the written word with all its nuances determined by its usage is the beginning and the end. But I shall not go into comparison or contrast. I would confine myself to a brief exposition of Bhartṛhari's theory of human behaviour as it is applicable to language-behaviour.

1. All human behaviour is inherited from five paths and from the surroundings (*lokebhya āgamaḥ*).

2. All human behaviour howsoever divergent (or) deviant it may be, looks for acceptance (*manddhe*) by others and therefore howsoever arbitrary it may be it is governed by a norm (*vyavārtha*).

3. Human behaviour tends to transcend its time and space and that which does not fall out or is completely rescinded, becomes in course of time a continuing way of life.

4. Logicality of such accepted and continuant human behaviour is not questioned.

The preceding human experience is an important factor in the shaping of human behaviour. Even Seers or Visionaries of the past could not visualise truth without the aid of the preceding experience transmitted from generation to generation (*ṛiṣhīṇāmapi yad jñāñaṁ, tadapyā gamapūrvakam*).

Language is the most important human behaviour, as it finds all human behaviours and makes it possible that interconnectedness

between all behaviours is realized. Bhartṛhari has profounded that *śabda* (language) has been considered to be the cause even of *pratibhā* (intuitive knowledge) through a continuous practice and language makes even a child (and in a crude form language makes even a non-human being) capable of getting at the essence of what is real.

Abhyāsāt pratibhāhetuḥ śabdaḥ sarvoparaiḥ smṛitaḥ

bālānām ca tiraścām ca yathārthapratipādane.

V.P. II. 117

Language in common parlance has to be visualized in its meaning, while language in a given codified text (śāstra) is visualised as both, word and meaning depending on whatever is the intention of the codifier. (V.P. II. 130)

Meaning in language is dependent on usage and on speaker-listener relationship and the capacity of each one of them to express and to comprehend what is going to be expressed and what has been expressed. (V.P. II. 135)

vāktrānyathaiva prakrānto bhinneṣu pratipattṛṣu

svapratyayānukāreṇa śabdārthaḥ pravibhajyate.

Language is one integrated whole and is an extension of vākya (li : that what is to be uttered) and its components have no separate identity. They derive their identity from the whole utterance.

vākyāt padānāmatyantaṁ praviveko na udyate (V.P. I. 73)

Sentence according to Bhartṛhari is a whole uttereance composed of nutually dependent units denoting action attribution on qualification all leading to one whole meaning (V.P. II. 4)

Bhartṛhari has a holistic approach to language in consonance with the holistic world-view projected by his tradition. Therefore, he gives an analogue of light, which is one but appears to be different when it illuminates different perceptible forms as well as of a painting which is one composition, though brought out by apparently different shades. On the same analogy there is one whole sentence and one

whole meaning. This cannot be divided into self-dependent entities. The divisions wherever made are for the purpose of showing the process of interlinking. Their congnition as units is not in absolute terms, they are just for the sake of convenience of the comprehender. Bhartṛhari has clearly enunciated that in a traditional system, grammar is integration through dismemberment. It could be recalled here that every creative act is like that on the analogy of the first sacrifice where the universal being was cut into pieces (mentally) and a sacrifice was performed to recomprehend the interconnected totality of the universal being. So such grammar is a means to comprehend the total reality of things which is of the nature of the purest light, as it explains the unity reflected in fusion of unreal items into one sentence, which has one meaning (the items may have been for the purpose of description ascribed separate meanings) and in coalescence of sounds of seemingly different words through the process of *sandhi*. *Vyākaṃa* is not only analysis, it is finally synthesis as devoted by *vi* and *a* prefixes. This science is the pathway to that ultimate *rasa* (essence or flavour) of *vāk* which has entered into the phase of word-meaning differentiation. Bhartṛhari further expounds that all shades of meanings are dependent on structuring of the Word, so is the case with all branches of knowledge, in this world (*loka*) which can be fully comprehended only through *vyākaraṇa*. *Vyākaraṇa* alone shows the way to processes of cognition of things and of transmission of that cognition to others.

Vyākaraṇa therefore is a process of intellection. It assumes that out of innumerable variations in articulation as well as reception and comprehension, one universally accepted abstraction is there. This is *sphoṭa* (that which explodes). *Sphoṭa* is beyond time, or rather is not sequanced in time, though it explodes as an expression or a comprehension in time — succession. Words along with their sounds come in succession and meaning is also comprehended in successive phases. *Sphoṭa* then transforms itself into multiplicity, though it is one (VP. I. 75) *Vyākaraṇa* is rightly called by *smṛti* (recollection) of *śiṣṭas*. *Siṣṭa* is one who is in this world and yet who has the capacity

of distancing himself from the world in order to view this world in its entirety. The *śiṣṭa* is not an elite, he is the residue of things, what remains unexplained, untainted by personal desires and hatreds is *śiṣṭa*. The science of language is carried in the memory of these *śiṣṭas*, who are the best observers of all behaviour (*loka vyavahāra*). This *smṛti* is distinct from *śruti* where there is neither a recollector nor a creator. *Śrutī* is like a dream where *word* stands as *word* while *smṛti* rests on cognitive indicators. One is reminded of a thing, when one sees something alien to that or something as linked to that thing. And *smṛti* is not a fixed thing, it gets renewed with new experience and with new modalities. A child learns language in a way which is not acceptable to the *śiṣṭa* and even then he or she communicates his/her purpose. Similarly even a subnorm (*apabhraṁśa*) can convey a meaning and gradually that subnorm gains currency and is no more unexpressive (V.P. I. 151-153).

Whatever, I have said so far clearly shows Bhartṛhari's keen insight in the phenomenon of Man and subsequently in the phenomenon of language, a unique human behaviour. He does not forsake the metaphysical aspect of language, as language is just one of the phases of the Supreme Reality just a tip of the iceberg and yet is the most reliable perception of that Reality.

I shall not dwell upon the detailed contents of the second and the third sections of his book, but before I conclude, I would briefly give my overview of these sections.

1. The second section deals with synthesis of meaningful and empty words and of connotative and denotative components and with the contextual tools of comprehending the meaning out of several possibilities. (II. 315 - 316)

2. The second section has its importance for enunciation of basic principles of linguistic analysis such as—

(a) When one has to teach a child one has to take recourse to such means which are themselves to be instructed by the successive steps, but one reaches truth by treading the

course of untruth. (II. 238).

(b) When some sentence is utterned in a sequence of another sentence, the action part of the preceding sequence is implicit in the following one.

(c) There is a limit to logical interpretation one has to take recourse to the tradition brought out through Purāṇas, Āgamas and elders, otherwise the knowing process gets muddled. (II. 487)

The third section is important for its elucidation of the Pāṇinian system, particularly that of the significance of grammatical categories.

Bhartṛhari has given a cogent formulation of the categories and provided a sound basis for universal grammar though his examples are from his own language, Sanskrit and from illustrative usages of Pāṇini's *sūtras*.

His treatment of Temporality, number, Spatiality, action, person, qualification and Relationship is remarkable in as much it is inclusive of both everyday perception and intuitive philosophical insight. Such a broadbased treatment is a model of linguistic clarity and perfection.

Language is one of the greatest sufferers in an age of rapid advancement of technology and nuances of language are on the way to extinction. It has caused a desolate situation where dialogue has become lifeless and therefore irrelevant. Consequently this situation is leading on one hand to utter loneliness and on the other to a painful but creative urge to rejuvenate the live element in human face to face communication. It is at this juncture in our history that Bhartṛhari needs to be explored and his ideas taken to heart.

❐

Understanding Bhartṛhari : A Modern Perspective

Hiranmoy Banerjee

It is now common knowledge that a person is born into a culture and all his thoughts and actions articulate themselves in terms of categories and concepts distinctive of that culture. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a person not sharing that culture to read those thoughts and action accurately. To concede this point is not necessarily to espouse relativism. Even if we find incoherent the very idea of a conceptual scheme and defend the ultimate inter-translatability of languages and thought-structures and intelligibility of all rational human actions, the practical difficulties of translation and interpretation of languages and cultures distantly located in space and time make the theoretical victory almost pyrhic. To conserve their energy the wise and the practical are extremely wary of venturing into alien cultural territory.

Bhartṛhari lived and wrote more that 1500 years ago. He was an heir to a metaphysical tradition which would appear strange even to a follower of Advaita Vedanta, most akin to it, not to speak of other Indians like most of us who are rooted either in other indigeous traditions like Vaishnavism, Mīmāṁsa or Nyāya, or being partly uprooted here, struggling to strike roots in imported soil. The caste Hindus, taught a smattering of Sanskrit at school, may not be too bemused by the word 'Śabdabrahman' or 'Nādattroam'. Gaurinath Sastri[1] translates it as 'Eternal Verbum' or 'Supreme Word' and the same Indians, educated at a missionary school, may have read St. John, the scholarly apostle speaking of Logos being there at the beginning or even Russell ridiculing the linguistic philosophers for being un-witting followers of the saint. Professor Sastri informs us that the Enternal Verbum is identical in essence with *Kālaśakti* or

Time-force which may be translated as 'Zeitgeist'[2]. The difficulties of translating and understanding are painfully obvious.

Sastri is fully aware of the danger of understanding ideas of one culture in terms of the ideas of another. While suggesting 'logos' as the equivalent of *sphoṭa* he warns us not to confound it with the *logos* of Neo-platonic or medieval schools of European philosophy. In his theme paper Professor K.J. Shah interprets *Sphoṭa* as something the manifestation or articulation of which is in the intellect. In the intellect? *Sphoṭa* is to be found in the *paśyanti* form of language[3]. Professor Shah does not assert directly that *Paśyanti* is the intellectual form, but seems to imply it. Those of us who do not find any parallel in Indian philosophy of the titanic struggle between rationalism and empiricism in the west may be intrigued by this suggestion, but hardly convinced by it. What is not cognised by the senses, but cognised nevertheless need not be cognised by the intellect. After Kant great deal of argumentation is needed to defend the rationalist position that the intellectual content is the more developed or subtller form of the sense-content.

Many commentators both traditional and modern have understood *Sphoṭa* as an internal entity (*āntara).* Punyaraja has said in his commentry on Bhartṛhari's *Vakyapadiya* that *Sphoṭa* is indivisable and partless, consciousness in essence (*bodhasvabhava*) and partakes of the nature of both word and its import (*Śabdārthamayam*)[4].

Sphoṭa is internal because our understanding which is mental must be internal. The ephemeral, sequential meaningless noises made by man are called *dhvani* and these external entities generate an internal entity *sphoṭa* or understanding (*Śābdabodha*). *Dhavani,* a kind of *Śabda* is a *Karaṇa* or nimitta of *Sphoṭa,* another kind of *Śabda* and *Sphoṭa* again is the *karaṇa* of the apprehension of *artha*[5].

Bhartṛhari says that *Sphoṭa* is to be understood both as *bāhya* and *ābhayantara,* external and internal. Again in understanding *Sphoṭa* as an external entity we have to understand it in the form of a universal

(*Jāti*) and also in the form of an individual (*Vyakti*).

In Professor K.J. Shah's interpretation Bhartṛhari introduces the idea of *Sphoṭa* to explain the common content of communication in spite of individual differences and varying mental associations. For Shah *Sphoṭa* involves intuition and he interprets Bhartṛhari as holding that intuition is necessary for the meaningful use of a word.

As is well-known, for Wittgenstein understanding a word or sentence does not consist in flashes of intuition. In Shah's language the flash of intuition must be projected from the mind to the external world. Putting Wittgenstein in a nutshell is a daunting task, but Shah, having heard him explain himself, bravely attempts it : "There could be more than one possible manifestation or projection which may be connected by some rule or other to the intuition. So the projection is the understanding not the intuition.[6]

From Shah's gloss, let us turn to Wittgenstein's text. "Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in music than one may think. What I mean is that understanding lies nearer than one thinks to what is ordinarily called understanding a musical theme. Why is just *this* the pattern of variation in loudness and tempo? One would like to say, "Because I know what it is all about". But what it is all about? I should not be able to say. In order to `explain' I could only compare it with something else what has the same rhythm (I mean the same pattern). (One says "Don't you see, this is as if a conclusion were being drawn" or "This is as it were a parenthesis", etc. How does one justify such comparisons? There are very different kinds of justification here)" (Section 527).

Or Again : "We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other. (any more than one musical theme can be replaced by another.)

"In the one case the thought in the sentence is something common to different sentences; in the other something is expressed only by these words in these positions. (Understanding a poem) Sector 531.)

"Then has understanding two different meanings here? I would rather say that these kinds of use of 'understanding' make up its meaning, make up my *concept* of understanding.

"For I want to apply the word 'understanding' to all this. (Section 532).

"But in the second case how can one explain the expression, transmit one's comprehension? Ask yourself. How does one lead anyone to comprehension of a poem or a theme? The answer to this tells us how meaning is explained here". (Section 533)[8].

When Wittgenstein tries to explain meaning in terms of a language–game Professor Shah raises questions about the ground of a language–game. When Wittgenstein justifies a language-game by saying "this is what we human beings are" Shah accuses him of falling back on intuition or a mental factor. From a Wittgenstein point of view it is also difficult to resolve conflict between languages - games. Michael Dummett once said that something does not cease to be a game merely because we call it a language-game.

Why did Wittgenstein tag the word `game' to the word `language'? His own justification is worth quoting again in spite of being oft-quoted : "Here the term "language-*game*" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life". (Section 23)[9].

The vital similarity which Prof. Shah notices between Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein is that for Bhartṛhari the outside reality with which '*Sphoṭa*' or the word in the intellect is connected is not object, nor state of affairs, but action. It is indeed highly intriguing that while citing examples during their discussion of philosophy of language, Indian thinkers prefer imperative sentences to indicative sentences. In the utterances of imperative sentences the speech-acts are much clearer and for Bhartṛhari at least it is easier to show how *āpoddhāra* or abstraction of word-meaning from the unitary cognition of sentence-meaning is made possible. The grammarians assert that every object

is apprehended as shot through its name. When we apprehend the object through a word we apprehend it as uncharacterized and as such undistinguishable. The distinction between objects and the postulation of a relation require that the word-impregnated objects are apprehended as means and end - *Upakārya* and *Upakāraka.* Word-stems establish means and end relationship. Again the unitary cognition generated by a sentence leads one to engage in an activity.

Does the grounding of language in actions lead to irrationalism and a pernicious kind of relativism? Was Wittgenstein a conscious relativist and irrationalist or was he nearly unwittingly paving the way for anarchy by not searching long enough for absolute grounds and justifications? The view that anything goes is certainly false but it does not seem that anybody at present has a correct theory of universality and obectivity and even a list of objective truths long enough to interest us long.

As an absolutist and monist Bhrtṛhari is not troubled by such problems, but he is giving us back all the multiplicity we went through *āpoddhāra, pratyavamanśa* and *anusandhāna.* In his recent book *Indian Philosophy of Language* the American philosopher Siderits says that many western philosophers are repelled by the Indian talk of the oneness of the one that one was once. To change the subject he talks of the theories of the Pūrvamīmāṁsā, Buddhism and Nyāya.

However the achievement of ancient India in empirical linguistics is unparalled. Can we really detach the empirical achievements from their philosophical underpinnings? As Professor Shah says Bhartṛhari tries to discover a method of understanding any language. By talking about *Śabdabrahman,* we do not lay down specific rules of grammar. The philosophical framework of Bhartṛhari leaves us as much freedom as other more empirically oriented frameworks.

Bhartṛhari fails to understand how many diverse real elements can be strung together by a unity-bond. That is why, for him diverse elements are only abstractions. He would have rejected the modern

Fregean doctrine of different kinds of reals which fit into one other to form a unity. Like Donald Davidson he would have said that it names a problem rather than solves it. The early Wittgensteinian talk of objects fitting into one another to constitute facts or states of affairs for sentences to correspond to is empty and for understanding the truth of sentences objects are good enough and facts are not needed over and above them. Correct semantic relations between sentences or speech - episodes and the world are to be discovered to make sense of language. That sentences rather words would function as one term of the basic semantic relation, whatever that may be seems to be acceptable by many. The early insight of Frege, not used by him in his later work, but repeatedly used by Wittgenstein in both his early and later work that words have meaning only in the context of sentences, leads directly to molecularism and not to holism. Quine's moderate meaning-holism is interesting because it is based on the insight that any belief not belonging to the periphery of a system can be made commune to revision. It is the system as a whole which confronts experience. Davidson borrows from Quine the idea that beliefs and meanings are inter-dependent and require fine-tuning. Intertranslatability is possible because beliefs are shared and consequently meanings can be shared.

Grammar is an empirical science and the science generated philosophical problems and Bhartṛhari manfully tackled them within the terms set by his cultural tradition. This tradition is not homogenous and other solutions of his problems were articulated within the same tradition. Modern India both continues and fundamentally modifies that tradition in course of her interaction with other traditions. The only logical structures well-understood and thoroughly explored are truth-functional, extensional structures. We try to understand natural language in terms of those structures. The problems are many and the programme itself may seem misguided. Wittgenstein also may be understood as giving us a programme or plan of work. Progress in philosophy is more slow than in science. Philosophical achievements are more abiding. That is why we shall never cease to learn from

Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein though many of our problems were not dreamt of by them.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning* (Calcutta, Sanskrit College) 1959, p. 1
2. Ibid. p. 3
3. Theme Paper p. 2
4. See Sastri, op. Cit. p. 89.
5. Bishnupada Bhattacharya; *Vākyapadīya (Brahma-kānda) (Bengali Translation Commentary) Calcutta, West Bengal Book Board, 1985, Part I p. 100.*
6. Theme Paper : p. 5.
7. *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford Basil Blackwell) Paperback Edition p. 143.
8. Ibid. p. 143-4.
9. Ibid. p. 11.

❐

Word and Sentence : Wittgenstein, Bhartṛhari and Jagadīśa

S. Bhattacharyya

Wittgenstein has given two different theories of words and sentences, one in the *Tractatus,* the other in the PI.

I. Tractatus

A. Syntax :

1. A word or a name is a primitive sign which cannot be dissected. (3.26). The simple signs employed in propositions are called names. (3. 202). A propositional sign is a fact. (3.14).

2. Although a propositional sign is a fact, this is obscured by the usual form of expression in writing or print.

For in a printed proposition, for example, no essential difference is apparent between a propositional sign and a word (3. 143).

B. Semantics :

1. A name means an object. (3. 203). Objects are simple. (2.02). A proposition is a picture of reality (4.01).

2. It is impossible for words to appear in two different roles : by themselves, and in propositions. (2.0122).

3. Objects contain the possibility of all situations. (2.014).

4. Only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning. (3.3).

5. Objects can only be *named* .... I can only speak *about* them. I cannot *put them into words.* Propositions can only say *how* things are, not *what* they are. (3. 221).

6. The totality of propositions is language. (4. 001).

II. PI

A. Syntax :

There is no grammatical criterion to distinguish between a word and a sentence. "Someone who did not understand our language, a foreigner, who had fairly often heard someone giving the order : Bring me a slab! might believe that this whole series of sounds was one word.....". (9e).

B. Semantics :

As meaning is use, there is no distinction between an 'elliptical' sentence and a complete sentence. In Russian one says 'Stone red' instead of 'the stone is red'; do they feel the copula to be missing in the sense, or attach it in *thought?*' (10e).

C. Comments :

On PI.

1. Although there may not be one rule to distinguish between words and sentences across languages, still there are clear rules to distinguish between words and sentences of each language, say, English or Russian, although the rules of different languages are different. Any one who knows the language, knows this criterion. Wittgenstein's example is only of a person who does not know the language and hence cannot distinguish between a word and a sentence in this language. But this does not mean that there is no grammatical criterion, simply because any one ignorant of the language does not know it.

2. Wittgenstein's practice goes against his theory. In the book he has used expressions which are grammatically regarded as sentences. So the grammatical criterion is not so inadequate and arbitrary as he says it is.

3. On *PI* and the *Tractatus.* In the *PI* Wittgenstein is concerned with what speakers mean, in the *Tractatus* with what words mean. Although the two concerns are fundamentally different, they are not inconsistent with each other.

III. Some Indian themes and theories

A. Ontology of spoken sentences

There is a serious ontological difficulty about spoken words or sentences. One cannot speak a whole sentence or even a word of more than one syllable, one can only utter sounds in succession, when the first syllable or phoneme is uttered the second is not yet uttered. When the second is uttered the first sound has vanished. So it is impossible to speak a whole sentence as one entity. As uttered sounds are necessarily successive, they cannot be regarded as pictures which are wholes of co-existing parts.

The Navya-Nyāya philosophers explain the experience of the common man who perceives a whole sentence. These philosophers make use of a special form of perception due to *jñana-lakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* to explain how past sounds can also be said to be perceived. When one hears the sounds as successively uttered, one remembers them in their order. This memory of the earlier sounds functions as a *sannikarṣa* which together with the hearing of the last syllable or phoneme, produces the perception of the whole sentence. If such a special form of *sannikarṣa* is not admitted, can there be any explanation how a whole sentence can be perceived, through hearing successive momentary sounds? There are different philosophical theories which I explain very briefly.

There are philosophers who distinguish between the act of speaking and a spoken word or sentence. They point out various difficulties in the Navya-Nyāya theory of perception of a whole word or sentence. If the last syllable presented together with impressions of the earlier syllables can cause perception (hearing) of the whole word or sentence, then even if the syllables are uttered with long temporal gaps in between, the perception of the last syllable together with the impressions of the earlier ones ought to cause perception of the whole word or sentence. But no one accepts this as a cause of the perception of the whole expression. The case is not different even if the syllables are uttered inquick succession. Secondly, "If the sounds

are remembered in the same order in which they are uttered, how could they be simultaneously grasped?"[1] Hence grammarians like Bhartṛhari do not accept the theory that speaking is ontologically identical with what is being spoken. A spoken word or a sentence, according to this theory, is a type of reality different from speaking.

The theory that words are ontologically different from noises which can be uttered by a seaker involves difficulties of all sorts. One difficulty is how to explain whether a speaker speaking words and sentences performs two acts — producing sounds and speaking words. Then there is also the difficulty from the hearer's point of view. Does a hearer hear two things — sounds and words? The following three different answers apart from their own difficulties are inadequate chiefly because they fail to explain what the speaker does in speaking.

(a) One answer is that sounds are heard as identical with words. There are no two objects which are heard when one hears words or sentences. But this answer does not explain how noises and words can be ontologically different and yet the hearer can hear them (correctly?) as identical. (b) The second answer is that sounds are imperceptible and only words can be heard. What is necessary and sufficiant to explain the perception of words and sentences is that there be sounds, not that the sounds be perceived. A difficulty of this theory is that a deaf person who cannot hear sounds should be able to hear spoken words, if objectively there are appropriate sounds. (c) Words are manifestors of objects, and so different from mere sounds. When one hears the manifestors one also hears the sounds as fused with the manifestors. That is why a hearer does not clearly hear the words because they are, say, spoken at a distance, one hears only the

1. K. Kunjunni Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, p. 110. The Navya-Nyāya philosophers, however, reply to this objection by pointing out that the memory impressions of the sounds in their spoken order are the causes of the resulting perception of the word as a whole.

sounds. Quine cites many examples of 'listening to a lecturer with an odd accent or unusual diction'. Accents may bewilder, and they can cuase misapprehension without bewilderment.[2] A difficulty of this theory is that it has to postulate two different causal relations — one for perception of words as fused with sounds, and another when they are not so fused. When we hear sounds we cannot hear the words, for perception of sounds prevents perception of words. But then the question is : if noises and words are ontologically different, words can at best be confused with, not fused with sounds. So the problem of reality of words confused with the ephemeral sounds producing correct perception of words remains unsolved. Producing sounds and speaking words are also different actions.[3]

B. An ontological problem concerning meaning

Language is about reality. The problem here is to explain how it is possible. This is a transcendental question distinct from a factual one. Hence it cannot be solved by asserting that language is, as a matter of fact, about reality. In the usual analysis of meaning, this transcendental problem is presupposed as already solved. For example, Charles Morris says :

"The process in which something functions as a sign may be called *semiosis.* This process....has commonly been regarded as involving three (or four) factors : that which acts as a sign, that which the sign refers to, and the effect on some interpreter in virtue of which the thing in question is a sign to that interpreter."

These three components in semiosis may be called, respectively, the *sign vehicles,* the *designatum,* and the *interpretant;* the *interpreter* may be included as a fourth factor.[4] He has already assumed that there are signs, that there is an 'effect on some interpreter in virtue of which the thing in question is a sign to that interpreter.' He explains *this effect* behaviouristically thus. To use one of Mead's frequent

2. Quine, *Quiddities,* pp. 166-167.
3. `Speaking with an eye to speech is one thing, and speaking with an eye to content is another.' ibid, p. 167.)
4. *Foundations of the Theory of Signs,* Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 3

examples, we may consider the situation of a person noticing smoke in a crowded theatre. Smoke is a nongestural sign of fire, and its perception calls out to some degree responses appropriate to fire. But further, the spoken word 'fire' as a response which is connected with a whole set of responses to fire tends to be uttered. Since this is a linguistic sign, the utterer begins to respond towards this tendency toward utterance as other members of his social group would respond — to run toward an exit.[5] But his explanation of how a sound becomes a linguistic sign is not satisfactory. In the course of reacting to smoke as a nongestural sign of fire, one may utter the sound 'fire' which may be considered as just an interjection. The passage from sounds as interjection to sounds as signs remains unexplained. Moreover, conditioned reflex is really a physiological process corresponding to the psychological process of association. The semantical relation between a word and its meaning is not *just* association, but a *special type of* association. The process of replacing a nongestural sign by a verbl sign in response to an object or situation cannot be identified with semantical meaning, because in this process there is no scope for uniformity. It would be a mystery if everyone, or, a person always, uttered the same word 'fire' when reacting to the non-gestural sign smoke, *before learning the word* which is not a semantically unrelated sound. Moreover, a hearer hearing the speaker uttering 'fire' will have no idea why the speaker is doing this. If the hearer has the idea of meaning, he may wonder what the speaker means by the sound 'fire'. Thus this behaviouristic theory of how a word is semantically related to its meaning already presupposes the theory that it is used by 'members of a social group' in very similar situations. But this is exactly what needs to be explained.

That meaning is neither a conditioned reflex or a mere association can be shown by the example of Helen Keller. Helen was deaf and blind from early childhood. The problem was how to teach her language. If meaning were a conditioned reflex or an association, this could have been easily established by repetition.

5 Ibid, p. 37.

Her teacher failed to make her realize that the sign that she made on her palm *meant* the object which she experienced. The teacher almost gave up her attempt to teach Helen language. As a last resort, she thrust Helen's hand under water and made a sign on her palm at the same time. Somehow Helen understood that the sign made on her palm *meant* water. One wonders if the teacher made the sign on a different part of Helen's body and thrust her hand under water, whether Helen would have understood that the sign made, say, on her forehead, meant the water which was flowing through her fingers; she might not have connected the two. It was just fortunate that the teacher made the sign on Helen's palm when thrusting her hand under water. Once the concept of meaning was available to Helen, there was no difficulty in teaching her language. This case shows that meaning cannot be a conditioned reflex or mere association. Meaning is association of an altogether different kind. For example, the word 'light' may be associated with darkness (by contrast), with the sun or a lamp, or even with other words as in `Hail holy light!'. But all these associations do not constitute the meaning relation between the word 'light' and light.

This also explains why by simply observing the behaviour of an adult on the command of a senior person, a child cannot learn the meaning of sentences and eventually of words. For the child may get the idea that the behaviour and the spoken words are casually, not semantically, related. That is why St. Augustine has to say that the semantic relation is 'naturally' known by knowing 'the natural language' of man. The problem is how to know what a person does, (by moving his hands, or by producing sounds), can be regarded as being *about* reality. A person's behaviour is his personal affair, perhaps causally determined by heredity and environment; how can one *ever* get the idea of a semantical relation between the personal actions (including speech behaviour) and reality? A sound emitted by a person may be an interjection, not necessarily a significant word. That a sound uttered by anyone can at all be about an object other than the sound is a mystery.

A theory which emphasises the conventional, rather than the causal-behaviouristic, factor in semantic meaning has also been proposed. But convention, as explicitly stated rules, is possible only when some language (a metalanguage) is available. But rules for the use of sign vehicles are not ordinarily formulated by the users of a language, or are only partially formulated; they exist rather as habits of behaviour'[6]. The problem is to explain how 'habits of behaviour' are possible to begin with. Navya-Nyāya philosophers invoke God's will as semantically relating a word with its meaning. This is almost the same theory as a natural connection between words and objects which is also not man-made. But this seems to be very much like repeating the problem rather than solving it.

The metaphysical theory of semantic relation between words and object emphasizes the point that this relation cannot be explained except on the hypothesis that words as articulated sounds and objects which are altogether different types of reality on the surface, must be one reality at the deepest level of consciousness. Unless language as rooted in consciousness is fused with reality in one amorphous unity, language as articulate speech cannot *refer to, designate* or *mean* reality. Even at the surface level of articulate speech, language cannot be totally divorced from reality. Language as sound, and reality, are very different types of reality — the word 'fire' and fire are indeed very different — still the word 'fire' *can mean* fire, *can be* semantically related with it, only if we suppose that language and reality are one at the deepest level of human existence. Thus the *possibility* of semantic relation can be explained only on the hypothesis of the metaphysical unity of language and reality. This is the theory of the grammarians.

Nyāya philosophers, however, offer a different solution. They point out that God who has created both the words and objects can relate them semantically by his will. It is divine will which is the semantical relation. This also explains why in a particular language

6. Morris, ibid, p. 23.

a particular word means a particular object. The grammarians explain why any word can mean any object, but not why a particular word means a particular object in a particular language. That meaning of words has a conventional aspect is missed by them.

It may be argued that Bhartṛhari has also admitted conventional meaning of words. But this aspect of Bhartṛhari's theory does not seem to be consistent with its other fundamental aspects. According to Bhartṛhari it is the sentence which is real as an indivisible unit; the words are unreal appearances. So both syntax and semantics of words are unreal appearances. So both syntax and semantics of words are unreal. As words are unreal, Bhartṛhari cannot also hold that words are semantically related to objects. Words are useful fictions; but they are fictions. Any fictitious entity cannot be related to objects which are empirically real.

C. Jagadīśa's theory of words occuring in a sentence

According to Jagadīśa, only words which in isolation have meaning can occur in a sentence to produce sentence-meaning. The pont here is that words in isolation cannot produce the cognition of interrelations among word meanings. A sentence may or may not be embedded into a larger sentence, but words have to be supplemented by words in order to produce cognitions of relations among word-meanings. This theory is radically opposed to the theory that a word-meaning already contains a relation although in the sense of a relation in general, not any specific relation. It has been argued that in a sentence, there is nothing except words. If a word cannot mean an object related to other objects by some relation or other, the sentence as a whole cannot mean a related objective structure. This is the theory of Prabhākara. This is not the same as Wittgenstein's theory in the *Tractatus,* that the object contains the *possibility* of all situations.

Jagadīśa recommends a theory that is opposed to the theory in the *Tractatus* that words cannot have two roles. Jagadīśa's point here is the words in isolation mean isolated objects (*padārthas*); but in a sentence words are necessarily related syntactically with other

words. These syntactic relations among words occurring in a sentence produce the cognition of a related meaning. Thus words occurring alone and words occurring in sentences do not occur in the same way, and do not have the same role.

As a matter of fact, Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* has advocated this theory. "Instead of, 'The complex sign 'a R b' says that *a* stands to be in the relation R' we ought to put 'That 'a' stands to 'b' in a certain relation says *that a R b*' (3.1432). Thus in a sentence, words are factually related in a certain way, and this factual relation among words is what means a relation among objects. We have, therefore, to examine whether the two aspects of the theory in the *Tractatus* are consistent. Words occurring alone are not factually related with other words, while words occurring in a sentence are so related. And this difference is important in producing the cognition of a related meaning.

Navya-Nyāya theory has this in common with the theory in the *Tractatus* that relations cannot be meant by any word, noun or verb; whatever is meant by a word becomes a term and cannot function as a relation.

I now explain Jagadīśa's theory of three different categories of words occurring in a sentence. Jagadīśa calls words occurring in a sentence producing a cognition of a connected whole 'significant words' (*sārthaka śabda*). When a sentence is heard, it produces a cognition of the words related as qualificand-qualifier. According to the theory in the *Tractatus,* a word followed by another word is a fact. In Indian philosophy in general, and Navya-Nyāya in particular, there is no conception of fact. What is called a fact in the *Tractatus* is only a complex object. Thus there is no fact of a brown table, but it is a fact that the table is brown. But according to Navya-Nyāya 'a brown table' and 'a table (is) brown' ('is' is usually omitted in Sanskrit as in Russian, as Wittgenstein says), produce the same cognition of a complex object, a brown table. In this cognition, the table is the qualificand, (not the idea or the word), and the brown colour is the qualifier also when words are heard in succession as occurring

in a sentence, the auditory cognition is the cognition of a a qualified object, the first word being the qualifier of the second word which is its qualificand and so on. (i) There are some words which are never cognised as qualificands of other words; only as qualifiers of other words, these words mean their objects. Sanskrit is an inflectional language; words usually have two parts — a radical and a suffix. The radical part as heard is cognized only as a qualifier of the suffix which is the qualificand. So the radical part is the substantive, because it *means its object,* by not being qualified by other words. (ii) The suffixes are words which can mean objects only if they are qualified by their radicals. So they are called 'suffixes' as distinguished form radicals. (iii) A third category of words is the indeclinables. What they mean cannot be related by identity with objects meant by other words occurring in the sentence.

The point is that neither a radical nor a suffix can produce a connected meaning. The significant words are words occurring in a sentence; and the words as heard are related by the qualificand-qualifier relation. Only as thus related, words occurring in a sentence can mean related objective structure. Words occurring alone cannot do so.

❐

The 'glory' and impenetrability of the Peacock - egg : Eternalism versus Conventionalism about the Word-Meaning Relationship

Arindam Chakravarty

"uta tvaḥ paśyanna dadarśa vācamuta tvaḥ śṛṇvanna śṛṇotyenām

uto tvasmai tanvaṁ vi sasre jāyeva patya uśatī suvāsāḥ.

(*Ṛgveda* 10/71/4)

(Some studying speech does not yet know speach, some hearing her still does not really hear her. Only to some speech reveals her true form as the beautiful wife reveals herself to her beloved husband).

....."Further, every name which can be properly said to be such, by nature corresponds to what is named and is the logical image of the object"

— Proclus; Commentary on Plato's *Parmemides*

"But 'glory' does not mean a nice knock down argument", Alice objected.

"When *I* use a word", Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just" what I choose it to mean neither more nor less.

..... Impenetrability—that's what I say

"Would you tell me please", said Alice, "What that means?" "Now you talk like a reasonable child", said Humpty Dumpty looking very much pleased, "I meant by impenetrability" — that we have had enough of that perfect.

—*Alice in Wonderland*

—Lewis Carroll

Words must be somehow intimately related to their meanings. Otherwise, how is that we hear or read a string of words and as a result immediately come to think of, know, or have other attitudes towards the meant entities, situations, tasks etc? Common usage everywhere expresses this relationship as a kind of possession or belonging, the word has the meaning, the meaning is of the word (*asyāyam vācako vācya iti sasthya pratīyate*). But what sort of *having* is this relation? It is surely not a physical proximity, contact, or containment like the room *has* chairs in it, although the metaphor of containment is fairly commonly used. The word 'syllablle', of course, contains syllables but that is quite fortuitious. Even if we go by the most concrete senses of the words 'word' and 'meaning' — i.e. treat a word as an audible noise and the meant object as a tangible body, the word 'ocean' neither contains nor in any fashion touches any marine expanse of water. "The word is in the mouth and the object meant is on the floor—it is traditionally remarked, having words like 'pot' 'chair' 'bed' in mind. (*mukhe śabdamupalabhāmahe bhūmāvarthamiti*)

Is the meaning, then, *inherent* in the word like properties relate to their substances? There is one crude and one subtle way of taking this idea of *inherence (samavāya)* as the operative relation between word and meaning. The crude way is rejected with silly counterexamples like this : the word 'red' means the colour red. But redness is not an inherent property of the word because sounds do not have any colour at all. The word 'sharp' does not slice or scar our tongue, nor does the word 'Firey' burn.

The subtler way would be to give up the naive conception of meaning as the meant object or the meant property altogether and to treat 'the meaning of a word' as synonymous with "the way the word is used" — and since the way a word is used is very much a property of the word, one could then say that this property simply inheres in the word. Under this theory, I suppose, no single cow, nor the class of all cows, nor any bovine essence out there in the world would be

the meaning of the word 'cow' but the property of being used to refer to any arbitrarily chosen member of the class of cows -- that *property* would be the meaning. And if you take that property as an intrinsic capacity or power of that word then you might call their relation some kind of *inherence*. This is the only way I can justify Bhartṛhari's long discussion of *Samavāya* in a chapter devoted explicitly to the word-meaing relationship. But ultimately neither this "manner of use" - theory of meaning nor the *inherence* as the relation linking up words and their meanings is embraced by Bhartṛhari as his own thesis. Here, as elsewhere, it is hard to decide exactly which view is his own - but he surely tries out a *causal relation* as an answer to our questions. In 3/3/32 he remarks :

"A word is the cause of its meaning; though the word itself is caused by the meant entity. Thus the word is cognised due to the meant entity when the latter becomes an object of the intellect".

Śabdah kāraṇamarthasya sahitenopajāyate

tathā hi buddhiviśayadārthacchabdaḥ pratīyate

On the face of it, the doctrine seems to verge on the magical or occult. Except in a creation-story or in sorcery to utter the word 'light' is not to *cause* light. Nor is it plausible that the Sanskrit word 'Fire' was actually brought into existence by an actual fire!

Taking a cue from the allusion towards the "meant entity as the object of the speaker's intellect" — Helarāja the commentator gives us the following story to make this causal theory of word-meaning relationship credible :

> In the beginning, the word and the meant entity stay undistinguished in the understanding of the speaker. We should not think that the intended meaning, i.e. the thought to be conveyed, is devoid of the structure or division which is later displayed in the words because it is intuited in the form of an inner-talk. Even subhuman animals' cognitions are beginninglessly perforated with potentiality for words.

Hence the sound - which is uttered properly through the instrumentality of the vocal and other facial muscles and organs of speech is already intrinsically intermixed with the nature of the meant entites (*arthasvarūpaśabalaḥ śabdaḥ*). When heard by the hearers it sparks off in them the same structure or nature - and thus makes the meanings known. Linguistic communication consists in the mutual transmission of the intended purports of the speaker and the hearer. The mental meaning (*antaḥsthitam artham*) leaves its original form in which it is buried in the intellect of the speaker. The word carries it over and offers it to the hearer. The hearer, according to his own personal predilictions, grasps the content as carved up by the word-concepts".

(V.P. Pt. III, P-265-266).

Once this is clear from the above passage : meanings are in longer external world entities, events, objects or properties. They are identified with *purports*. And the picture is somewhat like this with arrows standing for causal relations :

Speaker's meaning-in-the intellect-utterance of word-sound-awarenss in the hearer-grasped meaning in the hearer's intellect.

Yet the account looks unclear at a number of points, and where it is clear it is obviously highly contestable. What emerges is that neither contact, containment or inherence, nor causation is the alleged relation between word and meaning but some kind of an *identity-in-difference* or *isomorphism verging on sameness* is the relation asserted by Bhartṛhari's school of thought. Not only is the nature of *artha* or *meant entity* changed to suit the theory so that it becomes an intellectual construct immanent in the mind of the speaker but also the nature of *śabda* or *word* is changed beyond recognition to be placed, once again in the intellect of the word-user. Thus both meanings and words being reduced to mental entities, small wonder that they would be gravitating towards becoming the *same*. And, of course, if two things are the same then they must always have been

the same - we cannot make sense of occasional mergings as in the case of roads or rivers here. Hence the doctrine that words are eternal, meanings are eternal and their relationships too is eternal (*Nityaḥ śabdaḥ nityortho nityaḥ saṁbandhaḥ ityeṣā śāstravyavasthā* - vṛtti 1.1.23)

In the rest of this paper we shall try to make sense of this absurd sounding claim that a word means what it does due to an inherent, intrinsic, eternal, power, fitness, or relationship. In order to make this claim intelligible I shall examine the major arguments used by Bhartṛhari and others against the competing theory of conventionalism. Conventionalism has been the received wisdom in this matter in the West. Notice Aristotle's own gloss on his remark in *De Interpretatione.* 16[a] 19 that a name is a spoken sound which is meaningful by convention.

"I say 'by convention' because no name is a name naturally but only when it has become a symbol. Even inarticulate noises (of beasts, for instance) do indeed reveal something, yet none of them is a name".

The context makes it clear that Aristotile is not only speaking about proper names - which even Sanskrit Gammarians call "use-as-you-like words" *yadrācchāśabdaḥ* or "arbitrary labels" - but is anticipating Grice's point that significant words in a language are non-natural signs, i.e. not signs in the sense in which black clouds *mean* an imminent shower or tears and shrieks *mean* pain. That words mean like traffic-lights mean was also emphasised more recently by Wittgenstein in his *Blue Book.*

"But let's not forget that a word hasn't got a meaning given to it, as it were, by a power independent of us, so that there could be a kind of scientific investigation into what the word really means. A word has the meaning someone has given to it." (P. 27-28) Why is training required? Just as the criticism (found in *Nyāya Sūtras*) of the Eternalist dogma that words have meanings inherent or intrinsic to them comes in the form of the caricature : "Why does not saying 'rice' fill our stomach or saying 'Knife' - cut off our tongue"? - the

caricature of the conventionalist dogma is in Humpty Dumpty's view that since we are the masters we can mean whatever we like by a word : e.g. by 'glory' we can mean *a nice knock down argument.*

In Humpty-Dumpty's sense, therefore, the GLORY of Bhartṛhari's anticonventionalism is the following classical argument - usually put in the form of a regress. Since Sabara - the Mīmāmsā giant chronologically precedes Bhartṛhari let me quote his inimitably lucid words to state the argument :

There cannot by any period of time when not a single word was connected by C to any of its objects. Why? For, in that case, the act of connecting cannot take place. To make the required connection one must use some word which already has such a connection. What created the second connection? If it is by another such word, what created the third or the fourth connection? This will lead to infinite regress. Therefore, even when we admit that some connections are created we must admit that there are words which are well entrenched in our usage, and for which the connection C is uncreated.

Compare the insight contained in this passage (written around the 3rd/4th century A.D.) with the point made by Davidson at the end of his paper *Communication and Convention* (1981) "Convention is not a condition of language ..... Philosophers who make convention a necessary element in language have the matter backwards. The truth is rather that language is a condition for having conventions". The steps of the underlying argument could be made clear in the following kind of analysis. Notice that the conclusion of the argument is *not* that all words have natural pre-conventional meanings but that *some* words must have such meanings - which is the logical negation of the conventionalist claim that *all words are non-natural conventional signs.*

The Master Argument against conventionalism :

A. If a semantic convention (or meaning-giving rule) could not be enunicated without a pre-existing language, then *all* words could not have been made meaningful by first enunciating such a semantic convention.

B. A semantic convention typically takes the form : "From the word W the Meaning M must be understood or grasped".

(The Naiyāyika, strictly speaking, categorises such a rule as a *wish* - in God or in a lesser human agent. But that does not help. The wish cannot guide the behaviour of word-users unless made public through an actual or inferred sentence which expresses the wish and how would a sentence *express* a wish without precomposed meanings had by words?

Laying down of such a convention requires use of words with already established meanings at *three* points :

B1. You need words referring to the word (e.g. 'W')

B2. You need words referring to the meant entity (e.g. 'M').

B.3 You need words for the relation of signifier-signified because rule-giver must make it clear that the word *stands for* the meant entity - when this *standing for* is a unique kind of relation which only language-users can get any idea of.

C. Therefore, *not all* words could be made meaningful by laying down a convention.

We have to critically appreciate the force of all these three points : *that* words cannot be designated except by words and indeed - ideally - they can be designated by themselves. (Bhartṛhari's insistence that the closest tie that exists between a word and its meaning - is due to the fact that every word reflexively stands for itself - is based upon this insight). Any other description may capture the noise or the spelling but would not quite get at the word. (B1).

At this point, if time permits, I wish to discuss David Kaplan's recent (1988) theory about the *Metaphysics of a word.* Secondly, *that* objects, situations, functions, qualities, actions, etc. which figure as meanings can best be explained, described, demonstrated, once again, through further words. The common objection, at this point, by the

Naiyāyika that we can do it by the tip of our finger - by gestures of pointing or touching the object could be met in various ways.

Thirdly, the most difficult issue of trying to explain through words - the word-meaning *relation itself* has to be disentangled. This will bring us into another strand of Bhartṛhari's views : that the word-meaning relationship is and *has got to be* inexpressible by words.

Of course one could try to rebut the Master-argument at each of tis steps. The conventionalist camp in the classical Indian scene - Nyāya Philosophy - *has* appreciated the givenness of basic semantic relations on the basis of which further 'modern' usage-rules could be made up. Still, they insist that since the word-meaning links could not have emerged out of intrinsic properties of words - otherwise why do people need training? Why don't the same noises mean the same things in all languages? And so on - the original rule must have been established - even if at the beginning of creation by some *agency,* perhaps of God. So conventionalism is not quite a Humpty-Dumpty kind of individualistic view of semantics. That is why in later Wittgenstein a basic conventionalism could peacefully co-exist with a deep awareness of the basic unquestionability of certain rules of common usage. On the other hand, Bhartṛhari does not fail to notice the need for *learning* word-meanings from established expert-practice (*Vṛddha-vyavahāra*). From the fact that we need to be told which word means what it does not follow, he would say, that the telling *makes* it so.

Relations, elders, common knowledge tell me who are my parents but their telling does not make me the child of my parents : it remains a *natural* connection.

Bhartṛhari and his followers buttress the claim of eternal natural connection between word and meaning by a further argument which almost overshoot the target by proving word and meaning to be *identical.*

Surely the conclusion is not that that particular Sanskrit sound-pattern "KOKILA", for instance *is* the same as one particular black

cuckoo (which one?) because even Bhartṛhari accepts that the word does not fly or sing and the bird is not spelt with two `K's. The identification is between the word-*form* which is in the intellect and the bird-*form* which too is in the intellect. The question, "Whose intellect" - deserves a very complicated response which disassociates Bhartṛhari's *Sphoṭa-vāda* (The theory of indivisible speech-bud or speech-potential) from the popular imagist-mentalism of a crude psychologistic theory.

The central idea is this : When someone is trying to talk about the word '*ghaṭa*' he uses the word (because mentioning the word, in spoken language, *is* after all a way of using it, at least they are homophonic performances). When one is talking about his cognition of *ghaṭa* (a jar / a pot) to communicate or verbalise his experience, then also one uses the same word. Finally when he has to talk directly of the object - then also one uses the word '*ghaṭa*'. So - if one asks "What is the meaning of the word '*ghaṭa*'? The answer, would be : '*ghaṭa*' means the word, the awareness and the object three-in-one". The argument form could be this, borrowing major premise from Buddhist logic :

(1) If *a* and *b* are distinct, it must be possible to cognise *a* independently of cognising *b* (like a jar and a piece of cloth).

(2) It is *not* possible to cognise an object without cognising the word for it (because the question "What is that"? - is answered by giving the word for it).

(3) *Therefore,* the word and the object are not distinct.

Once again, neither premise (1) nor premise (2) of this inseparability argument are compelling for a Naiyāyika who believes firmly that it must be possible to cognise an object quite independently of the word or concept which captures the object : Wordless, non-conceptual awareness *is* possible. Even if Bhartṛhari does not allow any awareness of a jar without awareness of some word or word-potential for it - the first premise - from inseparability to identity has been rejected by Nyāya realists.

Eternalism about language-meaning is not unheard of in the Western tradition either. In Plato's dialogue with that name Cratylas is represented as clinging on to the view that, independently of all conventions - the root-words mean what they do because they are logical images or essential pictures of the bits of reality they stand for. This picture theory of word-meaning is neither Bhartṛhari's nor Wittgenstein's. But the relationship between word and meaning - especially the general *origin* - question is so imponderable that neither eternalism, nor picture-theory, nor identity theory could be just dismissed as 'absurd'. Until the Master argument is met squarely - I should say, in Humpty Dumpty's sense, the peacock egg of Bhartṛhari's *Sphoṭavāda* is simply impenetrability!

Wittgenstein on Language : Some Remarks

D.P. Chattopadhyaya

Wittgenstein neither proposed nor developed what may be called a *theory* of language. Yet he devoted most of his active philosophical life in telling us *how* language can be shown as an inseparable part of our life and living in relation to other human beings, other things and even with our own selves. Not only that he has not theory of language, he does not even propose to *explain* either how our words and sentences enable us to achieve the aims of using them. His exclusive concern is with the actual workings of language. His interest is not explanatory. What he does with language is to *describe* its *uses.* Description of our linguistic activities is his basic aim. He observes emphatically "we must do away with all *explanation* and *description* alone must take its place" (*PI.* para, 109). Apparently he refuses to see the point that description often serves explanatory purpose.

It is of some interest to note that the description of the workings of language has in it a problem-solving capacity. But to Wittgenstein, only *puzzle,* not problem as understood in empirical sciences, is of philosophical concern. The problems which get dissolved by description of linguistic activities are not empirical in character. If by linguistic analysis some philosophical problems get dissolved, it is so only in an incidental way. This is because philosophical problems cannot be said to be rooted in philosophy itself, i.e. philosophy as understood and written by professional philosophers. Strictly speaking, philosophy has no language of its own. Its so-called problems - actually puzzles, purported theoretical use, of ordinary language. Ordinary language has not been *designed* for solving empirical problems. Unlike scientific languages, it is a field of loosely connected *forms of life.* To solve a philosophical problem is nothing

more than like to be able to see a puzzle-picture in a non-puzzling, that is, in a normal, way. (*PI*, page 196).

Physics, for example, may be credited to have a language of its own. From the disanalogy between so-called philosophical language and the languages of other empirical sciences the point Wittgenstein tries to make out is interesting, viz., the apparent philosophical problems are due to our misunderstanding and wrong description of language. Here by language Wittgenstein means ordinary language. "It is primarily the apparatus of our ordinary language, ... that we call language." (*PI*, para 494).

Ordinarily, to speak of 'invention' of a language makes no sense to him. When a language is said to have been 'invented' it is to be understood as "an instrument for a particular purpose on the basis of the laws of nature or as an invention of a game" (*PI*, para 492). Since the meanings of the words 'invent' and 'language' are indicated, it is difficult to follow why philosophical language cannot be invented. Philosophers, according to Wittgenstein, have no empirical problems to solve by their so-called theories or explanations. Their muddle consists in likening their own activities to those of empirical scientists who have their own language for some or other theoretical or explanatory purposes to achieve. Arising out of the misuses of ordinary language, the philosophical problems have only to be dissolved by showing their correct use - correct in terms of the *rules* of the concerned context of use.

Language is what is does and can do. To describe what it does is the best *technique* for a so-called philosopher to follow. What a language can *possibly* do has to be gathered from what it *actually* does. When one speaks of possible uses of language it is to be understood *within* the appropriate context of the concerned uses of the language in question itself. *Possible* expressions of language do not mean that a language has (what may be called) a *depth* dimension. In a manner of speaking, it may be said that language is *flat.* It does not have two sides, *inner* and *outer.* Wittgenstein's elaborate analyses

of the impossibility of 'private language' and what expressions like 'having pain' mean are intended to clarify the public or 'flat', i.e. depthless, character of language.

Wittgenstein's later view, not theory, may be clarified in terms of what he calls *language-game*. It is true that in his earlier work, *Tractatus*, this notion in its explicit form is not to be found. But when he speaks of the distinction between 'sign' and 'symbol' (*TLP*, 3.32, 3.321, 3.322 & 3.323), he vaguely anticipates the possibility of the same word or expression of being used in different senses. For example, when he says that a sign is what can be perceived of a symbol, he clearly recognises that one and the same sign, written or spoken, can be common to different symbols. In this way one and the same symbol lends itself to different modes of signification. For example, Wittgenstein notes that "in everyday language it very frequently happens that the same word has different modes of signification .... (For example) the word 'is' figures as the copula, as a sign for identity and as an expression for existence .....". He goes to the extent of concluding ruefully : "In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole of philosophy is full of them)." (*TLP*, 3.324). To avoid this sort of confusions he thought of a sign-language which would exclude the possibility of using, rather perceiving, the same symbol in different ways, expressing them through different modes of signification. The felt requirement to realise this aim was "a sign-language that is governed by *logical* grammar - by logical syntax." (*TLP* 3.325).

The very possibility of *perceiving* one and the same symbol in and through different signs is bound to create a serious problem. How to relate one symbol, *logically* one, to different signs, *perceptually* different. This relational issue appeared *psychological* to the early Wittgenstein, and therefore it was to him an unpromising line of enquiry. He preferred a logical way out. The conceptual notation of Frege and Russell, though initially appeared to have provided him such an ideal language, on scrutiny, he found its inadequacy. His

main uneasiness consisted in the growing realisation that logical constants like 'and', 'or', 'not', 'implies', which of ligical necessity had to be accorded a definite syntactically meaningful role, could not be saved from having more than one semantic import, and, in the process, giving rise to confusions. In other words, while Wittgenstein was convinced that a logical sign-language must not have any psychological uncertainty in it, in practice, he failed to find the right way to it.

His sense of failure was aggravated by the deeply significant intuitionist view of mathematics developed, for example, by Herman Weyl, namely, that mathematical expressions are like musical notations and that the axioms of mathematics are like the rules of a chess. Reflection led Wittgenstein to the disconcerting conclusion that "the whole of syntax is arbitrary". For, the 'King' of chess is not the King who can rule. The King of chess is wooden, not of flesh and blood, and cannot sit on any throne, if any. He (or it?) is not even a King outside the discourse on, or context of, chess. This shows that questions like "What King is?" has to be answered in some such way as "It depends upon the discourse or the context in which the word 'King' is being used."

Rules of language stand for the ways, - speaking, writing, commanding, etc., in which a language is used in relation to a given purpose. However, the possibility of "purposeless" of language cannot be totally ruled out. It can well be imagined that a mad person (declared 'mad' by experts in the field) can mutter certain words which, to us (who are not apparently mad), make no sense and serve no recognized purpose of ours. But, to be very cautious, it may easily be pointed out that the mad person of our imagination may be trying to play a game which *we,* being unfamiliar as we are with its *rules,* do not recognise as a *game* and therefore cannot play. If the case is so hopeless, we perhaps cannot *imagine* it either.

With one and the same langauge very many games may be played. One and the same word, 'dark' for example, may be used for

different purposes, for characterising a colour, for evaluating someone's work or character, to express opinion about a particular period of history, etc. A sentence can also convey different meanings, mainly depending upon *who* uses it, in *which* context it is used, to *whom* it is addressed, *and so on.* To list every item falling under the expression "and so on" seems to be impossible.

In spite of immense variability of meaning of a word or sentence, its intelligibility cannot be confined only to one particular person. To say that a language or an expression thereof is peculiar to a person makes no sense. Because it serves no commonly recognizable purpose. It cannot be said to be understandable even to the person who utters it. For uttering a meaningful word a person is required at least to know which letters can possibly be combined into a word. This first requirement is an implicit reference to the syntactical rules of word-formation. Secondly, the words which do not serve any purpose whatsoever, for example, of describing, of ordering, of forming a sentence, etc., can hardly be called or identified as word. One may well make a noise which fails to be a word. Obviously every noise (*dhvani*) is not a word (*śabda*). So the prime requirement of word-formation or sentence-formation is to know necessary rules and the ability to follow the same. Birds' chirping, for example, which may be successful for the purpose of communication within a particular species of birds, is hardly recognized as language by us - normal human beings. That means, among other things, we must be able to identify the letters or sounds necessary for forming a word and to identify the words necessary for forming (a) sentence. These identificative abilities must be recognisable and sharable by a community of a particular language-users.

In Wittgenstein's scheme of thought rules of language and rules of game, notwithstanding the difference between them, are invoked mainly to serve two aims. First, to specify, to individuate and to contextualise the meanings of different expressions. Secondly, to impart a public or sharable character to the expressions of the

concerned language. Since with one and the same language many games may be meaningfully played, even *proper names* fail to be proper unless the context of its use is known, i.e., unless other specifying conditions of the concerned form of life are indicated. Even the very relation between '*one* language' and 'many language - games' is not clear unless 'language' itself is suitably specified. Every act of successful communication is not linguistic. Animals apparently do communicate but they are not said to have a language (or several long usages) of their own.

Perhaps this is the place when I may say a word or two on Bhartṛhari's *sphoṭavāda,* bearing some main points of Wittgenstein in mind.

First, to Wittgenstein, context or *form of life* is the semantic principle of individuation. What an expression means is to be gathered in terms of this principle, or one might say, in terms of the rules falling under the principle. But this formulation of meaning-determination is rejected by Bhartṛhari who maintains that it is time, *kālaśakti,* which lends specificity to meaning (*VP,* I.3). A recostruction of *kālaśakti,* bringing it in line with the *form of life,* is perhaps possible in principle. Introducing the concept of place in relation to time one can somehow capture the sense of context. But that does not seem to be a promising line construction in the scheme of Bhartṛhari himself (*VP,* I. 97). Because, to him, time and the particulars due to it are in a way different (but not essentially different) from *Śabda Brahman,* the ultimate metaphysical reality, the matrix of all that is meaningful (*VP,* I. 120).

Secondly, the said difference between the metaphysical and the temporal is quite alien to the spirit of Wittgenstein's criticism and rejection of Russells's Theory of Type based on the allegedly untenable distinction between *sign* and *symbol.* To speak, as Bhartṛhari does, of the distinction between *manifest* meaning, *pada sphoṭa* and *vākya sphoṭa,* on the one hand, and *unmanifest* meaning-whole, on the other, makes no sense to Wittgenstein. This is not to

suggest that one is right and the other wrong. What I mean is this : their approaches are quite different. The semantic fall out of this difference is instructive, *viz.*, while Bhartṛhari propounds a non-structural *depth* grammar, a monist view of language, Wittgestein argues in favour of a 'flat' of *one-dimensional* and pluralist view of language alluded to earlier.

Thirdly, the point on which Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein appear very close to each other is sentence-holism, that is, as the meanings of the inflections of words, verbal or nominal, depend upon the concerned words, those of words themselves depend the sentences of which they are parts. But close reading reveals the superficiality of this similarity. Bhartṛhari's concepts of *ākāṁkṣā* and *yogyatā* of sentence-forming words, not to be found in Wittgenstein, are functionally replaced by the concept of the rules of game. Fregean calculus-based account of Wittgenstein's contextualism, primarily a theory of meaning and secondarily a theory of understanding, proves inadequate to explain the meaning of *figurative* and *metaphorical* expressions, which is so important both in arts and science. Viewed from this end, Bhartṛhari's subtle and differential accounts of *artha, lakṣaṇa* and *vyañjanā* are extremely valuable.

Fourthly, it is due to time, says Bhartṛhari, that timeless linguistic meaning-whole of the highest, i.e., Vedic, variety appears to the mankind differently, as past, as present, and as future. In other words, the relation between the eternal and the temporal is said to be casual or sequential. And this tripartite difference, temporal difference, is said to be *action*-related, *complete* action (*siddha*) is indicator of what is past, *uncompleted* action (*asiddha*) of present, and action *yet-to-be-completed (sādhya)* of future. But in *kriyā* of future *krama* of past and present remains shomehow present. Thus time and whatever is temporal, including meanings, are subsumed under eternity.

But who (or what) is responsible for the said completion of action (*kriya-krama*) - *Sabda Brahman* itself or some human agency?

The relation between the eternal and the temporal is sought to be explained in terms of causality or sequentiality. But how causal efficacy, sequential continuity, subject to the *variable* influence of time, can be logically claimed to be permanent? How then *fixity* of meaning (*VP*, I-139), so essential to the constancy of intended communication, to be accounted for? Any theoretically plausible answer, according to Bhartṛhari, must consist in assimilation of time under eternity and in maintaining meaning as basically timeless. The metaphysical trappings of his view is apparently unacceptable to Wittgenstein. This is not to deny the coherence of the elegant system developed by Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya*.

Many other points of basic dissimilarity (pertaining, for example, to the relation between language and knowledge (*VP*, I. 124) the *specific* language-users ability to refer to the so-called self and reality (*VP*. I. 131-133) etc.) may be cited and elaborated. The context principle which at times is believed to be common to Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein is on scrutiny's found to be not identical at bottom. While Bhartṛhari's one is mentalist, essentialist and metaphysically rooted, Wittgenstein's one is secular and phenomenalist.

But here the basic issue I like to highlight is simply this. The main conceptual aparatus of Wittgenstein and that of Bhartṛhari are so widely different or mutually exclusive that a painstaking *comparison* of the two is not likely to prove very interesting. But one thing is unmistakable. Their passionate and primary concern with language have led them to formulate their views on grammar and semantics so perceptively that the studies of their perspectives, notwithstanding numerous differences do have their intrinsic value and reward.

❐

The Sentence as Freedom

Probal Dasgupta

O. Only a sutra is possible as a starting point. Middleman : a Saussure who says (roughly) word-signs are *unfree* (socially given) expressions that speakers *freely* combine into sentence-chains, '*free* expressions', read in the light of K.C. Bhattacharya's free expression *The Subject as Freedom.*

1. For Bhartṛhari it is in the sentence that words join forces to sparkle in the *vakya-sphoṭa* spark. Such sparkling partakes of the *nityata* 'invariance' of *śabda* 'Śabda'. This nityata is *free* from the contingent mortality of this or that concrete embodiment. Partaking of *such* freedom sets *us* free. Only so can we post-Saussureans re-read Bhartṛhari's reading of tradition's *Sphoṭa.* Wittgenstein helps us unpack such freedom.

2. Wittgenstein facing the sentence (young Wittgenstein facing the pictorial sentence and mature Wittgenstein facing the active sentence verging on Austinian and other pragmatics — the young Wittgestien of semantics and the mature Wittgenestin of pragmatics, to point to the unregenarate tangential derivatives of his undivided enterprise) seeks a nonsubjective orientation for sentencing. He wants sentence not to stay shackled under speaker's illocutionary Ego. He refuses Ego's proprietary rights over meaning/validity. He states this refusal as Wittgenestien denies the (relevant kind of) autonomy of mind', thus seeking to free meaning from the web of personal desire.

3. As intertextual readers, our project is to steep our Wittgenstein in our Bhartṛhari. The content of a text, then, is not what it contains; privacy is proprietary; no essencs please, we're texts. Rather, a text's content is that *nitya* detextual-adtextual flow which brings into play neither subject-matter or referent, nor speaker/

nor speech act/acts/drama, but flowing memorability, availabilty, producibility. Content is what carries over in retellings which we visualize in the light of an invariance-maximizing Translation which we know is counterfactual.

4. It is easiest to steep our Wittgenstein in our Bhartṛhari if we aestheticaly reground both. Start at Wittgenstein's *spiel* (as language *game,* and as *dramatic* mature recasting of young Wittgenstein's bild); recast play as acting, as theatre; move to the *rasa* of apprehension of drama-content via spark as catharsis giving access to the *yathartha* `real' (invoked in the '*yathārtham jñānam'* definition of Pramā). These moves work only if Wittegestien and Bhartṛhari are both read as raising the question of content against a background of *yathārtha* as sustainable reality. They use varying reality-criteria, which add up. Young Wittgenstein's criterion stresses truth. Mature Wittgenstein's criterion seeks the complete *rasa* of actual action (i.e. : what cannot be appropriately said in a visualizable context cannot signify at all). Even young Wittgenstein's truth was relative to a larger living. Bhartṛhari's criterion for reality, the *brahman* as *āśvādya* 'tastable' *rasa,* goes well with all this.

5. Bhartṛhari does, unlike Wittgenstein, assume a Self and the apearance of essences in Self's inwardness. But Bhartṛhari's I is a non-proprietary I, *siddha* in its capacity for valid judgment and taste. Wittgenstein cannot take that route. The mind his times have to offer is a merely instrumental immature I, eager to own, to annex, to exercise intellectual property rights, to profit. Hence Wittgenstein's no-mind path to public validity, like Buddhism's no-self path to knowledge/*pramā* (*pramā* is neutral between knowledge-of-truth and apprehension-of-*rasa*).

Can our period earn its way back to the visualizability of a Bhartṛhari-Self?

6. Proposed formal procedure for a Bhartṛhari-steeped rereading of Wittgenstein : we postulate a mind in a state of partial power tempered by active abdication i.e. systematic-but-partial renunciation

of power in order to welcome the truly-new. One opens up completely to the truly-new in the moment of instinctively moving away from the ways of the dead system, reaching for a truth committed to the moment and to its *dramatis personae,* a truth that gives meaning.

7. The Popper cycle of falsification and theory revision, though its neatness instantiates active abdication and may be useful as an aid to readers who otherwise find this concept obscure, is too neat to be a serious prototype. What we can retain from it is the idea that the continual enlarging of the inductive base forces revisions and that to revise is to accept at least some measure of defeat. The non-neat prototype of active abdicaton is the notion of chatting as exchange of news, What's New? Only a new item can be perceived as knowledge. Only in the context of new-activation of knowledge as learning-teaching can cognition continue to be available to its locus and thus recharge itself as *yathārtha,* real cognition. The teacher in such a prototypical example clearly does not own the teaching. Nor does the teacher's or parent's generation own the learner's or child's generation. The basic learning scene is that new people learn from the total context, which includes teachers quite saliently but obviously do not learn from humans (or animate beings) alone. This is real learning. Now, it is only what real learning shall reassemble that counts as a structure that is sustainable through transmission, i.e. valid. To teach is to show what is valid. The context of learning is also the context of re-seeing. Every valid seeing has to also re-see; hence active abdication as an essential feature of a publicly accountable, non-proprietary mind. This is where the mind learns how to suspend its ego-quality of the thirst for victory, for power, for scoring points.

8. Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein both want a language whose meanings as validities are independent of intention-as-desire at a personal level. Their *sphoṭa* responds to the call of the *active impulse (praiti).* The intention (*abhiprāya*) is static. The *praiti* is dynamic in that it seeks a *dṛṣṭi*/vision which simultaneously appeals to *kāma* (primary *fun*), to *artha* (secondary *dealings* at one conscious

remove from fun), to *dharma* (tertiary *rules* of games and other rule-domains at two conscious removes from fun), and, circularly and cyclically, to *dṛṣṭi* (called *mokṣa* insofar as vision sees itself as a zeroary freedom to do an Escher between removes of consciousness/perception). Thus *praiti* alone is truly *niṣkāma,* non-lusting. To seek vision is to overcome property-lust and to be independent of the proprietary mind Wittgenstein distrusts. Wittgenstin smells a rat; only if you get rid of that smell does the self become Bhartṛhari - available for *rasa*-tasting right up to the point of the *brahman*-taste; a simple point of cuisine.

9. To return to the last part of section 3, freedom as in vision/*dṛṣṭi* characterizes a true, undistorted flow of content from texts (detextual) and into texts (adtextual). Such freedom transmits, in that it reproduces faithfully, the way creatures breed true, but without reference to any arbitrary cloning faith in contingent *devas* 'gods' or *vedas* 'scriptures' whose haloes wax and wane. The *brahman* one wants to taste is the invariance of authentic self-transmitting life, textually manifested as handing-down/transmission/tradition through the full ambience of performing arts holding up the mere word; the *brahman* has nothing to do with a clutching fundamentalism. Only when you taste such a *brahman* do you perceive its reality. Those who lack the taste have the equivalent option, Buddhist mode, of a rigorous switching off of (denial of serious reality to) certain contingent personal desires which over-situate content and thus restrict the flow. The point is not to turn the *star wars* egoic cliche "May the Force be with you" into a pseudophilosophical greeting that goes "May the Flow be with you" and pretends to symbolize the overcoming of ego. Those who seek meaning gradually learn the art of renouncing the specificity of worship.

❐

Word and Meaning : Identical?

V.N. Jha

0.0 'Language-game' involves speaker on one side and hearer on the other and the common meeting point namely, the world of experience. As long as the worlds of common experience of both the speaker and the hearer is one and the same, there is agreement (*Saṁvāda*) and when it is not so, the disagreement (*visaṁvāda*) is the winner.

Enquiries about philosophy of languages in India seem to have been directed from two angles : (1) from the point of view of a speaker or writer and (2) from the point of view of a hearer or listener or reader.

Bhartṛhari's enquiry, in my understanding, belongs to the first category and the other Indian philosophical Systems like Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc. concentrated more on the second.

Bhartṛhari's enquiry is more fundamental in the sense that it wants to know how human beings articulate their cognitions, knowledges, feelings and the like. The enquiry of Nyāya-Vaiśesika and Mīmāṁsā Systems begins after the cognitions, knowledges, feelings, and the like are articulated. In other words, while Bhartṛhari's enquiry is about the process of articulation, that of the later is about the process of the unfolding of the articulation.

In the eyes of the Indian logicians a speaker encodes his experience in a sentence and the hearer decodes it. Thus, there are three elements in this game. There is a speaker or writer, there is a world which speaker experiences and with which he behaves and there is a listner or hearer or reader. The speaker experiences his world, encodes that experience and passes it on to his listener or hearer. The listener receives that encoded experience in the form of a sentence and decodes it and is expected to get at the world of speaker's

experience. If everything goes smoothly in the process, there will be *saṁvāda* or else *visaṁvāda* is the consequence.

According to Indian logicians there are four types of human experiences namely, perceptual, inferential, analogical and verbal. These experiences arise through four distinct processes, called *pramāna. Śabda* or a sentence of a reliable speaker is one such *pramāna* or process of experience. The experience which arises from a sentence is called *śābdabodha* (verbal understanding). Indian logicians are more concerned about this process or epistemology of verbal understanding. According to them a sentence is an encoded experience.

Gautama defines a perceptual cognition as follows :

indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicari vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam

"Pratyakṣa is that cognition which is not namable, which is not enoneous and which is determinate".

The clause which is not namable (*avyapadeśya*)' had created a problem.

Vātsyāyana, the author of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* presents the following *pūrvapakṣa :*

Yāvadarthaṁ vai nāmadheyaśabdāh, taiḥ arthasampratyayaḥ, arthasampratyayāt ca vyavahāraḥ/tatra idam indriyārthasannikarṣād utpannam arthajñānam rūpam iti vā, rasaḥ iti evam vā bhavati, rūparasa-śabdāḥ ca viṣaya-nāmadheyam/tena vyapadiśyate jñānam rūpam iti jānīte, rasa iti jānīte/nāmadheyaśabdena vyapadiśyamānam sat śābdam prasajyate, ata āha - avyapadeśyam iti.

It means —

There are as many words as referents. By those words referents are properly known. When the things are properly known our behaviour with them also becomes proper. Now, for example, when a perception (of colour and taste) arises, the perception appears as

idaṁ rūpaṁ 'this is colour', *ayaṁ rasḥ* 'this is taste'. Here the words *rūpa* and *rasa* are the names of objects. By those names, the cognition is also designated such as "He knows it as colour"; "He knows it as taste." Since the cognition is designated by a name, it amounts to saying that it is caused by that name (of the object of cognition such as *rūpa* and *rasa*). In order to avoid such contingency, Gautama put the clause "which is not namable" in the definition of perception. This is what Vātsyāyana thought.

This *Pūrvapaksa* view, thus, holds that there cannot be any perception without interference of language.

Udyotakara, while interpretting Vātsyayana says that it is possible to have a perception without interference of language. He cites a case that even before the acquisition of language, perception of a thing can occur and one such perception can be distinguished from other similar perceptions. Moreover, as far as the form of the perception is concerned, there is no difference in the form before and after the acquisition of language. Thus, the *pūrvapakṣin* is not right in holding such a view and this was indicated by Gautama in the clause "which is not namable" in the definition of perception.

While commenting on this issue Vācaspati Miśra formulates the issue more clearly and elaborately. He sees that the *pūrvapakṣin* holds a view that the word and its referent are identical. According to this view one cannot perceive an object independent of its name, and when the same name of the object is applied to the cognition of the object also, one has to hold that no cognition is possible without intervention of language. Vācaspati quotes from Bhartṛhari the most oft - quoted verse —

Na so'sti pratyayo loke
yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte/
anuviddham iva jñānam
sarvaṁ śabdena bhāsate// (Vākyapadīya 1.123)

In this world there cannot be cognition without intervention of language, as if cognition and languages are mixed with each other.

Nothing can be known without language.

He quotes verse from *Vakyapadīya*

Ādyaḥ karaṇavinyāsh

prāṇasyordhvasamīraṇam

sthānānām abhighātaś ca

na vinā śabdabhāvanām// (1.122)

The first movement of the sound-oprators in the oral cavity, movement of the palmonic air in the lungs, the contacts of the places of articulation, nothing is possible without accepting inbuilt language structure. Thus, even in children and the dumb, one must postulate language impression coming from time immemorial.

(*Bālamūkādinām api vijñānaṁ śabdānuvyādhavad eva anādiśabdabhāvanāvaśāt* p. 110)

From these descriptions of the *pūrvapakṣa* - view, it is clear that for Bhartṛhari it is impossible to think of a cognition without the intervention of language. As against this Indian Logicians argue that there can arise a cognition without the intervention of language. There can be an indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*) prior to the intervention of language. Such a cognition will produce another cognition which can be verbalised. Thus, there can be verbalisable and unverbalisable cognitions. What happens is, a particular cognition arises through a particular process and the speaker then encodes it and verbalises it.

In this background I would like to present the traditional dialogue for and against the view that there is identity between an expressive word and its meaning. Needless to say, Bhartṛhari will argue in favour of identity whereas the Indian logicians will argue against such a stand. I shall present first the Identity view and then present the non-identity-view.

1.0 *Word and its Meaning are Identical*

The following are some of the grounds for pleading in favour

of identity between word and its meaning :

(a) When some unknown item is seen by us we often say 'we do not know what this is'. And when someone tells the name of it, we say 'We know it now'. So, if in the cognition mere object appears, then how to explain his statement 'we do not know what this is?' This implies that object appears in the cognition as identified with its word.

(b) Suppose someone has seen an object *Kokila* and suppose he knows that *Kokila* is *Pika* (Cuckoo) and does not know that it is called *Kokila,* still there will arise the contingency of his having the awareness (*anuvyavasaya*) in this form 'This is *Kokila*' since he has seen the object which is called *Kokila* also. In order to avoid such difficulty, one must accept the identity between the object and the word *Pika* which is known to him. Since he does not know the word *Kokila* there will not arise the awareness that 'This is *Kokila'*.

(c) Unless we accept that in the perception of an object called pot there is identity between the object and pot we cannot present the cognition of that object as 'a cognition in which potness is the qualifier (*prakāra*) and pot is the qualificand (*viśeṣya*)'.

(d) The definition of perception by Gautama comes to support his view. He says that in perception the object is not word (*avyapadeśya*). Thereby, he endorses the view that in a Verbal understanding (*Śābdabodha*), word is the object. This means that word and its meaning are identical. Even Vatsyayana while formulating the *Purvapaksa* admits that in a verbal understanding the content is word. (*Śabdaviṣayakatvena pratyakṣasya śābdatvāpattih*). Vācaspatimisra is also in agreement with this view (*śabdaviṣayakatvameva śābdatvam na tu śabdajanyatvam*).

(e) Not only that. Let us look at the form of a cognition `This is a pot'. Here, 'This' stands for the object and it is identified with the word 'Pot'. There is co-referentiality in that for the cognition. That establishes identity. Not only that. The forms of cognition such as 'This is Pot' 'Pot is not cloth' endorse that idea and the fact are

identical; that we cannot have a statement such as 'Pot is cloth' confirms that idea that the object is identical with its word.

(f) Since all our verbalisable cognitions are language-oriented, we must accept them as having word as their content or as being prompted by word. In the former case there has to be identity between word and the object.

Let us examine the second alternative. Can a word prompt a cognition without itself being known? Certainly not. Thus it has to be known. In that case our view gets, again, established.

(g) There cannot be perception of a thing which is not in contact with the sense-organs. When pot is perceived, it is said 'This is pot'. The word `Pot' is not there; what is there is the object and still it is said `This is Pot'. This is possible only if we accept that the object and the word are identical.

(h) When one asks - What is the word for this object? The answer comes 'Pot'. And when one asks - What is the meaning of the word 'Pot', still the answer comes 'Pot'. This is another ground to hold the identity between word and meaning.

(i) In conversation one tells - 'You have heard the word, now you listen to the meaning.' How listening of meaning is possible unless meaning is same as word?

(j) Even Pāṇini will support this view when he himself says,

vṛddhiḥ ad aic a, ai, and au' are called *vrddhi.* So the vowels *ā*, *ai* and *au* are identical with the word *vṛddhi.*

(k) Even the statement -

Om ityekakṣaraṁ Brahma 'The single syllable 'Om' is the Brahman' - supports our thesis.

(l) The following usages are also in our favours :

(i) *Rama iti dvyakṣaram nāma mānabhaṅgaḥ pināki̇naḥ*

'The bysyllabic name 'Rama' is the remover of the pride of 'Śiva'.

(ii) *Hiranyapūrvam Kaśyapum pracakṣate*

'The demon is *Kaśyapu* preceded by *hiraṇya.*

In both these usages there is identity.

They clarify that this identity is between a conceptual word and conceptual meaning. This is the reason that when one utters the word `food' one's mouth does not become full of food, because mouth can be full with 'external food' only and not by 'conceptual food'.

2.0 *Word and Meaning are not Identical*

Some of the arguments of the Indian Logicians are presented below.

(a) As regards the identity statements like 'This is (a) pot', such statements are not possible unless the person has the knowledge of the relation between the object `Pot' and the word Pot. But it is our experience that the object is known as it is even by children and deaf and dumb persons even though they have no knowledge of the relationship between the object and its name. Thus, there is no identity between the object and its name.

The argument of *Śabdabhāvanā* being carried by children and deaf and dumb persons from earlier birth is not tenable.

(b) What one considers to be an identity-statement like 'This is (a) Pot', the word 'pot' stands here for the object 'pot' by convention. Moreover, if the object and its name were identical one should have a perception after seeing the pot 'this is the word pot'. But such cognition does not take place. Thus, they are not identical.

(c) The argument that when one does not know the name of an object he says 'he does not know it' and when he knows the name he says 'he knows it' implying identity between object and its name is also not tenable. Because when one asks : Who is he?, the word 'who' refers to the person of enquiry. And that is to be known from the context etc. The answer to this question may be any thing : He is a man, He is Brāhmin, He is teacher, He is PM and so on. The context will decide.

When a person says 'I do not know it' after seeing it what actually he says is 'I do not know the name of it'. Thus, a verbalisable cognition does not compell any one to accept the identity between the object and its name.

(d) As regards the problem of synonymous words, *Kokila* and *Pika,* it should not be a problem because the perceiver will have the awareness that he has knowledge similar to that which arises from the expression. This is *Pika.*

(e) It is also not true to say that in order to explain the structure of the context of a cognition the identity between object and its word is necessary. Because, where a property appears that is called qualificand and what appears is called qualifier. The terms like 'qualifier' and 'qualificand' are dependent terms and so they will appear at descriptive level and not as contents of the cognition. 'This is pot'.

(f) It is wrong to believe that Gautama supports the view of identity. The term *avyapadeśya* is not used to exclude *śābdabodha* from perceptual cognition, rather it refers to identerminate perception which is not verbalisable.

Vātsyāyana, too, does not endorse your view. The expression *śabdaviṣayakam* in the *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya* needs to be properly understood as *pratyakṣam api śabdaviṣayakam, śabdarahitam avikalpakam kimapi nāsti.*

'Even perception is language-oriented and so there is no cognition called indeterminate and not verbalisable.'

(g) Before the arising of a verbalisable cognition (*savikalpaka*), regularly there is absence of language. Even if one argues that the word is remembered still it cannot be held that the cognition of the thing is prompted by word.

(h) As regards the view that when one gets the same answer

(say, pot) when one enquires about the thing and its word, they have to be treated as identical, one may say that when one wants to know the meaning the word 'pot' stands for a thing and when enquiry is about the word the word 'pot' stands for word. There is no identity.

(i) When you say, 'listen now to the meaning,' what you intend is 'listen to the word which expresses is the meaning', or to the paraphrase. This does not prove identity. *Ātmā śrotavyaḥ* is to be interpreted in this way.

(j) The same is the solution for Pāṇinian *sūtra*—

(1) *vṛddhir ād aic* and for the expressions

(2) *rāma iti dvyakṣaram nāma mānabhaṅgaḥ pināk inaḥ* and

(3) *hiraṇyapūrvam Kaśipum pracakṣate*

In all these cases the words stand for their meanings and there is no question of identity.

Thus, in the cognition 'This is a pot' the word does not appear as its content. Merely on the basis of co-referentiality in the statement 'This is (a) pot' one cannot jump to the conclusion that object and its name are identical.

The theory that a conceptual word (*sphoṭa*) is the expressive word and conceptual meaning is the expressed meaning and there is identity between the two is also not acceptable to the Indian Logicians. I have discussed it elsewhere.

3.0 Observations

We have heard the dialogue. The following observations can be made on the basis of the above dialogue :

(i) While section 1.0 claims that no thinking or knowledge or cognition is possible without language, Section 2.0 attempts to point out that it is possible without interference of language.

(ii) That a cognition is always verbalisable is the view of

Bhatṛhari. But Indian Logicians think that a cognition can be both verbalisable and non-verbalisable, and there is a causal relationship between the two. The non-verbalisable is the cause of the verbalisable.

(iii) According to Indian Logicians there is a sequence in verbalisation. A cognition (say, perception) arises first through a particular process without taking the help of language and later the same cognition is verbalised by the cognizer.

(iv) It remains a fact that in the process of cognizing one goes from a thing to its name and from a name to a thing of which it is a name. Both the goings are based on a relationship between a word and its referent. Both the journeys are not simultaneous. At one time it may be from a thing to its name as in the case of perception and at some other time it may be from the word to its meaning as in the case of understanding a sentence-meaning. Indian Logicians are trying to draw the attention to this fact.

(v) It also remains a fact that children who have not yet learnt any language and the deaf and dumb are capable of cognizing and distinguishing one object from the other. Explanation of Bhartṛhari that even here such cognizing presupposes language-impressions (*śabdabhāvanā*) in such children and the deaf and dumb carried from their previous birth should have received more attention. Is it not closer to the idea of Wittgenstein when he says - "This is what we human beings are?"

(vi) The idea of conceptual expressive word and its conceptual meaning may merit pleasure in the Western Thinking where a distinction is drawn between sense and reference. Indian Logicians, however, cannot contribute to this idea simply because they do not want to open even one window for the entrance of idealism.

(vii) In Indian tradition the term for identity is either *tādātmya* or *abheda.* Although Indian Logicians use both the terms in one and the same sense namely, 'total identity', other systems like Mīmāmsā

use the term *tādātmya* in the sense of difference-cum-identity (*bhedasahiṣṇu-abheda*). I think, in the tradition of Bhartṛhari also the term *tādātmya* means 'difference-cum-identity.' In that sense it will mean-when looked from one angle there is identity between word and its meaning since they are inseparable, as it were, and when looked from another angle a word is a word and meaning is meaning. As expressive of something a word is a word and as expressed by some word meaning is meaning.

❐

What has Bhartṛhari got to say on Language?

Ashok R. Kelkar

ABSTRACT

I. Preliminary notes. Bhartṛhari has not received due attention for a variety of reasons. After a word about B and his works, a sketch of the Indian intellectual tradition in which to place him is presented in terms of its key questions, the resulting affiliations, and broad periodization. The difficulties in presenting B to the modern reader need to be overcome. Thus, no citations; Sanskrit terms parenthesized; the risk of tidying up his thought is taken.

II. A Conspectus of B's thought on language is best presented under three headings in a certain order. Language as communication : B's conceptual framework and ideas of related causal dependencies are touched upon. Language as human practice : For B it is human practice that sustains speech power and its acquisition and the power of the sppech bond. Language as cognition : All conginition, even seemingly non-linguistic cognition, is sustained by specific and generalized language competence. B's position on the interpretative element and on the presence of chains of signation was well-motivated.

III. B's thought on language is considered in the perspective of Indian and Western thought on language.

I

Anybody who has heard of the ancient Indian achievement in the field of grammar has heard of Pāṇinī and his grammar of the Sanskrit language. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of Bhartṛhari in spite of his crucial position in the development of the

Indian grammatical tradition. The present study is a modest, if somewhat unconventional, attempt to set things right. I hope that those familiar with the tradition will not find it too distorting and those not so familiar will be induced to find out more about his thought with the help of the select bibliography at the end.

As it happens all too often in chronicling Ancient and Medieval India, not too much is known about Bhartṛhari. He lived probably in the 5th c CE, in any case not later. The once widely shared supposition that Bhartṛhari (B from now on) the grammarian-philosopher is the same as Bhartṛhari the highly popular legendary poet-king-renouncer has now been mostly given up by scholars (who tend to place the poet in the 4th c CE at the latest). B is the author of *Vākyapadīya* ('of the sentence and the word') an incomplete verse treatise on the theory of grammar and language; *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* (a little light on the great commentary) better called *Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā,* a sub-commentary on Patañjali's commentary on Pāṇini's grammar available in a short fragment and not too widely studied; *Vṛtti* (commentary) an incomplete commentary in prose on *Vākyapadīya* (*VP* from now on) that is now believed to have been composed by B himself, and *śabdadhātusāmikṣā* (possibly, 'close search into speech as the basis of what there is') a treatise cited but now lost. We shall be concerned here with *VP* and its auto-commentary.

VP has three books (*kāṇḍas*), namely, I *Brahma-Kāṇḍa* (the book on *brahman* the Overwhelming Other), also called *Āgama-samuccaya* (a collection of traditions) dealing chiefly with language as such and its relation to what there is; II *Vākyakāṇḍa* (the book on the sentence); and the relatively longer and probably incomplete III *Prakīrṇa-kāṇḍa* (the book of miscellaneous (topics), also called *Pada-kāṇḍa* (the book of the word), divided into many topics (*samuddeśas*) some of which have either been lost or remained unwritten. Though the three books appear to constitute a cohesive whole with a traditional sequence but without constituting a connected argument, it has been argued that the title *Vākyapadīya* properly

applies only to books I-II or only to book II and the whole word should simply be called *Trikāṇḍī* (a work in three books). The auto-commentary is available only for books I-II.

B's contribution to the theory of grammar, cognition and reality was recognized as a watershed by grammarians and as significant contribution to an on-going debate by philosophers of language, cognition, and reality. There was, however, a certain waning of interest after the 11th c CE, judging from the paucity and bad state of the manuscripts, from the paucity of citations and commentaries, and, above all, from the relative neglect in traditional teaching and scholarly activity. Perhaps grammarians found B too philosophical and philosophers found him too philological and students found him too difficult. Among modern Western scholars and West-influenced scholars in India and elsewhere, B is coming into his own only in recent decades, judging from editions, translations, citations, and studies and from seminars and conferences.

A proper understanding of B's thought calls for its proper placing within the Indian grammatical and philosophical traditions. A concern for language (for which the metonyms *śabda, vāc, vānī, bhāṣā,* all meaning speech, are commonly used and, as will be seen later, differentiated semantically in careful use) and therefore a concern for linguistic forms ranging from word elements to sentence sequences (for which, again, the metonyms *śabda* and *vacana,* both meaning a unit of speach, are commonly used with some differentiation) as well as a concern for grammar (*vyākaraṇa*) was widely shared by all thinkers whether grammarians or not.

Traditional Indian thought involves taking a position on certain key questions. It will be useful to set these out along with alternative answers proposed and names of groups or individuals to be associated with answers.

(1) What is the chief object of philosophizing?

(a) Understanding (*jñana*) of what there is (*vastu*)

(a1) Understanding how to understand (*vastu-jñāna*), according to Grammar (including B), Hermeneutics (*mīmāṁsā*), Logic (*nyāya*).

(a2) Chiefly, understanding what there is to be understood (*vastv-artha*), according to Pluralist Cosmology (*vaiśeṣika*) and of course various positive sciences (like Health Science (*āyurveda*), Astromathematics (*jyotiṣa*) and normative sciences (like Ritual, Law, Poetics).

(b) Understanding of how to cope with one's life.

(b1) Chiefly, managing life with success (as befits a worldly one, *sāṁsārika*), according to Common Sense school (*lokāyata*), Political Economy (*arthaśāstra, daṇḍanīti*).

(b2) Chiefly, changing oneself in such a way as to be free from the need to manage (as befits a liberation-seeking one, *mumukṣu*), according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, Upanishadic thought, Vedanta, Pratyabhijna (the so-called Kashmir Shaivism), Buddhism, Jainism, various god-participation (*bhakti*) cults.

Notes (1) Quite often, thinkers under (a) takeup positions under (b) as well rather than remain neutral. Thus, B (Grammar), later Logic, later Pluralist cosmology additionally take up position (b2); later Hermeneutics additionally takes up position (b1) with the stipulation that rectitude (*dharma*) be adhered to. (2) Again, thinkers under (b) often take up positions under (a) rather than accept some received account. Thus, Sāṁkhya and Vedānta propose a regular cosmology, Buddhism proposes its own pluralist cosmology and its own modified logic as also Jainism. ('Regular' here is a cover term for 'monist' or 'dualit' as opposed to 'pluralist'.)

(2) Understanding how language works is crucially helpful in any serious philosophizing. That is, understanding language vehicle (*śabda/vāc*), language meaning (*śabda-ārtha*), and the bond (*saṁbandha*) between the two. What then is the chief object in understanding how language works?

(a) Chiefly, understanding language vehicle, according to

Phonology (*śikṣā*). Lexicon, Grammar (Pāṇini and others).

(b) Chiefly, understanding language meaning, according to Etymology (*nirukta*), Hermeneutics, Logic, Poetics (*kāvyaśāstra*).

(c) Chiefly, understanding language bond, according to Grammar (Vyāḍi, Vasurāta, B, Kauṇḍa, Nāgeśa), Rhetoric (*alaṁkāra-śāstra*).

(3) How does understanding or cognition come about (*jñānautpatti*)? From what sources (*jñāpaka*) ?

(a) Chiefly by resolute search (*ānvīkṣikī*), according to Logic, Pluralist Cosmology, Grammar (including B), Hermeneutics, positive sciences, Common Sense, Political Economy, Buddhism, Jainism.

(b) Chiefly by vision (*darśana*), according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, Upanishadic thought, Vedānta, Pratyabhijñā.

(c) Chiefly by precedent (*paramparā*) according to normative sciences.

Notes : (1) Quite often, thinkers under each head resort to the remaining two activities too. (2) At least some Upanishadic thought (Uddālaka Āruṇī Gautama, for example) takes up position (a).

(4) How can one make sure that understanding really amounts to right understanding (*jñāpti*)? Discovery (*pratyaya*) without scrutiny (*parīkṣaṇa*) is lame, scrutiny without discovery is blind.

(a) Cognition is never free from interpretation (*nirūpaṇa*), what there is being forever inaccessible, according to Buddhism (Nāgārjuna), Grammar (B).

(b) Cognition needs to reach out to what there is.

(b1) What there is being independent of the cognizer, (*jñātṛ*), typically material (*jaḍa*), according to Common Sense.

(b2) What there is being inherent in the cognizer, typically consciousness (citi) or mointoring (*vijñāna*), according to Advaita Vedānta, Pratyabhijñā, Vijñānavādī Buddhism (other than Nāgārjuna).

(b3) What there is being either of these, according to Grammar (including B), Heremeneutics, Logic, Pluralist Cosmology, Sāṁkhya-Yoga, Dvaita Vedānta, Sthaviravādī and Bāhyārthavādi Buddhism, Jainism.

(5) Transition between condition (*sthiti*) and process (*gati*) in either direction or between differing conditions or between differing processes indicates causal dependency (*kārya-tva*) as distinct from causal non-dependence (*nitya-tva*). How to understand causal dependency?

(a) Chiefly, as genesis (*utpatti*) in the course of which inflow or input (*kāryin*) undergoes activity (*kriyā*) yielding outcome or output (*kārya*) thanks to effectants (*kāraṇas*) alongwith accessories (*saha-kārins*) if any. Thus, uncooked rice undergoes cooking yielding cooked rice thanks to fire, water etc. along with occasion for cooking it etc. Genesis activity typically leads to a fresh episode in which the outcome/output now becomes the inflow/input, cooked rice getting digested or further cooked, so to say, in the belly in the example at hand.

(a1) Process alone (if at all) exists, effectant and outcome/output merely subsist, according to Vijñānavādi Buddhism, Vedānta (Gauḍapāda), Jainism. (This is the *a-jāti-vāda* position.)

(a2) Process and outcome exist, according to Sthaviravādi and Bāhyārthavādī Buddhism. (This is the *samutpāda-vāda* position, that tends to highlight causal dependency chains (*pratītya-samutpāda*).)

(a3) Process, outcome, and condition exist, inflow/input being pervasive (vyāpaka) or inclusive of outcome/output, according to Logic, Pluralist Cosmology. (This is the *pariṇāma-vāda position.*)

(b) Chiefly, as manifestation (*abhivyakti*) in the course of which manifest-yielder or unmanifest (*vyañjaka/a-vyakta*) undergoes manifesting, (*abhivyañjana/pariṇāma*) yielding manifest (*vyaṅgya/vyakta*) thanks to power-transmission (*śaktisañcāra*) along with manifesting-assistants (*abhivyañjaka*) if any. Thus, seed undergoes

sprouting and growing yielding seedling thanks to life-transmission along with soil, moisture etc. Manifesting typically metamorphoses the unmanifest into the manifest, seed into seeding int he example at hand.

(b1) Condition, unmanifest, manifest exist, manifest being no other than (*tadātma*) the unmanifest, according to Samkhya, early Vedanta. (This is the *sat-kārya-vāda* position.)

(b2) Condition, unmanifest exist, manifest being no other than a figuring out imposed (*vivarta*) on unmanifest, according to Grammar (B), later Vedanta (Śaṁkara onwards).

Note : (1) The terms under (a) are often substituted for the corresponding terms under (b). B, in spite of his (b2) position, not only does this but on occasion adopts (a3) stance.

(2) In certain cases, the inflow/unmanifest and the outcome/ manifest are seen to share a site (*āśraya/adhikaraṇa*).

(3) Causal dependency may well be conducive, compulsive, obstructive, or preventive (*anukūla, bandhaka avaśyambhāvin, pratikula, pratibandhaka* respectively).

(4) While the distinction between the causally dependent (*kārya)* or the causally non-dependent (*nitya)* is crucial in Indian thought, it is open to a thinker, given the occasion, to suspend consideration of the distinction and provisionally use the more fluid distinction between the achievable (*sādhya / prāpya*) and the available (*siddha / prāpta*). Thus, language analysis consistently ignores language history and treat everything in the language being looked at as available whether it is liable to be lost or modified at a later time by virtue of causal dependency or not so liable.

(6) When is man most himself when coming to terms with what there is?

(a) In understanding rightly what there is to be understood, according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, Pratyabhijñā, Grammar (B).

(b) In accomplishing one's goal through action (*karman*), according to Common Sense, Hermeneutics.

(c) In accomplishing one's goal through action and at the same time understanding rightly what there is to be understood, according to *Bhagavadgīta,* god-participation schools, Dvaita Vedānta.

(d) In understanding rightly what there is the cope with, namely, suffering (*duḥkha/kleśa*), according to Upanishadic thought (at least some), Advaita Vedānta, Buddhism, Jainism.

Notes : (1) Thinkers under (a), (c), and (except Buddhism, Jainism) (d) recognize a non-interacting inner self (*ātman*) beyond the interacting outer self (*asmitā/ahaṁkāra*). The rest do not. (2) Thinkers under (d) also take the position that there is ultimately nothing to be understood (Buddhism, Jainism) or that what there is ultimately cannot be understood, being the Overwhelming Other (Upanishadic thought, Advaita Vedānta); B joins the second group though falling under (a).

(7) In what different ways does man intereact with what there is?

(a) Being a man is no more than being a site for certain channels of consciousness (*pudgala* individual), according to Buddhism, Jainism.

(b) Being a man is at least being a person (*puruṣa*) with certain channels of interaction, according to the rest, including Health Science.

Note : On either view, one does not think of man as body and soul put together or as body, mind, and spirit put together, but rather as a whole person to whom certain channels are available for interacting. There are certain broad correspondences between different schemes of the channels. Two such schemes widely accepted under (a) and (b) respectively are presented here for comparison.

a1 presentation (*rūpa*)	b1 gross (*sthūla*)
a2 name-holding (*nāma*)	b2 subtile (*sūkṣma*)

a2 a sensing (*vedanā*)	b2 a outer (*bāhya*)
	b2 b inner (*antar*)
a2 b mentation (*saṁjñā*)	b2 b1 minding (*mānas*)
a2 c disposition (*saṁskāra*)	b2 b2 disposing (*citta*)
a2 d mointoring (*vijñāna*)	b2 b3 controlling (*buddhi*)
	b2 b4 referral (*asmitā/ahaṁkāra*)

Sāṁkhya was probably the common source of such schemes. Each channel under b2 has a cognition aspect and an action aspect; for example, at b2 a are recognized five sense modes (sight, hearing touch, smell, taste) and five action modes (speech, handling, legging, defecation, urination-coitus). Memory is the cognitive aspect of b2 b2 and a2c. The scheme appears in Upanishadic thought as the doctrine of five sheaths covering the inner self (these *kośas* being *anna, prāṇa, manas, vijñāna, ānanda*) : they rougly correspond to b1, b2a, b2 b1 & 2, b2 b3 & 4, the fifth speath being the inmost state of the inner self.

It will be noticed that there are certain broad correlations between the positions taken on each of the key questions. In other words, not all the logically possible combinations of position are attested. There are of course many complications. B appears to plough his own rather lonely furrow (with some untypical combinations).

The task of placing B's thought will not be complete without a rough indication of the periods in the unfolding of the Indian intellectual tradition. (This broad periodization does not wholly correspond to the periodization of political-social-economic history and is subject to revision in the light of current research.)

(1) Proto-historic period 20th-8th c BC associated with *Veda* and *brāhmaṇa* texts, with a poetic-mythic-ritual-magical-ethnocentric-this-worldly worldview.

1st mytopoeia : the Indra pantheon out of the Varuna pantheon; *asura* demonolgy.

1st brahmanization : maintaining Vedic texts and practices and Sanskrit in a beleagured Aryāvarta (10th-6th c BC).

(2) Transition ot historic period 8th c-4th c BC associated with Upanishadic thought, the Epics, Buddhism and Jainism, gradual emergence of a prosaic-dialectic-ethical-technical-anthropocentria world view admitting the other-worldly option the cosmocentric option, and the genesis option (by the side of the accepted manifestation account of causal dependency), wide acceptance of the twin doctrines of *karma-phala* and rebirth.

1st spiritual ferment : Upanishadic thought, Buddhism, Jainism.

1st intellectual ferment : the emergence of disciplines and their gradual dissociation from the Vedas.

1st debrahmanization : Samkhya, Yoga, Tantra.

Note : The worldview translation has often been seen as a part of a worldwide Axial Revolution comprising Rome, Grece, Hebrew prophers (Isaiah to Jesus), Persla (Zarathushtra to Manes), India, and China (Laotse, K'ungtutse, and Mengtse).

(3) Ancient period 3rd c BC-7th c CE associated with India as the home of a world-linked civilization and the rise of Pāli and the Prākṛits (the literary vehicles of Middle Indo-Aryan).

2nd mythopoeia : the Trimūrti and Devī pantheon;

rākṣasa demonology.

2nd brahmanization 3rd c BC-4th c CE : emphasis on codification, hierarchy, constraints, anti-intellecutalism.

2nd intellectual ferment : debates between and within Vedic, Buddhist, Jain, and Vedānta camps 4th-9th c CE.

(4) Medieval period 8th c-18th c CE associated with *bhakti* cults, *purāṇa* texts, insulation from non-Hindu contacts across and within the borders, the rise of Modern Indian languages and their poetry (little or no prose or intellectual discourse in these languages) 3rd intellecutal ferment 8th-18th c CE.

2nd de-brahamnization Nath and *kuṇḍalinī* Yoga, *bhakti.*

3rd brahmanization : intellectual complacency or intolerance.

Note : Sanskrit (but not Pāli or Prakrits) continues as a vehicle of intellectual discourse in prose or verse.

(5) Post-Medieval period 19th c CE onwards associated with the challenge of modernity to the Indian tradition.

Note : The terms 'brahmanization' and 'de-brahamanization' of course refer back to Brahmanism and not to the Brahamans as such.

B belongs to the 2nd intellectual ferment, though he presents himself as a Brahmanist. He carries on from Grammar (Vyāḍi, Vājapyāyana, Audumbarāyaṇa, Patañjali, his own teacher Vasurāta); borrows and reacts to Buddhist Logic (Vasubandhu). Subsequently, B was supported by Maṇḍanamiśra (Hermeneutics to Vedanta) and Grammar (Kauṇḍa, Nāgeśa); B influenced Jain Logic (Mallavādin), Pratyabhijñā (Abhinavagupta) and Poetics (Ānandavardhana); and B was opposed by Hermeneutics (Kumārila), Logic (Vācaspati and Jayanta), Buddhist Logic (Diṅnāga, Dhrmakīriti), and Vedanta (Śaṁkara). The available commentaries on B include those of Vṛṣabha (on *VP* book I), Helārāja (on *VP* book III) Puṇyarāja (chiefly on *VP* book II), none of them later than the 10th c CE, they are of great help, apart from the auto-commentary, in the understanding of *VP kārikā's.*

In a milieu of polemical dialogues or a sententious monologue B's presentation is often in the likeness of an interior monologue in which he reviews various available positions and then offers a new position or selects an available position such that it will put the remaining positions in a new perspective that will make allowance for whatever plausibility they possess. His cognitive style is gentle rather than hard, depth-seeking rather than tidiness-seeking. Once in a while, he treats us to charming cameos of ordinary life by way of illustration (a mother pacifying a crying child by saying, 'Be quiet or the tiger will carry you away') or metaphor (a bird-catcher plying his trade).

Having placed B within the Indian tradition and having made the modern reader aware of the key questions that were being asked within that tradition, we shall now consider some of the other difficulaties in understanding B and ways of mitigating them. Inadequate translations of key terms like *śabda* (as word), *artha* (as sense), *jñāna* (as knowledge), *nitya* (as constant or even eternal) in contexts in which they don't have these senses is another difficulty that we have sought to remove. (Very often in B, these terms mean speech, speech form/language, speech meaning/what there is to be understood, understanding (cognition, causally non-dependent respectively.)

His handling of *kārikas,* which are supposed to be the verse counterparts of the prose aphorisms (*sūtras*) in intellectual discourse has not made for lucidity. His terminology is not stream-lined but fluid; this may be due to exigencies of verse form and to a relatively exploratory style, but may also be due to his pioneer status. His doctrine of *sphoṭa,* of *a-khaṇḍa-pakṣa,* and of *śabda-tattva* are often discussed in isolation from the rest of his thought, which make these seem stranger or more mystifying than they need to. His arrangement of topics does not always make for a clear grasp on our part of the over-all structure of his thought or of its cross-disciplinary ramifications. Kant has said (*Critique of Pure Reason* B 370) that our job is to understand Plato better than he understood himself. This study is an attempt to present B's thought on language with a more careful arrangement of topics, a more careful use of terminology, but with a less careful separation between what B has taken over from the tradition and from other thinkers and what he has contributed himself and also a less careful separation between what he has to say tacitly or implicitly and what he has to say explicitly. We hope to bring in greater tidiness without sacrificing either the gentleness or the depth. (What Kant said is not a piece of presumptiousness or arrogance but the recognition of one way of repaying our debt to a major thinker.)

II

The foregoing preliminary notes, sketchy as they are, should be of help to someone, especially a modern philosopher or scientist of language, in placing in perspective B's thought, which does not really recognize either a spilt between the philosophy (*mīmāṁsā* in the broader sense) of language and the science (*śāstra*) of language or a spilt between a consideration of (a) speech (*vyākaraṇa*), (b) interpretation (*mīmāṁsā* in the narrower sense of hermeneutics), and (c) cognition (*nyāya* that comprises logic, dialectic, and epistemology as one sees them today).

His thought on the narrowly grammatical questions (available in most of the 'topics' of book III of *VP*) cannot be fully understood except in the context of certain prior steps (available in books I, II, and some of the 'topics' of book III). The steps in their order are—

Language as communication (*pratipādana*)

Language as human practice (*loka-vyavahāra*)

Language as cognition (*jñāna*)

The present account, as the title suggests, is confined to these three steps. No textual references will be offered. The Sanskrit terms are given in parentheses primarily on their first occurrence and should serve to offer bearings to the reader. (A newcomer should feel free to ignore them in the first reading.)

Language as Communication : Communication (*pratipādana*) presupposes comprehension (*pratipatti*). The first is an action episode (*karman, kriyā*), but the second is a cognition episode (*jñāna* and *jñāpti*). In any communication episode, the communicator (*pratipādayitṛ*) brings about the comprehension of the meaning (*pratipādya/pratipanna*) in the comprehendor (*pratipattṛ*) with the help of some means of communication (*pratipādaka*). (B's terminology is not all that stream-lined, it is more fluid and informal, as has already been indicated. This observation applies throughout.)

All communication and ensuing comprehension is, in a deep sense, linguistic. This is true of seemingly non-linguistic communication and comprehension as in animals, newborn humans, children, even humans when they use silent language as in pointing fingers, flying banners, or wooing the beloved.

In what is normally called a linguistic communication-and-comprehension-episode, namely, a speech transaction (*vagvyavahāra*), the speaker (*vaktṛ*) brings about speech reception (*śabda-grahaṇa*) of the speech meaning (*śabda-ārtha/vācya/ukta*) in the listener (*śrotṛ, śabda-grahītṛ*) being addressed (*saṁbodhita*) with the help of some speech act (*vacana, ukti*),

One may present the causal dependency underlying the speech transaction as genesis or as manifestation.

(1) In the course of genesis, speech act as input undergoes the composite episode of speech transaction, which yields speech reception as output thanks to effectant speech bond. In the site of the speaker, speech meaning undergoes speech performance (*śabdaprayoga*) yielding speech vehicle thanks to speech bond. In the site of the listener, speech vehicle undergoes speech performance yielding speech meaning thanks again to speech bond.

(2) In the course of manifestation, unmanifest speech (*āvyakta-śabda*) undergoes the speech transaction manifesting, yielding manifest speech (*vyakta-śabda*) thanks to speech power transmission (*śabda-śakti-sañcāra*). In the site of the speaker, unmanifest speech undergoes speech power linkage (*śabdaśakti-yoga*) yielding manifest speech in successive stages thanks respectively to inner, mediate, outer speech power transmission (*paśyantī, madhyamā, vaikharī vāṇī*). In the site of the listener, manifest speech undergoes speech power linkage yielding unmanifest speech in reversed stages. The three stages in the speaker are the following : (a) inner speech that consists in figured-out (*sa-vikalpa*) speech meaning; (b) mediate speech that

consists in figured-out speech meaning and quality specified (*sa-guṇa*) speech form that is classified and sequenced segments; and (c) outer speech that consists in figured-out speech meaning and quality-specified speech form and accessbly formed speech vehicle. The stages are incremental in the speaker (speech-meaning, speech form, speech vehicle) and the listener (speech vehicle, speech form, speech meaning).

Thus, looking out of the window, one sees falling drops of water. One 'sees' that it is raining. One then recalls a dark shape seen on the horizon earlier. One 'sees' that one saw a dark cloud. One wonders about the connection between the ongoing experience and the recalled experience, and welcomes the rain on a stuffy afternoon. One 'sees' in a flash how the dark cloud has brought welcome rain. This inner seeing, this figuring out is inner speech. One silently says to oneself in English or Hindi or whatever and hears oneself saying this or that thing. This is figured-out inner speech getting translated, so to say, into figured-out mediate speech complete with classified segments in due sequence. One may then choose to speak out to another and choose what one speaks about and speaks out. The outcome is figured-out, quality-specified, and accessibly formed outer speech. One hopes that the listener will arrive at a seeing that is reasonably close to one's own seeing, after moving from accessibly formed speech through successfully formed, quality-specified speech to figuring-out, quality-specified, accessibly formed speech.

Note : B has conveyed this account in terms of manifestation by using a popular metaphor already used by grammarians in other connections : the metaphor is probably of bursting sound as on percussion (*sphoṭa*) and resulting resonance (*dhvani, nāda*) standing respectively for unmanifest speech and manifest speech.

B does not turn down the genesis account but finds the manifestation account much more illuminating.

Language as human practice : A new term, 'speech power', has been introduced. Speech power is the power that sustains speech bond in a specific language (*bhāṣā*). Now what sustains the power of the speech bond? B places language squarely in human practice.

(1) In the course of manifestation, unmanifest apeaker-intention-claim (*vivakṣā*) undergoes speech transaction yielding manifest listener-discovery (*pratyaya*) thanks to the intentionality-in-the-speech-bond (*tātparya-śakti*) in the site of the interlocutors (*vāk-prayoktṛs*).

Note : The term *tatparya-śakti* came later, B uses *yogyata* (or *yogya-bhāva*). The term *yogyatā* latter came to mean the compatibility aspect of sentence-cohesion, and *tātparya-śakti* (Literally, 'that-for-ness') was assigned to intentionality-in-the-speech-bond. The transition from speaker-intention-claim through intentionality to listener-discovery applies as much to speech vehicle and to speech form as it does to speech meaning.

(2) In the site of a would-be interlocutor, typically a child, unmanifest specific language competence (*śabda-śakti*) undergoing language acquisition (*śabda-śakti-graha*) yields manifest specific language competence (*sabda-śakti*) thanks to language faculty (*śabda-bhāvanā*) along with assistants like exposure to grown-up-interlocutor-transaction (*vṛddha-vyavahāra*) and elucidation (*vivaraṇa*) offered by grown-up interlocutors, grammarians or the like.

Two more questions can be asked for which B has only partial answers. The question 'How do specific languages arise?' was traditionally answered : 'Through language degeneration' (*apabhraṁśa*). But B holds that language faculty also causes generalized language competence (*śabda-tattva*) to be manifest, yielding unmanifest specific language competence. So we have a chain of manifestations : generalized language competence (whose details, discussed in *VP* book III, add up to what Westerners have called 'universal grammar') through specific language competence to speech transaction. The question 'Where does language faculty come from?' was answered by B : 'Through traces (*vāsanā*) left from

previous births' (which was the traditional Indian way of saying, 'as innate capacity').

The traditional Indian way of asking the question 'What sustains the power of the speech bond?' was 'Is speech bond characterized by causal dependency (*kārya-tva*) or causal non-dependence (*nitya-tva*)?' Ordinarily, interlocutors and language specialists choose to regard speech bond simply as an available (*siddha*) given. In a few cases (*samjñā-śabda*). Whichever as assigned proper names or as assigned technical terms, the speech meaning has been arbitrarily (*yadṛcchayā*) assigned to the speech form within the span of living memory (*ādhunika*). What about the majority of cases that remain?

(3) Is the speech bond essentially causal-dependency-bound (*kārya*) or causally independent (*nitya*)?

(a) It is causally dependent, being basically sustained by assignment (*saṁketa*) or by convention (*samaya*)

(a1) In accordance with God's will (*iśvaraicchā*) which imparts power to it, according to early logic, Pluralist Cosmology.

Note : This position has evoked the ironic query, 'God appears to have plenty of leisure to do it lexical item by lexical item?' This is apparently a pious way of mitigating (a), except in the case of *saṁjñā*.

(a2) In accordance with somebody's will, whether God's or (in the case of *saṁjñā*) an ordinary person's, according to later logic.

(b) It is causally independent and the common property of people (*loka*).

(b1) Except when (in the case of *saṁjñā*) effected by restrictive rule (*niyama-kṛta*), according to hermeneutics, Vedānta (b2). It is felt-to-be-appropriate (*yogyatā-rūpa*) because people, conditioned by memory of constant association (*nitya-sāhacarya-smṛti*), actually impute (*adhyāsa*) the meaning to the speech form; indeed they even identify the two (*tādātmya*), according to Grammar.

(c) It is sustained by specific language competence which is manifest generalized language competence, according to B.

Language as cognition : All cognition is, in a deep sense, linguistic; this is true of seemingly non-linguistic cognition, as in animals, newborn humans, children. Comprehension of what is communicated is of course only a special case of cognition. Generalized language competence covers both communication and comprehension, and, again, both comprehension following communication and comprehension of on-going and recalled experience.

In taking this position, B does not receive much support. The 'linguistic turn' that begins with Nāgarjuna and culminates in B in Indian philosophy does not quite fructify. This position of B is his way of saying three things :

(1) Some say that cognition needs to reach out to what there is, but what there is inherent in the cognizer, typically the cognizer's consciousness. The impression that what there is can be independent of the cognizer is no more than the cognizer's imaginative figuring out of something out there. B argues that, while no cognition is free from interpretation (*nirūpaṇa*), this additive is not so much a matter wholly private to the cognizer as a matter publicly shared through generalized language competence if not through specific language competence. Even wholly silent cognition that does not get `translated' into mediate or outer speech falls back on inner speech. How else to account for space or time sense, for example?

(*pratyaya*)

(2) Is there pure discovery that is yet free from inner speech? Pure sensation, for example? B concedes that this can be. But such pure discovery is cognition in only a rudimentary sense : it cannot be retrieved, communicated, or manipulated in any way. Any cognition worth the name involves at least some figuring out (*vikalpa*) and any such figuring out attracts at least rudimentary mediate spech forms (such as 'this', 'that', 'something or other'). As we have already seen, inner speech is figured-out (*sa-vikalpa*). Figuring out, inner speech (*paśyantī*), time-wise imaging or storying (*kriyā-vivarta*),

space-wise imaging or picturing (*mūrti-vivarta*) are all channelled through disposing (*citta*). (B uses the cover term *pratibhā* for all such capacities of *citta.*) Sooner or later, we have to recognize inmost recesses of *paśyantī,* call it *parā-paśyantī* if you like. (Later, the terms *parā-paśyantī* or simply *parā* came to be used.) (In any case, how else to account for mystical experience except as inmost seeing, figured-out or non-figured-out as the case may be?)

(3) Man is most himself in understanding rightly what there is to be understood. What there is to be understood cannot be understood, being the Overwhelming Other (*brahman*), the eminently unmanifest, any aspect of the manifest being no more than an imposed figuring out (*vivarta*). Considering that all that is manifest is open to interpretation through speech (*śabda*), what better way could there be of being most oneself in understanding rightly than through generalized speech competence (*śabda-tattva*) reaching to the inmost recesses of speech. One has access to the overwhelming other through speech (*śabda-tattva-brahman*).

Note : Compare similar claims about musical resonance (*nāda-brahma*).

Another related position that B takes and that was widely resisted was his invoking unmanifest speech (*āvyaktaśabda*) or *sphoṭa* in attempting certain problems in accounting for the operations of language recognized by Indian grammarians, namely, the following—

(1) How is it that varying manifests are figured out as the same language unit, whether speech sound (*varṇa*), word (*pada*), or sentence (*vākya*)? By virtue of the unmanifest kind (*jāti-sphoṭa*).

(2) How is it that fragmented manifests are figured out as the united language unit, whether speech sound, word, or sentence? By virtue of the unmanifest unity (*akhaṇḍa-sphoṭa*).

Actually, B proposed his version of the *sphoṭa* doctrine in connection with *varṇa-jāti-sphoṭa, akhaṇḍa pada-sphoṭa,* and

akhaṇḍa-vākya-sphoṭa. Others applied it to the remaining cases. The crucial point that concerns B's version of the doctrine is the janus-faced role played by unmanifest speech sound, unmanifest word, and unmanifest sentence. They are both signates (*vācyas*) and signants (*vācakas*). Thus, unmanifest word is the signate of speech sounds but the signant of speech meanings. B also takes up another related problem.

(3) How is it that certain operator speech forms such as certain flexions or particles participate in the speech meaning formulation or comprehension without any speech meaning directly assignable to them? They are essentially signants that assist other signants in meaning formulation or comprehension. Thus, a negative operator within a word or a sentence has no signate of its own but merely bars the signate of the signant it accompanies.

Note : Later, such operators were treated not as signants (*vācakas*) but as co-signants (*dyotakas*). B distinguishes between grammatically figured-out speech forms (*anvākhyeya-śabda*) and communicating speech forms (*pratipādaka-śabda*); his attempt to assimilate the content/operator speech form distinction to this latter distinction is not wholy felicitous.

This exposition of what B has got to say on language when read carefully with the preliminary notes should serve to reveal the wide-ranging scope and the deep penetration of this pioneering thinker on language. (Let it be noted that we have left out B's insights on the specific topics in language.) Those familiar with modern studies of B will appreciate that the tendency to mystification has been consistently resisted in the present account. It may be noted in passing how Saussure resembles B in adopting a semiotic framework in thinking on language and linguistic analysis.

III

How do we sum up the over-all trend of B's thought on language as a philologist (lover of speech) and as a philosopher (lover of wisdom) in a terminology that is accessible to us?

(1) Language (unmanifest speech power) is certainly a means (contributory cause) of communication (*pratipādana*). But it is much more. It is nothing less than a medium (manifestation) of human understanding or cognition (*jñāna*) in that a generalized speech power manifests man's capacity for cognition and a specific language manifests that generalized speech power.

(a) So, as a philologist, he attends to the speech meaning rather than the speech vehicle.

(b) So, as a philosopher, he sees part meanings as no more than intersections of whole meanings (*a-khaṇḍa-śabda-artha*), and sees universals (kinds, qualities, actions) rather than particulars (substances, individuals) as the basis of the unity of word meaning.

(2) Language use (speech transaction, *vāc-vyavahāra*) is certainly the performing of a text calling for interpretation. But it is much more. It is nothing less than the performing of an act calling for a response.

(a) So, as a philologist, he attends to the actual specifics (speech transaction) rather than the abstract form (speech power, *śabda-śakti*). The specific context (s), for example, are accorded special attention.

(b) So, as a philosopher, he sees configuration (*kalpanā*) imposed by the minding faculty (*manas*) rather than any direct accout of what there is out there (*bāhyārtha*) as available to man.

It should be interesting, and instructive, to compare B's thought on language with that of Wittgenstein, early and late. Earlier Wittgenstein, an associate of ideal language philosophers, appears to agree with B in respect of (2), (2b) but not so much in respect of (1), (1b). Later Wittgenstein, an associate of Ordinary language philosophers and a part-time philologist, appears to agree with B on both (1), (1b) and (2), (2b). One difficulty in comparing the two thinkers is that the problematics they are disposed to select for closer attention in applying their basic insights present a somewhat limited overlap. This, of course, is also a measure of the difference between the traditions within which the two respectively operate.

It will be interesting to make similar comparisions with other Indian and Western thinkers on language. The following schemata are only a tentative beginning subject of course not only to elaboration but also to possible corrections.

(1) (A) Language is chiefly a means of human communication and its use is chiefly the making of text.

(B) Language is chiefly a means of human communication and its use is chiefly the performing of an act.

(C) Language is chiefly a medium of human cognition and its use is chiefly the making of a text.

(D) Language is chiefly a medium of human cognition and its use chiefly is the performing of an act.

Note : It will be seen that B fits best under (D), and so does later Wittgenstein but earlier Wittgenstein fits best under (B).

(2) Philologists :

(A) Pāṇini, the *śikṣā* phonologists; Bloomfield.

(B) The *prakriyā* Grammarians (like Bhaṭṭoji), the *prātiśākhya* phoneticians; Saussure, the Prague School, Halliday.

(C) Nāgeśa; Chomsky

(D) Bhartṛhari; Sapir, the rebels against Chomsky.

Note : The cleavage between (A, C) and (B, D) appears to be more salient than that between (A, B) and (C, D).

(3) Philosophers of language

(A) Logic (*nyāya* school); Locke

(B) Ideal language philosophy, earlier Wittgenstein

(C) Hermeneutics (*mīmāṁsā* school); Descrates, Frege

(D) Bhartṛhari; Kant, Humboldt, later Wittgenstein, Ordinary language philosophy

Note : The cleavages appear to go the same way as with

philologists (note under 2). Appearently, the alternative (B) is not attested among Indian philosophers of language.

There is of course more to B and other thinkers on language than such pigeonholing, but some diversion was needed after such a strenuous journey.

A Select Bibliography for Further Reading

Texts and Translations

Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari. Ed. Abhyankar, K.V.; Limaye, V.P., Pune : University of Pune, 1965. (Bare text)

Bhartṛharis Vākyapadīya. Ed. Rau,Wilhelm. Wiesbaden : Franz Steiner for Deutsche Morgenlandische Gesellschaft, 1977. (Bare text, with a *pada*-index). Another verson, Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya II, 1991. (Bare text).

Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari. Ed. and transl.Iyer, K.A. Subramania. Kanda 1, vṛtti, Vṛsabha' commentary. Pune : Deccan College, 1966. English tr. Pune : Deccan College, 1965.

Kānda 2, vṛtti, Punyaraja's commentary. Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1983. English tr. Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1977.

Kānda 3, Helaraja's commentary, 2 parts. Pune : Deccan College, 1963, 1973. English tr. Pune : Deccan College, 1971 (pt. 1); Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1974 (pt. 2). (No vṛtti on books has come down to us; probably none was written).

Bhartṛhari Vākyapadīya Brahmakānda. Avec le vṛtti de Harivṛsabha. Texte reproduit de editon de Lahore (ed. Charudev Sastri, in 2 parta, 1934, 1939/40). Traduction, introductio et notes. Bliardeau, Madeline. Parts de Boccard, for instiout de Cvilisation indienne, 1964. (Translation closer than Iyer's translation.)

Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari. Ed. Abhyankar, K.V.; Limaye, V.P. Pune : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1970.

Critical ed. with Engish tr. (ahnikas 1-7). 8 fascicules, by various hands. Pune : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1985-91.

Indian Intellectual Tradition

Mohanty, Jatindra Nath. Indian philosophy. In : Encyclopaedia Britannica. 15th ed. Chicago; London 1974. Macropaedia Vol. 9, p. 313-34.

Potter, Karl H. Presuppositions of India's philosophies. Englewood chiffs, NJ : Prentice-Hall, 1963.

Bary, William Theodore de, & others, compilers. Sources of Indian tradition. New York : Columbia U.P., 1958. Indian rpt : Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1963. (Extracts in English translation.)

Indian Thought on Grammar, Language, Logic, Cognition, and Reality

Biardeau, Madeleine. Theorie de la connaissance et philosophie de parole dans le brahmanisme classique. Paris; The Hague : Mouton, 1964.

Chakraborti, Prabhat Chandra. The Philosophy of Sanskrit grammar. Calcutta 1931.

----- Linguistic speculations of the Hindus. Calcutta 1933.

Kunjunni Raja, K. Indian theories of meaning. Chennai (Madras) : Adyar Library, 1963; revised 1969. (Based on U. of London Ph. D diss., 1954.)

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. Epistemology, logic, and grammar in Indian philosophical analysis. The Hague : Mouton 1971. Sections 1 : 4, p 29-34; 3 : 5,p 109-13 on B's thought.

----- Logic, language and reality : An Introduction to Indian philosophical studies. Delhi : Motial Banarsidass, 1985.

----- The Word and the world : India's contribution to the study of language. Delhi : Oxford U.P., 1990. Chapters 8, p 84-98; 99, p 120-32, 12, p 133-41.

Ruegg, David Seyfort. Contributions a l'histoire de la philosophie

linguistique indienne. Paris : de Boccard, for Instunt de Civilisation indienne, 1959.

Coward, Harold G.; Kunjunni Raja, K. ed. The Philosophy of the grammarians. Being : Encyclopaedia of Indian philosophies. Ed. Potter, Karl H., Vol. 5. Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1990.

Staal, John F., ed. A Reader on the Sanskrit grammarians. Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 1951; Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1985.

Bhartṛhari's Thought

Aklujkar, Ashok Narhar. The Philosophy of Bhartṛhari's Trikāṇḍi. Harvard U.Ph.D. diss. 1970, unpublished.

---- Bhartṛhari. In : Arrington, Robert L., ed. A companion to the philosophers. Oxford : Blackwell, forthcoming.

Gauriantha Sastri. The Philosophy of word and meaning : Some Indian approaches with special reference to Bhartṛhari. Calcutta : Government Sanskrit College, 1959. Rptd 1981.

---- A Study of the dialectics of sphoṭa. Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1980.

---- The Philosophy of Bhartṛhari. Delhi : Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1991.

Iyer, K.A. Subrahmania. Bhartṛhari : A Study of the Vākyapadīya in the light of the ancient commentaries. Pune : Deccan College, 1969.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna; Sen, P.K. The Context principle and some Indian controversies over meaning. Mind 97 : 73-97, January 1988. (Frege, Mīmāṁsā, and Bhartṛhari.)

Bhate, Saroja; Kar, Yashodhara. Word index to theVākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari (together with the complete text). Delhi : Eastern Book Linkers, 1992.

---- Bronkhorst, Johannes, ed. Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartṛhari, University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992. Being : Asiatische Studien / Etudes asiatiques. Bern : Peter Lang. 47 : 1, 1993. Rptd as a book : Bhartṛhari :

Philosopher and grammarian : Proceedings ..... Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1994, rptd 1997. Including : Aklujkar, Ashok N. An Introduction to the study of Bhartṛhari, p 7-36; Ramseier, Yves, Bibliography of Bhartṛhari, p 235-67.

Ravi, Wilhelm. Bhartṛharis Vākyapadīya Vollständiger Wortindex zu den *mūlakārikās*. Stuttgart : Franz Steiner, for Akademic der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, 1988.

---- With Peri Sarveswara Sharma, ed. Vākyapadīyaprameyasaṁgraha..... München : Wilhelm Fink, for Marburger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, 1978. (Anonymous scholia on *VP*, book II).

Colophon

This is a thoroughly revised version of a paper presented at the seminar on 'Word and Sentence : Two perspectives : Bhartrihari and Wittgenstein' at Sahitya Akademi (The Indian Academy of Letters), New Delhi, on 12-14 December 1994. The paper owes its existence to my senior friend Professor K.J. Shah who would not take a no for an answer from an absolute novice in Bhartṛhari studies. Unfortunately he did not live to attend the seminar that he had planned. To his fond memory I dedicate this essay.

A novice badly needs both encouragement and nitpicking criticis. Both were presented in ample measure by my junior friend, Professor Ashok Aklujkar (Department of Asian Studies, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada) who suffered its two earlier versions as also my obstinacies. Comments will be welcome from the knowledgeable as well as the curious and may be sent to the following address : 7 Dhananjay, 759/83 off Bhandarkar Road, Pune-411 004, India.

This paper is also being published in the Yearbook of South Asian Linguisties 1999 (Sage India, New Delhi).

❐

Speech as an Ongoing Activity Comparing Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein

Lachman M. Khubchandani

There has been a keen contest among the philosophers of language between the view that the primary function of language is (1) that of an instrument of communication, and the view that it is (2) that of a vehicle of thought. This has a great bearing on the debates over the theory of meaning for a language and its actual use.

One detects quite many similarities in the expositions of Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein concerning language and its relation to reality. At the same time, there are significant differences in their orientations. Ancient sciences, the *śāstras,* are generally attributed with a *holistic* approach to knowledge—understanding the real world in totality, as illustrated by Bhartṛhari's *sphoṭa* theory. The contemporary science, the *vijñāna,* probes knowledge in *analytic* terms as a relational system.

In the reality of everyday life what synergically transpires (or is actually grasped, i.e. an ac*tion*) from a speech event matters more than what it signifies. The instrinsic stability of the concepts of natural language and their openness, their being not well-defined, and their undergoing changes along with usage just as the reality itself changes, lead us to a new meaning of the term 'understanding'. It is only in natural language that we can be sure of touching reality. A convergence of perspectives that other groups of people may have a different basis from our own all the 'openness' for all kinds of concepts.[1]

The Whole is Prior to the Parts

The Indian school of philosophy has a rich tradition dating back more than two thousand years capable of shedding light on the humanistic perspective of communication. Indian thought examined the relation of language to consciousness. All aspects of the world and human experience were thought of as illuminated by language.

The *sphoṭa* theory of Bhartṛhari is based on the logic that "the whole is prior to the parts". It accounts for a continuum of cognition, resulting in an ascending hierarchy of speech levels, whether one is dealing with factual scientific language or a poem or a book : *vākya, mahāvākya, akhaṇḍamahāvākya.* The word is subsumed by the sentence, the sentence is subsumed by discourse, the discourse by the chapter (component), the chapter by the book, and so on, until all speech is identified with *Brahman.* The terms *śabdabrahma* carries the connotation of indivisible word, sentence, discourse, text, and the ultimate consciousness. In reality only an indivisible speech act, a text (sentence) as a physical whole, is meaningful.

The concept of *sphoṭa,* the ulitmate in language, has been interpreted by traditional grammarians as "something intent which takes *form"* just as a flower blooms; its literal meaning bursting, plosion signifies the point that verbal and non-verbal signals evoke a situation of reality just as throwing a pebble in a pond causes ripples. Maṇḍana Miśra's reasoning based on the analogy of the jeweler's cognition points out that a jeweler by his continuous gaze (i.e. a series of cognitions), perceives the genuineness of the stone but with increasing clarity. Each cognition leaves its *saṁskāra,* a common memory trace; the last cognition helped by all previous *saṁskāras,* fully perceives the genuineness of the stone. An expert before beginning the examination of the stone had the image of a precious stone ingrained is his subconscious. This image is revealed by *sphoṭa* in the jeweler's mind at the end of his series of partial, as well as erroneous, perceptions.[2]

Bhartṛhari identifies three speech levels : At the 'outer speech'

level of *vaikharī vāk,* the sounds uttered sequentially make up a sentence, a poem, or a book. The 'inner speech' level of *paśyantī vāk* marks an instantaneous perception of the reality the *sphoṭa* : "a bursting forth of illumination of insight". In this context, all intuitive flashlike understanding of meaning of any sentence (or a discourse) as a whole is described as *pratibhā.* Between the two there is *madhyamā vāk* the mide level of speech. Here the unitary *sphoṭa* breaks up into a sequence of thoughts, phrases and words but has not yet reached the separateness of individually uttered sounds. The integral *vāk* is gradually externalized when speaking; when listening, this is reversed.[3]

Communication as a spontaneous activity is characterized by effortlessness. The Buddhist doctrine of the *madhyama mārga* `Middle Path' *stresses* the fact that man functions at his best in the merging of two extremes, i.e. by treading the middle path. Such moderation enables harmony between relaxation and alertness. Spontaneity transcends intellectual evaluation. The Jain theory *syādvāda* is another codification proposing multi-valued logic which stresses, complementarity, potency, potentiality, and possibility.

Greek philosophers have also drawn attention to the holistic interaction involving all the elements of Nature. According to Anaxagoras, the nature of reality is best understood as consisting of *mind* (*nous*) and *matter;* each part contains what is in the whole of reality, each thing having a special 'portion' of everything in it. It is akin to the breaking of a single magnet producing two magnets, and not two isolated magnetic poles : [4]

North	South
N S	N S

Such a holistic approach to science enables us to work towards a slow merger of physical sciences with social sciences. For modern natural sciences there is no longer in the beginning the material object, but *form*, mathematical symmetry. Since mathematical structure is in the last analysis an "intellectual construct"—the image, the "idea",

we could say, in the words of Goethe's Faust : "In the beginning was the word, the logos"; in the terms of Bhartṛhari, the *Śabdabrahma.*

II

What is Customarily Said

Many different theories of meaning distinguished by various concepts such as sense, knowledge, reference, and truth value are debated to improve and expand our horizons of understanding verbal communication : [5]

— What constitutes successful communication ?

— What is the relation between words and concepts ?

— Can the meaning be attributed to the originator, to the code transmitted, or to the recipient ?

— Is meaning an *absolute* property of the utterance without reference to the originator or the recipients, or is the speech act to be viewed as a physical whole responding to the complex reality in everyday life?

Patañjali claims : "Meaning is not to be produced by a word, but a word is to be produced by meaning."

Coherence in natural orders is classified on a *scale.* There are different ranges of magnitude within "measurement constant". One attaches a certain *range* of meaning to words and sentences of the language. The theory of meaning is intended merely as a systematization of the understanding which a speaker manifested in his/her use of language.

Wittgenstein and other contemporary philosophers have been engaged with the issues concerning meaning, understanding, intention content, and objectivity. Wittgenstein's treatment of meaning and understanding has been summarized in four themes :[6]

1. To mean something by a sign is not to be the subject of an inner state or process.
2. To understand a sign is not to interpret it in a particular way.

3. Using a sign in accordance with a rule is not founded upon reasons.
4. To understand a sign is to have mastery of a technique or customs of using it.

According to Wittgenstein, language and all rule - governed institutions "are founded not in our internalization of the same strongly autonomous, explanation-transcendent rules, whose requirements we then succeed, more or less, in collectively tracking, but in primitive dispositions of agreement in judgement and action."[7] The requirement of rules exist only within the framework of institutional activities. The very existence of any rules depends on some rules being applied, and one rule being applied only *once* would not be enough. This capacity is to be guided by *normativity,* by cooperative institutional environment, within a framework of extensive institutional activity.

Wright (1989) points out to Wittgenstein's mistrust of erecting mythological picture about the content of language as "rule-following", as active in the Platonist philosophy of mathematics and in the Cartesian philosophy on inner experience (i.e. innate faculties of the speaker).[8] Wittgenstein posits an alternative account of normativity, to explain how there can be standable middle ground between the hypothetization of "rules-as rails" imagery; "If you see a rule to give a description, you yourself do not know more than you say .... If you say, 'and so and so', you yourself do not know more than 'and so and so'.[9]

There is a sufficient gap between the requirements of a rule and a subject's reaction in any particular case. Texts are guided by the notion of "free play" tempered by normativity; this phenomenon abrogates the spurious autonomy of rules. The grasp of such a rule is thus the internalization of an open-ended set of pre-ordained requirements, an informational state accessible, as Wittgenstein had his interlocutor put it, only by a kind of *quesswork.*[10] In Prigoginian terms all systems, close or open, cotain subsystems that are continually "fluctuating" : "Free will downstairs operated only within the limits of a menu determined upstairs".

This onging *flexibility,* in correlating linguistic form with context, regulated according to the expediency of the communicative task, is the concern of pragamatic grammar. "All meanings are sensitive to contexts that, taken together, constitute a galaxy of contexts"; these contexts are labeled as "semantic galaxies".[12] It exhibits the connection between the theory of meaning for a language and the actual use. Language to a speech act can be characterized as an organism that drives to a purpose; it acquires a "practical cash-value" determined by relevant use.[13] Coarse meaning (the `blueprint') will both determine and be determined by use. Wittgenstein positively insists on *use* itself as the determinant of meaning.[14] There is no fact of the matter concerning what someone means. There could be variable "readings" of the same text.

This phenomenon explains Wittgenstein's preference for "piecemeal" description of "what is customarily said", and his rejection of the *centrality* of the notion of truth to an account of pragmatics. He regards "understanding" as a practical capacity associated with the multiple application thesis" : "To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess are customs" (uses, institutions).[15]

Often different roles in a setting or different identities or cultural legacies from one generation to another transmit some prominent values of interaction — a common way to interpret, to share experiences. That common way, that a sort of general framework is called the *communication ethos.*[16] Sharing some same ethos does not mean that the existing differences are to be eliminated; these traits get integrated through a superconsensus; "... the things it aims at, prizes and endorses, and more or less achieves."[17] One has to account for the play of cross-purpose elements in interpreting reality. In everyday life communications, such elements get adjusted through various "fuzzy" strategies such as elucidating, itemizing, etc.[18]

People in a community do often share concepts and translational

meaning, despite differences in their beliefs about the world, and even differences in their explications of the relevant terms.[19] In the pragmatic and transactive modes of usage, words live and move, a characteristic of an ongoing process.

III

A Synergic Process

Communication at the human level utilizes language as an infinitely subtle and flexible instrument to cope with a variety of relations and a diversity of facts :

"Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced ..... Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it."[20]

Everyday speech in human interaction, though not well-defined, never loses immediate connection with the reality, whereas the idealized language with precisely defined concepts is confined to a construct, a sort of `formalized' reality. A speech act can potentially have multiple interpretations in the way that in an interaction, oral or written, the "perceived" may differ from the "measured" objective reality. Interpretation is a semiotic exercise, characterized by its "spontaneous" effortless condition (see the appendix).

Communications in everyday life are based on the *synergic* relationship between the twin criteria : (i) *The reciprocity of languge skills* among communications (spread over a speech spectrum comprising one or more languages, dialects, styles, etc.)

(ii) the mutuality of focus (that is, sharing the *relevance* of the setting, commonly attributed to the attitudes, moods, or feelings of the participants.)[21]

One characteristic harmoniously blends with the other. Such a relationship accounts for the element of *indeterminacy,* a sort of tentativeness in human encounters characterized by implicitness in

everyday communication events, built into the synergic process itself. Time, distance, disparities in outlook or in assumed references require a message to be an operation of "interpretative decipherment".[22] Such indeterminate characteristics account for the quality of communication in face-to-face encounters and in creative writings. Ambiguity becomes a virtue in many human communication settings : *He didn't say in so many words what he* meant.

According to Husserl, indeterminacy as a progenerative medium "points ahead to possible perceptual multiplicities".[23] It is a "determined indeterminacy"; I *know what this is all about I should not want to say.*[24] In this context, Derrida's comments are meaningful : "The meaning of meaning of meaning .... is infinite implication, the indefinite referral of signifier to signifier ..... (its force) engages to its own *economy* so that it always signifies again and differs."[25] Garfinkel also points out that the meaning of every utterance in a conversation bears an etcetera "the open horizon which inhabits the world," a license for permitting some indeterminacy.[26]

In this ongoing process, the manoeuvres are always negotiatively shaped choices, working out temporary choices based on the relevance of a context. Dasgupta calls this kind of reasoning "exduction" distinct from deducation and induction. One can afford to be "tentative" in keeping track of options, working out contradicting alternatives : doing one derivation from assumption *p* and *q*, and another from assumption not *p* and not *q*.[27]

Wittgenstein has been attributed with inventing a startling "Regress-of interpretation" Paradox : "But how can a rule show me what I have to do at *this* point? Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule ..... any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning."[28]

Wittgenstein discusses intuitional epistemology, pointing out the contrast between "intuition" and "decision" (*Entscheidung*). Intuition *implies* and decision *repudiates* the suggestion that one can

say nothing by way of justification for one's particular way of proceeding. Intuition suggests an unarticulated *ur-cognition* a form of knowledge too basic to admit of any further account. This primal (primitive) faculty can accomplish harmony between the real requirement of a rule and a subject's impression of them. As Wittgenstein puts it : "If intuition is an inner voice (comparable to Bhartṛhari's *Pratibhā*) — how do I know *how* I am to obey it? And how do I know that if doesn't mislead me? For if it can guide me right, it can also guide me wrong. This is what we human beings are."[29]

In a linguistic interchange, the hearer's presumption that he/she has understood the speaker can never be definitely refuted or confirmed; he can only have evidence that he has done so, which falls short of being conclusive. So regarded, communication rests ultimately on *faith* - trusting that one has hit on the very theory of meaning that one's interlocutor has internalized. An individual's explicational ability not only does not suffice to fix the referent of the individual word, it does not exhaust the meaning expressed by a word in the individual's ideolect.[30]

In everyday life decisions contain an inevitable element of irrationality. The decision may be a result of deliberation, but at the same time complementary to deliberation; it exclude deliberation and decision.[31] One will always have to act on an insufficient evidence. The decision always rests on by pushing away all arguments, understood or not, and by cutting off all as a basis for action. Without such a firm stand our own actions would lose all force. In this sense, some real or apparent truth forms the basis of life.

The Heisenberg 'Principle of Uncertainty' in physics shows clearly that the concept of probability "potentia" in an event is to be reckoned as a kind of reality. The possibility or "tendency" for an event to take place has a kind of reality. The potentiality may involve or overlap with other potentialities. In view of this, the distinction between a *real* and an *apparent* contradiction has disappeared. Capra,

explaining the parallelism between modern physics and Eastern mysticism, makes out a compelling case for believing that the trends in the development in the new physics tend to be similar to the basic tenets and insights in ancient Indian and Chinese mystical and philosophical traditions.[32]

The potential energy of relevance shows man's ingenuity in abstracting or transcribing everyday reality through speech. Projections of different focuses through selection and shift mechanisms convey much more than is grasped at the cognitive plane; they also camouflage many details. A speech event carries a "formal" meaning within sentence (s) signifying subject, predicate, and so on; a "specificatinal" meaning within a context (conditioned by interactional roles, setting, channel, etc.), and an "effective" meaning within the discourse, emerging from the relavance of interaction.[33] A sentence does not "convey" meaning the way a truck conveys cargo, complete and packaged, It is more like a blue print that allows the bearer to reconstruct the meaning from his knowledge (Winograd 1974).[34]

In the light of this, a three-dimensional model of language isolates (1) the *cognitive* dimension, to draw a broad "blueprint" of verbal activity, (2) the *identity* dimension, for providing "specific" social details to the blueprint, and (3) the *design* dimension, to "filter" differential values over the specified details of the blueprint; it intensifies, in a way, the focus that heightens compatability in a speech act.[35]

Expressive modulations in a creative process, a "language design" so to say, *open up* many choices to cope with any unprecedented communicative tasks : `The selective function of meaning depends on "the states of readiness"; as in the game of chess" the movement of a black pawn may mean to the "white" players a *threat,* to the "black" player a *relief,* and to an ignorant onlooker the *displacement* of a piece of carved wood'.[36]

IV

Complementarity of Intuition and Reason

In the pursuit of knowledge, modern sciences generally stress isolating a phenomenon under study by controlling its variables : "all other things being equal". Each discipline attempts to arrive at a totality, by aggregating or multiplying a single dimension, giving a fragmented picture of the phenomenon, failing to present a total view of life. It reminds us of the parable of the "blind men and the elephant": the blind men determined the reality from insulated examination of only one or more parts (identifying them as pillars, walls, fans, etc.), but missing the *organic* whole.[37]

Many philosophers accept formalized domains with a sharp boundary and with a closure of some sort, and the logic of replicating each mode of accounting on a domain-by-domain-basis.[38]

Today in interdisciplinary enquiries one notices lot of cross-fertilization on the surface, but these investigations hardly question the "established" domain boundaries.[39]

Bhartṛhari tackles the unity of language, *sphoṭa,* by relating the "universal" and "particular" characteristics of meaning at two speech levels : (1) the word "reflected" at the *paśyantī* level, in the intellect of both the speaker and the listener, (2) the word "uttered" at the *vaikharī* level—the word in action, the word used i.e. the action accomplished; as stated earlier "what synergically transpires". Wittgenstein's *language-game* identifies the process of internalization of an open-ended set of pre-ordained requirements in speech, as a "paradox of interpretation," as conditioned by the analytic tradition of linearity. On the other hand, Bhartṛhari gives central position to *madhyamā vāk;* it represents the *integral* level of speech.

Verbal discourse in everyday life is an integral activity, a complex interplay betwen linguistic exchange and related action. It gets modulated on a scale of *intentive* and *instinctive* extremes. Bhartṛhari describes this phenomenon by positing two times : 1)

Vṛttkāla speech in a sequential time, as in *vaikhaī vāk,* and 2) *svakala;* speech in own time instantaneous time, as in *paśyantī vāk.* At the intentive end, thought processes are sequential through audio-monitered (i.e. calculated) speech. Verbalization is overt and deliberate. At the instinctive end, communication processes are largely simulataneous with extemporized speech; verbalization is spontaneous and involuntary.

The instinctive use of language is characterized by implict regulation, depending on identity pressures, suggestion, inference and design. These elements are prominently manifested on the stage or in a literary work. Conversely, the intentive use of language is characterized by an explicit value system, maximally detached from the context for precise and overt manifestation. These elements are prominent in formalistic, legal and scientific discourse.

A focus on an external manifestation of word projects discourse on a "rational" plane, and a reflection over the speech act as a whole draws attention towards the unity of a discourse on an "intuitive" plane. Characterizing Wittgenstein's perspective as "rational" and Bhartṛhari's as "intuitive" can be justified in the light of the analytic and holistic orientations of their enquiry. For Bhartṛhari, "*Brahman* is the principle of unity which is the starting point as also the goal. And it does not lay down the specific rules, it embodies a method of understanding any language."[40]

Bhartṛhari's two levels of speech highlight the *complementarity* of "intuition" and "reason" in a discourse, a text. The Wittgenstein theory of language use also looks for its justification in the basis of unity; "that is what we human beings are". A discourse in a quest for the conscious, or poem for the *Sahṛdya,* the *rasika,* or a speech event in everyday life communication setting are primarily understood and acted upon through the faculty of intuition. On the other hand, a text arguing scientific concepts, a narrative of an eyewitness in the court room, or instructions in an utility-oriented setting are deliberated through deductive and inductive reasoning and inference. The degree

of prominence of different faculties of interlocutors (or readers) could be *relevant* to the communitative task of discourse. Shah's comments succintly bring out the relevance of both intuition and reason in a discourse : "Intuition without reason lacks power and reason without intuition lacks direction."

Appendix

Speech as living phenomena

Speech process	**Normative entity**
I. Communication device	
1. an organic process, potentially diverse and heterogeneous	a formalized entity, emphasizing uniformity
2. regarded as a nonautonomous device, communicating in symphony with other non-linguistics devices; its full signification can be explicated only from the imperatives of context and communicative tasks	and homogeneity ideally aiming at the targets of being an autonomous and unambiguous tool of communication
3. interpretation dependent on the focus of communication 'field' and the degree of individual's 'sensitivity' toward it.	interpretation relying heavily on explicit formulas—grammars, dictionaries, etc.; efforts for consistency made through the standardization apparatus
4. An effortless integral activity; discourse centres around the 'event' with the support of ad hoc 'expression' strategies	an ideal-oriented representation requiring directed effort; discourse concentrates on "expression", which measures the "event"

II. Strategy of control

5. guided by implicit identity pressures - a sort of etiquette agreed upon ad hoc by those participating in it	characterized by explicitly defined value system - a prescriptive code with sanctions from the language elite in the community
6. regulated by "situation-bound" propriety in which ecosystems, constituting the social reality "here and now", claim a prominent share.	conditioned by "tradition-inspired" profiles in which "time-honoured" standard practices (spelled out through the grammatical accounts, lexicons, and style sheets) dominate the scene
7. permissive toward inherited variations linked with region, class etc.	less tolerant toward such ascribed deviations; assimilatory pressures in favour of the elitist standard variety

III. Total repertoire

8. total verbal repertoire is malleable, responsive to contextual expediencies resulting in uninhibited convergence between speech varieties with the contact pressures of pidginization, hybridization, code-switching, etc.	total verbal repertoire is demarcated for the demands of different normative systems (specified by a "distant" elite) involving stress on maintaining divergent development of a different system, and insistence on exclusiveness or "purity" of tradition

9. greater scope for functional fluidity leading to innovations and creativity of expression in negotiating the event	Restrictions over the scope of or spontaneity and creativity due to the pressures of exclusive conformity to different systems
10. fuzzy speech boundaries; interlocking variations responding to covert stratificational and situational differences	sharp language boundaries; compartmentalization through overt linguistic differentia

Source : Khubchandani (1983) (f. note 39)

FOOTNOTES

1. "The concepts of natural language, vaguely defined as they are, seem to be more stable in the expansion of knowledge than the precise terms of scientific language, derived as an idealization from only limited groups of phenomena..... hence we must be sceptical about any scepticism with regard to this natural language and its essential concepts" (Werner Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy : The revolution in Modern Science,* London : Allen and Unwin, 1959, pp. 171-72.)
2. Kantian epistemology also maintains that the senses first intuitively *grasp* the object; then the pure forms of understanding *categorize* the object; and finally the active standing *categorize* the object; and finally the active faculty of reason *integrates* the object i.e.; positing intuitively a definite cognitive form for it in the perceiver's subjectivity and making possible a synthetic judgement (Hosaku Matsuo, *The Logic of Unity,* tr. by K.A. Inada. State Univ. of New York, Albany, 1981).
3. Subramanya K.A. Iyer, *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari,* Vol. I. Deccan College Research Institute, Pune, 1963; Harold Coward,

Sphota Theory fo Language, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1980; discussed in L.M. Khubchandani "Reality and Scientific construct from a linguistic perspective". In : *Philosophy of Science,* eds J.V. Narlikar etal. Indian Instt. of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1992, p. 56-66; "Reality and Scientific construct : Methodological pluralism in a sociolinguistic perspective." *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* Vol. 100-101. Mouton, 1993.

4. John D. Barfow, "Inner space and outer space" In : *World Within the World,* Clarendon, Oxford, 1988 174-75.
5. S.S. Barlingay, *Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections.*

   Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publication, Pune 1983.
6. Colin McGinn, *Wittgenstein on Meaning.* Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984, p. 3.
7. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* tr. by G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxord, 1973. p. 211.
8. Crispin Wright, "Critical notice", *Mind,* Vol. xcviii. Oxford Univ. Press, 1989.
9. L. Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* IV. p. 8.
10. C. Wright, *Ibid.* p. 302.
11. Alvin, Toffler, "Science and Change". In : *Order out of Chaos : Man's New Dialogue with Nature,* I. Prigogine and I. Stengers, Flamingo, London.
12. Paul Freidrich, *Language, Context and the Imagination,* ed. by A. Dil. Stanford Univ. Press. Stanford, 1979, p. 450
13. William James, "What pragmatism means ?" In : *Classics in Semantics,* eds, D.B. Hayden and E.P. Alworth. Philosophical library, New York, 1965, 21-28.
14. Michael Dummett, "Language and Communication". In : *Reflections on Chomsky,* ed. A. George, Blackwell, Oxford, 1989, 192-212.

15. L. Wittgenstein, *Philsophical Investigations,* p. 199.

16. Lachman Khubchandani, *Language, Culture and National Building; Challanges of Modernisation :* Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1991, p. 5.

17. Alfred, Kroeber, Anthropology, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1948.

18. The processes of overlapping and contradicting exchanges in interpersonal encounters and discussed by the author, " `Face-to face' interaction; A probe into processes of communication". *Indian Philosophical Quarterly.* Vol. 8:3, Pune, 1981; also "Interaction processes : In a framework of human communication". Working Paper 76. Indian Instt. of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1989.

19. Tyler Burge, "Where is language social ?" In : *Reflections on Chomsky,* ed. A. George, Blackwell, Oxford, 1989, p. 187.

20. L. Wittngenstein, *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus,* tr. from German by G.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, 1966. Routlledge and K. Paul, London.

21. L. Khubchandani, 1981, 1989 (f. note 18).

22. George Steiner, *After Babel : Aspects of Language and Translation,* 1975. Oxford Univ. Press, New York.

23. E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology,* tr. by F. Kersten, M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1982.

24. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* p. 143.

25. J. Derrida, *Writing and Difference,* 1978. Routledge, London, p. 25.

26. H. Garfinkel, *Ethnomethodological Studies of Work,* 1987 Routledge, London.

27. Probal Dasgupta, "Accountability, boundaries, closure, derivativity *New Quest* 104, Pune, 1994. 95-101; also "Introduction", in : *Revisualizing the boundaries of Language.*

The ethos of Communication, L. Khubchandani. Sage Publication, New Delhi, Forthcoming.

28. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* 198-201, see the discussion on Saul Kripke's formulation of Sceptical Paradox in : *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language,* B. Blackwell, Oxford, 1981.

29. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* p. 213.

30. Donald Davidson, "A nice derangement of epitaphs" In : *Truth and Interpretation,* ed. E. Lepore. Blackwell, Oxford, 1986 also M. Dummett, "Language and communication", 1989 (see f. note 14)

31. Werner Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy : The Revolution in Modern Physics.* Allen and Unwin, London, 1959. p. 175.

32. Fritjof Capra, *Uncommon Wisdom : Conversation with Remarkable People.* Fontana, London, 1988.

33. L. Khubchandani, "Towards a selection grammar : Fluidity in the modes of address and reference in Hindi-Urdu. *Indian Linguistics* Vol. 39 (*Special Volume in Memory of Professor P.R.B. Pandit*) 1978, pp 1-24 (Reprinted 1988 in : *Language in A Plural Society,* ed. M. Khubchandani, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, Pp. 77-98).

34. Terry Wingograd, "Artificial intelligence : When will computers understand people ?" *Psycholgy Today,* May 1974.

35. L. Khubchandani, "Language as an everday life activity", *RELC Journal* 5:1, Singapore (Reprinted 1988 in : *Language in A Plural Society,* ed. L.M. Khubchandani, IIAS, Shimla, pp. 29-39).

36. Paul Friedrich, *The Language Parallax : Linguistic Relativism and Poetic Indeterminacy.* Univ. of Texas Press, Austin, 1986.

37. L. Khubchandani, "Universal and unique in cross-cultural interactions : A paradigm shift in development ideology",

UNESCO Experts meet on Culture and Development, Indira Gandhi National Centre for Arts & Culture, New Delhi, 1993.

38. P. Dasgupta, 1994 (f. note 27).

39. L. Khubchandani, *Plural Languages, Plural Cultures : Communication, Identity and Sociopolitical Change in Contemporary India,* East-West Center, Univ. of Hawaii Press, Honolulu 1983.

40. K.J. Shah, "Word and sentence : Two perspectives—Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein", Theme paper of the Seminar, Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi, 1994.

❐

Alternative Conceptions of Sentence and Conflicting Perspectives of Language

P.K. Mukhopadhyay

(ABSTRACAT)

I

We propose to discuss first the following issues relating to sentence (roughly *vākya*). As we proceed it will be necessary to discuss about words (*pada*) also.

1. That sentences enjoy primacy over words is still a debatable issue. To say it is debatable is not to say it is false. But some confusions seem to vitiate the popular and standard understanding of the thesis. We need to clarify these confusions and when we do so we may find that it depends on which criterion one uses, whether sentences or words are primary.

Unless we keep this in mind the primacy of sentence thesis will tend to conflict with intuitively unexceptionable truth that (on some other specifiable contexts) words have primacy over sentences. Dummett has tried to show this to be true even in Frege's view. Similar confusions are there about the true import of the views of the thinkers of different Indian schools of thought. It is believed that *anvitābhidhānavāda* of the prabhākara mīmāṁsaka-s (and of the *vaiyākaraṇa-s*) contends certain form of primacy of sentence thesis. *Abhihitānvayavāda* and *Anvitābhidhānavāda* on the other hand are opposed to this. It is usually believed that the advocates of the *anvitābhidhānavāda* subscribe to the primacy of sentence thesis whereas those who subscribe to the latter two views deny the primacy of sentence thesis. But a closer study of the writings of Bhartṛhari, Gaṅgeśa and Prabhākara (and his followers) will reveal that in certain

contexts they all advocate primacy of sentence and in certain other context they all admit primacy of words.

2. It is as much unclear whether Bhartṛhari had one single conception of sentence as it is uncertain how his conception can be reconciled with the more familiar and standard conception of sentence of the Pāṇinian *vaiyākaraṇa*-s.

2a. It is all the more difficult to devise any general test by applying which we can make objective comparative assessment of different conceptions of sentence.

2b. How Bhartṛhari's own conception of sentence as a revealing (*pratipādaka*) 'expression' and sentence as a revealed (*pratipādya*) expression be reconciled with each other ?

2c. Again how Bhartṛhari's conception of a sentence may be reconciled with more familiar and standard conception of the *vaiyākaraṇa-s* on the one hand and of the thinkers of other schools on the other.

II

It may be thought that one promising and contemporary route to introducing discussion on sentences and words is the question of primacy. Leaving aside for the moment the exact sense of the word "primacy", it may be said that the thesis that sentences enjoy primacy over words is a widely accepted doctrine of philosophy of language of the contemporary West. The founder of this new branch of philosophy, Frege (1848-1925), has made the primacy of sentence a celebrated thesis. And Witgenstein (1889-1951) among many others accepts it. Again leaving aside for the moment the exact sense of the word "Akhaṇḍa", Bhartṛhari (400-500 A.D.) may be said to have first emphasised in the Indian tradition the *akhaṇḍapakṣa* so far as sentences are concerned. It amounted to declaring "*ataeva padāt vākyaṁ gariyaḥ*". Some scholars, however, seek to derive each of the two (*pakṣa-s* i.e.,) ways of looking at a sentence - (i) that it is an indivisible unit (*akhaṇḍa pakṣa*)) and (ii) that it is a divisible complex

unity (*sakhaṇḍa pakṣa*) - from the Nirukta Utterance (6) below.

Just as there does not seem to be perfect agreement among scholars as to the sense of either primacy or *Akhaṇḍatva* there is no single sense in which the word sentence itself is used in any single tradition. There is one fairly accurate and precise sense in which the expression is used in Logic. But the same cannot be said about different systems of grammer and linguistics. There is also some doubt as to the exact nature of and motivtion for proposing that sentences are primary or that *vākya* has *prādhānya.*

However, let us first note a few definitions or notions of *vākya* and sentence chosen almost at random.

(1) Suptiñantacayao vākyam.

(2) Ākhyātam sāvyayākarakaviśeṣanaṁ vākyam

(3) Eka tiṅ vākyam

(4) Sākañkṣapadasamuhaḥ vākyaṁ

(5) Vākyaṁsyāt yogyatākāñkṣāsattiyukta padoccayaḥ

(6) Padaprakṛtiḥ saṁhitā

(6) Samarthapadasamuho vākyaṁ

(5) Śābdbodhajanka śabdaviśeṣa vākyaṁ

(7) Arthaikatvādekam vākyam sākāñkṣam cet vibhāge syāt

(8) "A is said to be a sentence of L if A is either true or false in L." With suitable adjustment this definition can be turned into a definition of sentence for a system of multivalued logic.

Bhartṛhari has discussed 8 different senses of "sentence". Of these the third (*jāti saṁghātavartinī*), fourth (*eko navayavaḥ śabdaḥ*) and the sixth (*buddhyānusaṁhṛtiḥ*) belong to the *Akhaṇḍa pakṣa.*

We need to consider and compare these notions of sentence before we can meaningfully discuss the question of primacy. For example, an open sentence is never a name but whether a closed sentence is or is not a name is controversial. Though most of the

contemporary Western philosophers of language will accept the Fregean thesis of primacy of sentence a few if any will accept his view that a sentence is a kind of name. Similarly though most perhaps all the non-*vaiyākaraṇa* thinkers will accept the primacy of sentence in the sense that it alone is capable of supporting our linguistic behaviour or enabling us to behave linguistically; yet very few will hold that a sentence is literally indivisible.

III

Frege's thinking is so central and effective in the field of philosophy of language of the contemporary West that he is regarded as the founder of the branch of philosophy we call today philosophy of language. And one important tenet of Frege's philosophy of language is the primacy of sentence. Bhartṛhari is known as a celebrated *vaiyākaraṇa* of the Pāṇinin school. But did Pānini envisage *akaṇḍapakṣa* or *sphoṭovāda* in connection with sentence ?

Pāṇinian system of *vyākarana* (linguistics/grammar) is held in highest esteem all over the world. In India it is not only held in theory to be the best possible system of grammar, it is also being actually used by men of widely different persuasions in their theoretical, literary and everyday communicative activity. It however seems that *Pāṇinian* system of *vyākaraṇa* enjoyed such wide acceptance and esteem not so much as a philosophy of language as a formal system of grammar. For though the *Pāṇinian vyākaraṇa* is highly praised for its formal or structural properties yet some of the major analytical and philosophical tenets of what is sometimes known as *pāṇinian* theory of language are generally rejected by different schools of Indian thinkers.

Pāṇini himself is not explicit as to what conception of language in general or of sentence in particular he had. We are not sure if he had one single consistent and comprehensive philosophy of language or what it was. Later followers of Pāṇini particularly Kātyāyna, Patañjali and Bhartṛhari developed in their own ways and with increasing amount of comprehensiveness and explicitness the

theoretical side of the Indian linguistics and one distinctive variety of Indian philosophy of language with which they mean to credit Pāṇini. We are inclined to refer to this philosophy or view as Pāṇinian view or philosophy of language rather than Pāṇini's philosophy of language.

Two major and related components of Pāṇinian philosophy of language are held to be (i) *Sphoṭavāda* and (ii) the thesis of primacy of sentence. We distinguish the two because some thinkers admit over and above *vākyasophoṭa, padasphoṭa* and *varṇasphoṭa.* On such theory vākya cannot be primary simply because by *vakya* is understood *vākyasphoṭa.* Besides the expression "*sphoṭa*" itelf does not carry the sense of primacy or even indivisibility (*akhaṇḍatva*). Nor does it mean a sentence.

To my mind the scholars have failed to make out convincingly that Pāṇini was a *sphoṭavādin.* Be that as it may, in spite of the highest regard for Pāṇinian system of formal grammar, both (i) and (ii) are widely debated and generally rejected in India, at least in the different Indian philosophical schools.

Contrary to what many people think it does not seem to be true even that the *anvitābhidānavādin*-Prābhākaras (and the Pāṇinian *vaiyākaraṇa-s* all of them) either believe or are committed to believing that sentence enjoys primacy over sub-sentential expressions of a language.

Anyway from the way the things are viewed standardly it appears that there are two different routes to primacy thesis - one the *sphoṭavāda* and the second the *anvitābhidhānavāda.* So the Prābhākara Mīmānsaka-s may accept the primacy thesis even though they are also among the severe critics of Pāṇinian doctrine (i). A closer study seems to suggest that it is wrong or oversimplistic to attribute to the Prābhākaras the primacy thesis simply because they accept *anvitābhidhānavāda.* For even semantically or from the point of view of theory of meaning, word and not the sentence is the primary unit. In Indian philosophical schools and systems, including the

vyākaraṇa darśana, the major issues are : What does a sentence mean? Does a sentence mean anything over and above what the words mean? Do words mean anything at all ? Do words mean what one understands form a sentence ? Is *vākyārtha* (sentence meaning) a linguistic meaning in the strict sense of the term?

Many scholars find in the *anvitābhidhānavāda* an echo of the context principle of Frege. Most of these scholars tend to think that for this reason the Prābhākara-s or the *anvitabhidhānavādins* are committed to accepting primacy of sentences in a sense in which sentences are the primary bearer of linguistic meaning. But this seems to be wrong or at least here there is a certain confusion. The Prābhākara-s admit (in their own way) that there is a distinction between a word (roughly *pada*) and a sentence (roughtly *vākya*). They do not hold however that words does not have meaning or that this meaning is not distinct from the meaning of a sentence. They do not hold, however, that what is known as sentence meaning (*vākyartha*) is really the meaning of a word. The point which the Prābhākara-s want to score against their rivals in India is that *Vākyārtha* is a kind of linguistic meaning. In fact, the Prābhākara-s alone seem to be intent on using the expression 'artha' in the context of 'vakyārtha' literally and in the same sense in which the expression is used in the context of 'padārtha'.

But for all that the anvitābhidhānavādin-s agree with the *abhitānvayavādin-s* and *ananvitābhidānavādin-s* that *vākya* is not *śakta* or meaningful or signifying expression. That *pada* or word signifies if and what linguistic meaning a sentence has is not only not the view of the *naiyāyika-s* and Bhātta Mīmāmśaka-s, it is not also the view of the Vaiyākaraṇa-s in general or of the *sphoṭavādin-s* in particular. (I do not suggest that there is no controversy as to the nature of *vakyārtha. Anvya* as *vakyārtha* and *pratibhā* as *vakyārtha* are hard to reconcile).

IV

Thus contrary to popular belief (ii) is as much controversial

(for even between the *anvitābhidhānavādin* themselves there is no agreement in the matter) as (i) and this suggests some deeper relationship between these two doctrines of the *vaiyākaraṇa-s.* Is there involved any strong linguistic or semantic point or motivation behind these two doctrines? If it turns out to be the case then we can make sense of one admitting (as for example a *vaiyākaraṇa* does) or rejecting (as for example a *naiyāyika* does) both (i) and (ii).

But as said earlier even the truth of the primacy of sentence thesis cannot easily falsify the intuitively unexceptionable truth that we learn the meaning of individual words before we can learn the meaning of a sentence. Dummett has made the best effort to reconcile the intutive truth of primacy of words in some sense with the theoretical semantic thesis of primacy of sentence within the Fregean philosophy of language. And Bhartṛhari is hard put to reconcile the two senses of 'vākya' - the *akhaṇḍa vākyasphoṭa* and *sakhaṇḍa śrutavākya.*

I think that the Naiyāyika-s as well as the Mīmāṁsaka-s also admit primacy of *vākya.* They admit the primacy thesis in such a sense that the isolated words do not lack meaning or become meaningless linguistic symbols. We may say that the primacy or otherwise of an (a type of) expression is contextual. In the context of grammatical operation we should understand by *śabha* sub-sentential expressions which are in use (*arthāntara śabda*) and which themselves are being referred to by another token of the same word. This second token is a case of mentioning of the word (*śabdāntara śabda*) (cf. Pānini Sūtra : *Svaṁ rūpaṁ śabdasya aśabda saṁjñā;* and Bhartṛhari 1/58f).

In the context of communicative use of language - when language is used to inform or instruct the hearer - or descriptive use of it - as in a theory where words are used to express some factual truth - words are taken primarily as signifying something non-linguistic or extra-linguistic. In a semantic theory expressions are therefore primarily taken as expressions in use. But in linguistics

words are often used to refer to (same or similar) words (which in their turn are really words in use) themselves as forming scope (*adhikāra*) of grammatic operations in question. But whether an expression is used or mentioned - i.e., whether it is used to refer to something extralinguistic or something linguistic - it must itself be known. It is only a known word which can signify something whether another word or something extra-linguistic. Thus signifying power accrues to an expression only when it is itself apprehended. A speaker cannot use an expression for signifying a certain thing (if the man is not doing linguistics (at the moment) or a certain linguistic expression unless he already or at the moment is not aware of the expression. Similarly a hearer cannot understand either an expression or a thing till he has awareness of the expression uttered by the speaker. This will be admitted by all.

But while accordingly to a Naiyāyika being aware of an expression uttered means often *hearing,* for Bhartṛhari it means a different thing. For according to him the linguistic (!) expression which signifies is not the audible sound a speaker makes or *śrotragrāhya guṇa* of *ākaśara* as the Naiyāyika-s think. It is to be known by a different means. Thus *śabda* does not have essentially anything to do with our auditory perception or our power of audition. Thus Bhartṛhari distinguishes sharply two features of *śabda* its audible character and its signifying power. Most of the audible sounds have a complexity; they have parts so much so that when they are uttered their different parts get uttered in succession. When a sound of a certain type is uttered and heard for a certain stretch of time - its parts being uttered or heard in succession (*krame*) - then thereby is revealed and or cognised another (kind of) *śabda* which (thus being known though not heard) signifies certain *artha.* This second *śabda* is revealed all at once (*akrame*); and it has no parts, it is partless or *akhaṇḍa.* Now can we identify that *akhaṇḍa śabda* which does the act of meaning ? It is a sentence. For the basic idea of *śabda* is that through which we perform some linguistic behaviour or do the job of informing or instructing. This is the reason for according primacy to

sentence.

Thus we may be having different criteria of primacy. Semantic criterion of primacy as in Frege and pragmatic criterion as in Indian theories. A Naiāyika will also accord primacy to sentences when it is a question of knowledge transmission or inducing action. This is the context of *śabda pramāṇa* or use of *sabda* for theoretical or practical purposes. But in the context of learning language or constructing linguistic (grammatical theory) sub-sentential expressions are primary. This seems to be the only realistic attitude to adopt in the matter.

V

Some may think that Bhartṛhari's version of primacy of sentence is really an offshoot of the controversial ontological view that *śabda* is *nitya*. Keeping the sense of *śabda* as *pratyāka* and sentence as the minimum unit involved in linguistic behaviour undisturbed, Bhartṛhari seems to think that *vākya* must be regarded as *akhaṇḍa*. In the process he has to change the sense of *śabda* to reconcile *akhaṇḍa* thesis with the observed complexity of a sentence. *Akhaṇḍavākya* necessarily becomes *sphoṭa* which is not amenable to ordinary perception. Among the *śabdanityatvavādins* the Mīmāṁsaka-s do not feel the need to admit (*sabda*) *sphoṭa;* they on the other hand are among the severe critics of the *sphoṭa* theory. We do not want to enter into a discussion of these two versions of *śabdanityatvavāda*. But the important point for us is that both the versions of *śabdanityatvavāda* seem to share a common semantic concern and originate from it.

Thus *śabdanityatvavāda* has two forms or versions depending on what is understood by *śabda*. It seems that the mīmāṁsaka-s hold that *varṇātmaka śabda* is *nitya* whereas the *vaiyākaraṇa-s* believe that the *spoṭaṭmāka śabda* is *nitya*. We shall argue that there is a quite respectable motivation behind *śabdanityatvavāda*. But in so far as the motivation is defensible it is semantic in nature. But problems arise if we go further and try to provide ontological foundation to this

valid semantic principle and motivation.

Both the Mīmāṁsaka-s and the *Vaiyākaraṇa-s* share the legitimate semantic worry as to how a linguistic expression of a language can mean or signify for every competent user of that language something non-linguistic. They also share the view that this would not have been possible if the relation between *śabda* and *artha*-i.e., the linguistic expression which means and the *artha* or extra-linguistic item which is meant - were eternal. In the next step they think that for the relation of meaning to be eternal the terms of this relation - both the *śabda* and the *artha* - must be eternal. In fact they maintain that *śabda, artha* and their relation all are eternal. But the thesis that *śabda* is eternal (or-non-eternal) is an ontological thesis. The important question is the relation between these two principles : the semantic principle that a *śabda* bears certain definite relation to extra-linguistic items which enables the former to mean the latter, and the ontological principle that *śabda* along with *artha* and the relation between *śabda* and *artha* is eternal.

One natural way to argue about *nityatva* of the relation between *śabda* and *artha* is to say that both *śabda* and *artha* are eternal; and unless some compelling reason is there, the relation between the terms each of which is eternal can be taken to be eternal. But what can be the argument for the thesis that *śabda* is eternal? One argument is that *śabda* is something indivisible. More precisely formulated the argument is that *śabda* is eternal because while it is indivisible it is not what Naiyāyika-s tell it to be viz., a quality of the *ākāśa*. Such *śabda* is not perceived by us and yet the vaiyākaraṇa-s hold that such *śabda* alone signifies. What is more important is that only those expressions can perform the job of signifying (at least) non-linguistic things which are themselves known. Viewed in this light what could have been otherwise a problem - viz., how the indivisibility thesis of *śabda* may be reconciled with the observable (syntactic) complexity of a sentence - turns out to be a way of reconciling two views about sentence.

Lastly it is generally accepted that śabda (*vākya*) is

apūrvārthaka. So no amount of computation of the meaning of the constituent words can enable us to get at the uniquely sentential meaning. The radical way of putting the matter is that we do not owe to the constituent words what we know about facts - the primary factual belief we have when we understand a sentence - from a sentence. So the content of a sentence cannot be exhausted by senses of the words of the sentence. This is a defensible version or acceptable interpretation of the primacy thesis. But this has a risk of inviting the paradox of making sentence meaning non-linguistic. The way the Prābhākara s say that what seems to be there in a sentence over and above the constituent linguistic expressions or *pada-s* is nothing linguistic so the subsentential linguistic expression or the *pada-s* actually mean what sentence as *apūrvārthaka śabda* means.

Meaning Holism in Wittgenstein and Bhartṛhari : A Study in Two Semantic Perspectives

R.C. Pradhan

The theme of this paper is meaning holism which supposes that meaning accrues to the whole of a linguistic entity, be it a sentence or a corpus of sentences. The theoretical assumption is here that it is the sentence or the sentence-corpus which is the basic unit of meaning. Meaning itself is taken as the semantic content that cannot be identified as either a mental content or an external object. It is therefore in language alone that meaning can be situated. In short, meaning is out and out a semantic reality that is independent of the subjective domain of consciousness and also of the world of sense-experience.

To the above theory of meaning both Wittgenstein and Bhartṛhari are committed though in entirely different ways. Meaning holism has emerged in their philosophy as the solution of the puzzle they faced about meaning in view of the fact that they have refused to take it as an empirical phenomenon. While Wittgenstein's anti-verificationist accent on meaning is well known, it is hardly noted that Bhartṛhari has been a consistent opponent of externalism and positivism in meaning theory.

My effort here is to study the foundations of the anti-externalist and anti-empiricist framework of semantics that allows for an autonomous concept of meaning. Meaning autonomy and meaning holism go hand in hand in this framework.

I. The primacy of the Grammatical : The resolution of the externalism - Internalism conflict

Wittgenstein's broad philosophical framework is grammatical. That is, it is meant to bring out the grammar of the language which is

the subject-matter of the philosophical discourse. By grammar Wittgenstein means the rule-structure of language or the norms or regularities which govern the use of language. It is grammar alone which gives a clear view of the meaning of the signs in language. He writes :

> What interests us in signs, the meaning which mattters for us is what is embodied in the grammar of the sign.
>
> We ask, "How do you use the word, what do you do with it" - that will tell us how you understand it.
>
> Grammar is the account books of language. They must show the actual transactions of language, everything that is not a matter of accompanying sensations (PG, sect. 44)

It is, however, the perspicuous representation of grammar that matters most, since a grammatical representation "produces just that understanding which consists in in seeing connexions' (*PI*, sect. 122) Philosophy aims at 'seeing connexions', since in this alone lie the disclosures of meaning and also the resulting `complete clarity' (*PI*, sect. 133) in the understanding of language.

Wittgenstein's grammatical investigation makes a broad distinction between the use of language that involves time and the context and the *rules* that are timeless and so are independent of the context. It is the latter that are the subject-matter of the perspicuous grammar. Uses of signs are the ongoing concern of the languge that show the remarkable phenomenon of diversity, prodigious contextuality and the resilient open-endedness. In language, therefore, Wittgenstein holds, there are "countless different kinds of use of what we call symbols, words, sentences. And this multiplicity is not something fixed once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and forgotten" (*PI*, sect. 23). Thus there is a historical dimension to the dynamicity of language; there is an endless flow of the language-games on an unending time-axis.

Grammar in its effects to systematize "actual transactions of language" (*PI.* sect. 44) transcends time in that its representations are not themselves in time. The flow of language-games is in time but grammar itself is a non-termporal discourse. Therefore there is a demand from within grammar to transcend the contextuality of language. This is done not by leaving the language altogether, since this is not possible, but distancing the grammatical (philosophical) discourse from the time and context of the particular language-games. Philosophical discourse is part of language as much as the context-specific language-games are, yet it is in the former that we have the representations of the rules of the latter. Rules of language operate int the language-games no doubt but only in grammar they are described, shown and put forth for clarity in understanding (PI sect. 124). This is, in short, Wittgenstein's plea for liberating grammar from time, and thus to make the grammatical discourse autonomous i.e., to make it free from the stranglehold of science (*PI*, II, xii).

The internalist-externalist distinction in meaning assumes importance in view of the fact that grammar internalizes the meaning of signs and their rule-structure. Grammar tends to make everything *internal* to the system of signs in that in the system alone the rules operate and meaning physiognomically appears (*PI,* sect. 568). The meaning of the signs is their function in language, that is, their role in the language. Wittgenstein writes :

I want to say the place of word in grammar is its meaning. But I might also say : the meaning of a word is what the explanation of its meaning explains (*PG*, sect. 23)

Further,

The meaning is the role of the word in the calculus (*PG*, sect. 27)

The internality of meaning thus comes forth as the very nature of meaning is bound up with the internal structure of language. Meaning in this sense is an internal feature of language.

The externalist argues that meaning and the rules of language are externally conferred on the signs, either in the way of treating a sign as a response mechanism to the external stimuli[3], or as the instrument of expressing or externalizing an internal thought[4] such that in either case the sign is exernal to the meaning, and the actual language-use involves the externalization of meaning in the symbols. The externalist framework divides meaning into the content-aspect and the canonical aspect such that the content is the cognitive core and the cononical aspect is its systematic (logical) formulation. Quine, for example, formulates the exernalist position as one of treating meaning as the property of behaviour and thus of the external use of language in a multiply layered system of symbols. Externalism is fully realized in the scheme-content distinction[6] which Quine retains as a contribution of empiricism. The reverse externalism as espoused by the mentalist, notably by Chomsky, maintains that there is a distinction between the inner structure of rules and the external language-use. Language as a performance is a definite continuation of the inner reality of the mentally embedded rules, but it acquires the limitations of the utterances in a physical setting. Chomsky's innate rules hypothesis reverses the Quinean scheme-content distinction into one of the inner-outer distinction between the inner grammar and the external symbolization. In both cases there is a distortion of the relation between language and meaning.

Wittgenstein's opposition to both forms of externalism is undoubtedly most decisive. He rejects both empiricism and the mentalist innatism as both want to divide what is indivisible and want to externalize what cannot be externalized. Meaning, for him, is not a property of behaviour nor is it a mental content. It is in essence a grammatical function, i.e. a property of grammar.

Meaning, from this point of view, is a grammatical representation, that is, a representation of the rules and their application. Meaning and rules constitute a single whole of language-use, i.e., a language-game. A language-game is the articulation of the

embedded meaning insofar as the meaning is co-terminus with the rule-structure. In this sense, meaning is not external to language-use; it is its internal structure. Wittgenstein says :

When I think in language there aren't 'meanings' going through my mind *in addition to the verbal expressions : the language is itself the vehicle of thought (PI,* sect. 328).

That is to say, language does not happen to express pre-verbal meanings; language is itself the vehicle or the expression of meaning. Idea of pre-verbal meaning is the one that fits a mentalist framework wherein meaning and rules are posited in a mental medium. That is, however, a case of making meaning external to language itself. Wittgenstein rejects this in the following passage :

> But is'nt it our *meaning* it that gives sense to the sentence? (And here, of course, belongs the fact that one cannot mean a senseless series of words.) And 'meaning it' is something in the sphere of the mind. But it is something private! It is the intangible *something :* Only comparable to consciousness itself.
>
> How could this seem ludicrous? It is as it were a dream of our language (*PI,* sect. 358).

Wittgenstein makes it a necessary fact of language that meaning is expressed in language and is, therefore laid in the language use. Meaning is the fact of language use.[8] If it appears external to, or independent of, language, it is due to a false appearance. As a fact of grammar, meaning and rules are expressed in the medium of language - the only medium that situates meaning and explanations of meaning in language.

II. Meaning, use and the world : The Autonomy Question

If language is the only medium of understanding - the universal medium[9] - then it is imperative that there is nothing other than language itself which can claim to be the source of meaning. As already indicated, meaning is not a deposit in the mind. Hence, a

cognitive science of meaning is impossible.[10] This leaves room, however, for an epirical science of meaning in the sense that meaning is a matter of factual evidence[11] and therefore, of empirical verification. Wittgenstein brackets all the verificationist theories in the category of the so called `theories' which are constructed with a scientific bias. Such theories are unwarranted because meaning is already an integral feature of language and therefore, cannot be explained theoretically in a metalanguage. Meaning is *shown* rather than said (cf. *TLP* 4.022).

Wittgenstein's picture theory in the *Tractatus* is not meant to explain meaning or sense of a proposition; it aims at showing how sense is already an internal feature of a proposition. Wittgenstein writes : "It belongs to the essence of a proposition that it should be able to communicate a new sense to us (*TLP* 4.027). Sense, however, does not depend on a proposition being a picture of the world. Sense lies in the way the proposition represents the world, that is, it being the logical picture of the latter. Wittgenstein explains :

> A proposition must use old expressions to communicate a new sense.
>
> A proposition communicates a situation to us, and so it must be essentially connected with the situation.
>
> And the connection is precisely that it is its logical picture.
>
> A proposition states something only in so far as it is a picture (*TLP* 4.03).

The argument here is that the sense, the picture of the world and language are the same thing. There is nothing to disturb the complete unity of language, thought and the world. The verificationists try to leak the unity at the peril of missing the sense itself.

The externalist suggestion that meaning is dependent on the world commits the empiricist fallacy that the world is *external* to languge and therefore meaning must be constituted by our experiences of the world. This reduces meaning to the empirical experiences and

the associated sensory inputs. Wittgenstein finds this position intolerable in view of the fact that the so called experiential inputs are already linguistically structured and are impregnated with meaning.[12] This reiterates the fact that meaning is a necessary fact of language and so we cannot conceive of a fact lying beyond the boundary of language that can explain and justify meaning. What would it mean to go beyond language? It is only apparent that objects and facts are posited outside language but in fact they are part of languge, i.e. the functions of language-games. In a telling passage Wittgenstein writes :

> What looks as if it *had* to exist, is part of the languge. It is a paradigm in our language-game; something with which comparison is made. And this may be an important observation; but it is nonetheless an observation concerning our language-games - our method of representation (*PI*, sect. 50).

Thus the language-games alone reveal what exists in the world, that is, what the world is. This goes to the extent of showing that the world is veritably a partner in the ongoing business of language. Therefore, meaning or sense does not depend on the confirmation of what we say in the world. The externalist game of confirmation is a move in the language-game. Language is the background medium of all our linguistic moves and thus there follows the autonomy of meaning and the rules of language.[13]

Meaning autonomy is the idea that meaning is resistant to the externalist justification. That is, it is in no need of external support either in the speaker's mind or in the external world. This is reflected in the constrution of meaning as use, i.e., in the internalization of meaning in the language-game. A self-supporting language-game evolves its grammatical structure from within the grammatical space, and so there is no gap between grammar and the linguistic representation of the world. The latter are themselves grammatically structured. So, Wittgenstein tells us.

Grammatical conventions cannot be justified by describing what is represented. Any such description already presupposes the grammtical rules. That is to say, if anything is to count as nonsense in the grammar which is to be justified, then it cannot at the same time pass for sense in the grammar of the propositions that justify it (etc.) (*PR*, sect. 7).

This is to emphasize the fact that language and its grammar cannot be justified by anything outside language since nothing exists outside language. In other words, "any kind of explanation of a language presupposes language already. And in a certain sense, the use of language is something that cannot be taught, i.e. I cannot use language to teach it in the way in which language could be used to teach someone to play the piano - And that of course is just another way of saying : I cannot use language to get outside language (*PR*, sect. 6).

The use of language is self-governed in the way the rules are autonomously real in the language-game. Rules are internally related to the structure of language and the world. There cannot be a separate realm of rules in the Fregean[14] or the Chomskian sense except in the grammatical space itself. This is, however, not to posit them as linguistic practices[16] in the sense that the linguistic community evolves them and are commonly accepted. If the rules are conventions of unquestionable standing in the community of rule-followers, even then they cease to be so necessary as Wittgenstein wishes them to be. A necessary structure of grammatical rules is an imposing imperative, according to Wittgenstein. He expresses his concern for the necessity of rules in the following passage :

> Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the question whether a rule has been obeyed or not. People do not come to blows over it, for example. That is part of the framework on which the working of our language is based (for example, in giving descriptions) (*PI*, sect. 240).

Rules, in short, work as the bedrock of language-games and thus are *fundamental* to language (*RFM*, VI, sect. 28).

III. Language, Unity and the non-naturalism in Wittgenstein and Bhartṛhari

Now the question arises : How is language to be conceived in view of the fact that meaning and the rules are integrally involved in the structure of language? Can language be conceived as a supernatural, ideal entity or as a system of naturally developed symbols? Wittgenstein opts for the idea that language is a natural symbol-system since, according to him, "everyday language is a part of human organism and is no less complicated than it" (*TLP* 4.002). Thus language is part of the natural history of mankind. For "commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting are as much part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing" (*PI*, sect. 25). This summarizes the idea that language is a natural phenomenon. But this does not rule out the fact that meaning and rules are themselves not natural facts about language. They can be called the non-natural and so transcendental facts about languge.

It is in the transcendental perspective of language that we can see a common meeting point for Wittgenstein and Bhartṛhari, since in this perspective alone the apparently two different grammatical traditions meet. Bhartṛhari is well-known as the philosopher of grammar in the transcendental tradition for whom the unity and indivisibility of language is a transcendental fact.[17] For him, there is multiplicity of linguistic phenomena and yet that is not the ultimate truth about language. Beyond and behind multiplicity there is the oneness and indivisibility of language. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, though not very explicit on the issue of unity of language, is yet very much aware of the fact that language is a system and is an integral whole of propositions and their use in language-games. The whole itself is not a natural fact and cannot be conceived as, in any sense, an empirical phenomenon. Hence its transcendental character cannot be denied. As Wittgenstein has argued, language is basically

a grammatical unity given in a grammatical space which not only allows multiple symbols and their uses, i.e. language-games to occur but also manifests itself as multiple forms of life (*PI*, sect. 23). Language is a systematic unity of language-games and forms of life. There is a unity underlying the multiplicity of language-games. The received view about Wittgenstein is that he rejects the idea of unity as metaphysical and so accepts only a pluralism about language-games. But a closer reading of his concept of family resemblance (*PI* sects. 67, 72) suggests that the unity is emphasised in the idea of the family of language-games all hanging together in the grammatical space. The grammatical space is the field of language-games wherein there is the interpenetrating existence of the language-games. Thus plurality of linguistic phenomena does not necessitate the cancellation of unity which is a necessary condition of the so-called plurality of phenomena. The diversity is no doubt a natural fact but the unity itself cannot be anything other than a transcendental fact.

Bhartṛhari's emphasis on the transcendental fact of unity is loud and clear. For him, language is a non-natural phenomenon essentially. That is, it essentially belongs to the realm beyond the spatio-temporal speech-phenomena. Language (*śabda*) has a dual existence : it is a plurality of utterances (*nāda* or *dhvani*) and also a unity of meaning (*sphoṭa*).[18] The sensory inputs constituting the utterances are diverse in character and are in space and time but the ideal unity itself is beyond this diversity. The ideal unity or the *sphoṭa* does not belong to the realm of the natural facts but transcends them. That is the reason why Bhartṛhari argues that the real language (*śabda*) cannot be the speech that shows signs of plurality but must be the underlying essence that is one and indivisible (*sphoṭa*). There are two ways in which Bhartṛhari transcends naturalism; one, by way of cancelling time as a medium of the language-essence, the *sphoṭa* and secondly, by introducing time as a medium of speech, i.e., the utterances (*dhvani*). It is the latter that manifests the meaning that is communicated but in itself it is not constitutive of meaning. The meaning is eternal like the *śabda,* but for the purpose of

communication it is manifested in the temporal medium (*VP.* I. 44-47). The following passage from a commentary on *Vākyapadīyam* is given bellow :

> After the manifestation of the word by way of *sphoṭa,* these secondary or reverberatory sounds cause variations in the perception, they themselves being intimately related with the mind, and thus give a false impression of causing variation in the *sphoṭa* itself. But *sphoṭa,* being eternal itself, does not respond to these variations, and remains unchanged and undivided.[20]

This is an assertion of the fact that the linguistic unity called *sphoṭa* is not a natural entity and that transcends the temporality and the variability of natural speech.

Bhartṛhari recognizes the naturalness of ordinary speech as it takes the spatio-temporal form of what he called the *vaikharī* speech. In this form language becomes the instrument of communication and also the means of the expression of the thought or the meaning. For him, *vaikharī* represents the language in its contextual and manifest form and therefore it is given in the medium of space and time. The real language is different from this manifest form. The *madhyamā* form which precedes the manifest form represents a stage where language is yet to be involved in space and time. In *madhyamā* the inner structure of language, i.e. the *sphoṭa* is yet to be fully expressed in utterances. This stage is not pre-verbal but pre-communicative and is fully articulate so far as its meaning is concerned.[22] Bhartṛhari realizes that there is still a higher form of language in which the purity of the *śabda* is fully guaranted such that its esential character is fully manifest. This stage he calls the *paśyantī* which literally means the seeing or the full realization of its potentiality in the form of the *sphoṭa.* The pure form of language as embodied in the *sphoṭa* fully articulates its meaning since meaning is non-different from its form. Here it is to be noted that all the three forms of language are unitary in character in which there is gradual diferentiation of form and

meaning. The form (*sphoṭa*) itself expresses the meaning and this takes place in its ideal completeness in the *paśyantī* stage only. The other stages do contain the seeds of diversification between form and meaning and in the *vaikharī* stage the complete differentiation (*bheda*) takes place. The *sphoṭa* appears diversified and thus meaning gets diffused in the medium of time and space. Bhartṛhari is well aware that the loss in purity of form is compensated by the communicability of meaning.

Wittgenstein has no conception of such a hierarchical order of language. For him, sense is fully manifest in the ordinary or natural language itself. So far as the form is concerned it equally manifests itself in language as it is naturally given. Wittgenstein believes that the logical form of language is mirrored in language (*TLP* 4.121) and so there is no necessity of postulating a higher or ideal language to reflect the logical form. Even then he recognizes that logical form itself is not a part of natural language. The latter only mirrors it such that anybody who understands language must grasp the form itself. Besides, for him, form and meaning are logically the same because without the latter form ceases to be linguistic in character. The idea that form is grammatical, that is, syntactic in character suggests that meaning must lie in the form itself. Meaning, therefore, cannot be a product of language-use, though it is only in language-use that meaning is grasped. In his later writings Wittgenstein is fully aware that use is only the way meaning is grasped and not constituted, and so there is no possibility of meaning being lost in the inchoate mass of linguistic use and the associated contextual factors. He shares Bhartṛhari's anxiety to suppose that ordinary language presupposes a rule-structure that explains the form of language and also its use. Use reflects the form as much as the form is manifested in the use. Thus there is no gap between what the rule-structure ideally is and how it is followed in practice. Rules and their application make a unique whole of the linguistic reality that can be called the grammar of language.

The grammatical structure in Wittgenstein is comparable to

Bhartṛhari' *sphoṭa* in that in both there is a tendency to transcend the temporality and thus to posit a realm of grammar that is timeless. However, whereas in the idea of *sphoṭa* there is the necessity of a hierarchy of language-forms, in the transparency thesis of language the ordinary language is a perfect medium. Bhartṛhari has the idea of an ideal or depth-structure of language in the *paśyantī* form. The surface structure is in that sense a distorting medium though inevitable for languge-use and language-learning. Wittgenstein, in spite of his distinction of surface-grammar and depth-grammar (*PI* sect. 664), is not inclined to believe that the depth-grammar is something that is not revealed in ordinary language. In fact, for him, depth-grammar is the rule-structure itself that is fully in the cognitive grasp of the speaker and hearer. The way to depth-grammar is not through a direct seeing as in Bhartṛhari but a direct mirroring in language. Of course, it need not be the case that the mirroring is not a kind of direct seeing or a case of revelation through *sphoṭa.*

Wittgenstein's repeated warning that grammar does not harbour anything hidden must not be taken as his aversion to the idea of depth-structure of language. The 'hidden' that he forbids in grammar is the one that is supposed to lie outside language and yet poses itself as grammatical. The pseudo-grammatical entity is the product of misunderstanding of language and hence the perspicuous grammar is meant to dissolve such conceptual confusions as arise out of lack of grammatical knowledge. Depth-grammar is the one that fully reveals the rules of language and thus its underlying form. Wittgenstein does not fight shy of the fact that language is not what we see and hear but something more in that what we see is only the surface of language. What we understand when we understand the language is the depth-grammar itself. Thus Wittgenstein agrees with Bhartṛhari that language is more than what meets the eye.

For Bhartṛhari there is a grammatical compulsion to posit an ideal language-form in *paśyantī* because without it he cannot explain how form and meaning are manifest in the *sphoṭa* which is the real language or the *śabda.* This is the perspicuous grammar for him which

manifests the form in all aspects. This depth-structure is in a sense completely formal in that there is no emergence of the so called phonemes here in their temporal character. The indivisible whole called the *sphoṭa* has not been subjected to the differentiations which are real only at a lower level. This leads us to believe that Bhartṛhari is not only concerned with grammar in the formal sense but also is determined to show that grammar is embedded in the structure of the human consciounsess. The latter thesis is, of course, external to the idea that grammar is substantial and is the determinate whole of a grammatical essence called the *sphoṭa.* Why, then, one may ask, does Bhartṛhari divide the grammatical reality into three forms or stages? The answer may be that the division is not ontological but rather methodological. Methodologically, there is a hierarchy of grammaticality but ontologically there is unity of grammar. The oneness of *sphoṭa* is the standing proof that the division is more apparent than real. As an uncompromising unitarist. Bhartṛhari takes grammar as one and so the plurality that appears in lower levels of grammaticality is only a matter of convention and practice. Bhartṛhari writes :

It is the same all-pervading *Śabdabrāhman* which seems to act differently in different situations. For example, it becomes the user, used and usable in different situations[23] (*VP* I. 4)

Though couched in a metaphysical language, the point is that the same grammatical reality manifests itself in many forms (*VP*, I. 2-3). And it is a reassertion of the fact that natural language and its various forms presuppose the transcendental unity of grammar. For both Wittgenstein and Bhartṛhari such a reality is the foundational source of our ordinary language and its varied uses.

IV. Mind Language and Meanings

Is the grammatical reality mental in character? This is the question that is uppermost in the minds of the commentators on Bhartṛhari. One standard response is that there is a strong sense of mentalism in Bhartṛhari's theory of grammar and meaning. The

evidence for this thesis lies in the fact that there is reference to the *buddhi* as the locus of language and meaning. The *śabda* is taken as that which is embedded in the *buddhi* (*VP*. I. 46) and it is through the *pratibhā* that meaning is fully manifest (*Ibid.* 118). That is to say, the mental faculty is taken as the seat of grammar and meaning, according to this view. Bhartṛhari is in a way compelled to talk of language as mind-embedded for the reason that there is no way he can escape calling it spatio-temporal and thus physical. The grammatical unity is itself a non-temporal phenomenon. The *sphoṭa* is different from the utterances and so it must be beyond the *dhvani*. That apart, the *sphoṭa* is perceived by the intellect in a transparent way. Hence the affinity of grammar to the intellect has to be conceded. But this is not to say that grammar is a product of the psychological processes or is a part of the physical structure of the brain in Chomsky's sense. Bhartṛhari himself says that the *śabda* is a metaphysical principle that explains the possibility of the diversity of the linguistic phenomena. So that principle cannot be called a mental entity in the empirical sense. A mental entity is an empirical entity and therefore it cannot explain how grammar in the transcendental sense is possible. Grammar in Bhartṛhari's sense is non-empirical and so no amount of psychological investigation can lead to the understanding of language and meaning.

Wittgenstein, following Frege, has been consistently opposing mentalism as a theory of language and meaning. According to him, neither language nor meaning can be explained by the so called mental processes (*PI*, II, x, P. 218). The latter are not relevant to our understanding of meaning. Besides, these mental processes are not the meanings themselves. Mental processes themselves are in need of description in language and so the meaning of the descriptions must already be presupposed. It is ultimately language which vouchsafes for meaning and so there cannot be any extra-linguistic entity which can explain meaning. The anti-psychologism[24] of Frege and Wittgenstein which has been a landmark development in recent theories of logic and grammar has shown that we cannot explain the

rules of logic and grammar in terms of their role in our thinking. Rather our thought is governed by the rules themselves. Thus in the logical tradition a clear demarcation is made between logic and grammar, on the one hand, and psychology, on the other.[25]

Chomsky's mentalist theory of grammar, of course, has a different intellectual background. He is not a mentalist in the crude sense because he does not reduce grammar to psychology in the way it has been attempted by many. He offers grammatical explanations in a mentalist framework[26] such that knowledge of grammar can be proved to be innate and universal. Chomsky appeals to the innate structures of the mental faculty to explain the grammatical structures. Modelled on the Cartesian theory of innate ideas, Chomsky's grammatical theory describes grammatical knowledge in terms of the implicit principles of the mental faculty.[37] This facilitates the understanding of the syntax of language as the universal grammar[28] as the one that represents the rules of language as embedded in the cognitive faculty of the mind.

Chomsky's theory has many assumptions which are peculiar to the Cartesian, rationalist linguistics. These concern the nature of mind and language. The implicit structures of both are held to be innate. Neither Wittgenstein nor Bhartṛhari shares these assumptions. Wittgenstein does not take grammar as an empirical phenomenon at all. For him, grammar is normative and is therefore a non-empirical rule-structure. Grammarians themselves realize that a normative grammar is presupposed by the so called empirical grammars and therefore there must be a place for grammatical explication rather than explanation in the scientific sense.[29] Wittgenstein has realized this fact long since in his logical theory of grammar. For him, grammar represents not the so called empirical rules of language-use but the rules that are grammatical and normative. These rules are constitutive of the language-use and are in a sense transcendental in character.

Bhartṛhari's protest against the empirical grammarians can be made explicit by his rejection of the idea that language is a mere

composition of the word-meanings which themselves are conventional and man-made. He has made grammar a transcendental reality which embeds meaning timelessly. The ideal language or the *sphoṭa* is the root of all natural languages and grammars. Such an ideal grammar cannot be a matter of psychological investigtion.

Bhartṛhari's concept of *pratibhā* is closer to the idea of intuition or pure understanding which does not invite mentalism. He appeals to this idea as a transcendental method of justifying the ideal language,the *sphoṭa.* Like Frege, who opposed psychologism but entertained thought as eternal and timeless,[30] Bhartṛhari appeals to the ideal language and meaning being comprehensible to the intellect without committing himself to the reality of the ideal meaning in the mind. *Sphoṭa,* according to Bhatṛhari, is the essence of speech and is given to the intellect as the transcendental reality of all grammatical phenomena. The *sphoṭa* is out and out grammatical in nature and so needs hardly a psychological foundation. We can well conceive a formal or syntactic definition of the *śabda* such that no mental characterization of it is possible. Of course, it remains open whether a Chomsky-type of cognitive explanation of grammatical phenomena is possible at all.

Bhartṛhari's grammatical theory ultimately rests on a metaphysical thesis that there is a grammatical essence which is the underlying autonomous reality in a transcendental plane. This plane itself is not non-grammatical, since it is the first principle of all evolving languages and grammars. As Matilal puts it :

> Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language is ultimately grounded in a monistic and idealistic metaphysical theory. He speaks of a transcendental word-essence (*śabdatattva*) as the first principle of the universe.[31]

It is this metaphysical theory that supports the grammarian's claim that what ultimately matters is language (*śabda*) since it pervades all activities of man. Man's consciousness as well as his experience of the world is thoroughly imbued in language (cf. *VP.* I .123).

Wittgenstein has said in so many words that language is the universal frame of reference in which all human activities take place. Language is not only the form of life but also the form of existence. According to him, life, language and the world all make one unique whole such that we cannot separate one from the other. This metaphysical unity can be best understood if we keep in mind Bhartṛhari's idea that the *śabda* is the ultimate principle of all existence.

V. Meaning, Holism and the primacy of sentence

Bhartṛhari' *sphoṭa* theory is holistic for the reason that *sphoṭa* is a unity and a whole. The meaning that the *sphoṭa* reveals is also a unity. Besides, there is no difference between the *śabda* and the meaning. This conception of meaning being an indivisible entity[32] that is absolutely one (*VP*, I. 93-103) is holistic. Bhartṛhari holds that meaning cannot be a composite entity at all because to say so is to commit a semantic error. A composite meaning paradoxically leads to the disappearance of meaning. This compositionally leads to the disappearance of meaning. The compositionality appears due to the maniness of the constituent elements (*padas* and *varṇas*). The meaning is timeless though the phonemes produced are temporal. It is the temporal division of words that makes meaning appear itself divided.

Meaning holism, or by whatever name we may call it, establishes the primacy of the sentence and thereby the primacy of the whole language itself. The primacy of sentence-meaning[33] holds the key to our understanding of language and meaning. It is in that sense that the *sphoṭa* becomes the unfoldment of the unitary meaning in the sequence of the words and phonemes (*VP*. II. 75-100). The constituent parts are not themselves independently real though all that they do collectively is to express the unitary meaning. So the question of meaning being dependent on the component parts does not arise. Bhartṛhari like other grammarians rejects the compositionalist

view of meaning espoused by the Nyāya and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas. The later are known for their vehement opposition to the grammarian's theory of oneness of meaning. For them, meaning is a compositional entity[34] and so is a conventional product of the summation of the word-meanings. The word-meanings are independently real. The composition takes place only after the word-meanings are explicit (*abhihitānvaya*). The composition does not alter the original meanings which themselves are eternal.

Bhartṛhari also rejects the modified compositionalism of the Prābhākara Mīmāmsakas who maintain that sentence-meaning precedes word-meaning in that the latter is cognized only in the context[35] of the former. The Prābhākara view is that the words themselves together present the sentence-meaning as the cognition of the sentence-meaning (*anvitābhidhāna*). In fact only in a sentence does the word get meaning by way of contributing to the totality of the meaning of the sentence. This position is midway between the atomism of the Bhāṭṭa school and the holism of the grammarians.[36] But from the grammarian's point of view such a thesis does not hold good because it does not explain how words can express the sentence-meaning unless the latter already exists. That is, it does not tell in so many words how the sentence-meaning comes into existence. If it is a compositional entity then there is no meaning in calling it being presupposed by the word-meaning. Then again, if it is not a compositional entity, there must be a *priori* meaning called sentence-meaning. Meaning holism follows once the inconsistencies are removed from modified compositionalism. It is a logical corollary that meaning remains a unity that can be expressed in multiple forms of words and word-combinations.

Against this backdrop,Wittgenstein's struggle to establish holism against the contextualism of Frege and the molecularism of the verificationists can be better appreciated. Wittgenstein's rejection of the contextualism in Frege is well documented in the *Tractatus* 3.3 :

Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning.

This is not a reiteration of Frege's context principle as mentioned in his *Foundations of Arithmetics 37*

.....never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition (p. x).

The latter statement introduces the context principle in order to secure the meaning (*bedeutung*) of a word in the context of a proposition. In the absence of the sense-reference distinction in the *Foundations* it is not clear whether Frege would have talked about the word-sense being dependent on the sense (*sinn*) of the proposition. Besides, it is not clear whether the meaning of the proposition is a compositional entity or not. Frege later made it clear that a sentence-meaning (sense) is a compositional entity. This is because a sentence is syntactically built of the sub-sentential expression. However, in spite of ambiguity contextualism remains a strong thesis in the *Foudations*. Wittgenstein overcomes this contextualist theory of meaning in favour of the holistic theory because he realizes that the context principle is as indefensible as the compositionality principle. The sentence-meaning is a single entity that is not dependent on the meaning of the constituent expression. That is to say, the sentence-sense is not a conventional product of the word-sense. This he demonstrates by denying that propositions are composed of words in the semantic sense. Of course he admits that propositions can be analysed into the names which stand for the objects.[38] But this analysis is only for the sake of our understanding of the proposition and so this does not reveal the ontological status of the proposition. Ontologically speaking, propositions are wholes or self-sufficient entities. This sentence-holism in the *Tractatus* is the result of Wittgenstein's realization that propositions themselves express their sense independently of what the names themselves are. Names are abstractions of the propositions and they do not have independent reality. Their reality is proposition-dependent and therefore they do

not have independent sense or meaning at all. The reference that they have is so built into their syntactic makeup that there is no independent mechanism of talking of their reference (*Tractatus* 4.02).

Wittgenstein's later works do contain the holistic tendency which matures in the idea of a language-game which rejects the idea of context altogether. The language-game is not the context for the propositions. In fact, the language-game is the set of propositions themselves in an internal relationship. The propositions constitute the system (*PR,* Sect. 15). Wittgenstein writes :

A word only has meaning in the context of a propositions : that is like saying only in use a rod is lever. Only the application makes it into a lever ....(*PR*, sect.14).

Thus the application of the propositions in a system which is otherwise known as the language-game facilitates the meaning of words. Word-meaning presupposes the proposition which itself is internally linked with the system. Wittgenstein adds :

'Language' is only languages, plus things I invent by analogy with existing languages. Languages are systems.

"A proposition belongs to a language". But that just means : it is units of languages that I call "propositions" : (*PG,* sect. 122)

Thus the idea of system integrates all aspects of language including the propositions and their meaning. The basic units of language, i.e. the propositions owe their meaning to the total system which carries meaning only by virtue of its internal logical relations. The system has meaning in the totality of the functions of the symbols, i.e. in the network of the linguistic representation. The latter are nested in the very structure of life and actions and thus there arises a holistic framework in which meaning arises as a complete whole. Here what is to be noted is that meaning is not detatched from the phenomena of language themselves and is internally structured into them. Therefore meaning appears self-complete and autonomous.

For Wittgenstein, the primacy of the sentence is not the only

factor responsible for meaning holism; it is rather the sentence's capacity to be in relationship with the rest of the sentences in the grammatical space that accounts for the holistic nature of meaning. The *Tractatus* recognizes the idea of logical space (3.4; 3.42) in which the propositions occupy their logical place and exhibit their sense. The logical space is the holistic sense-space which the propositions express as it were unitarily. The Tractarian method of holistic analysis does reveal that propositions themselves are abstractions from the logical space of grammaticality (syntax) and sense (semantics). Sense is expressed in the syntax and thus there arises no need to mention the semantic relations independently. Wittgenstein writes :

In logical syntax the meaning of a sign should never play a role. It must be possible to establish logical syntax without mentioning the *meaning* of a sign : *only* the description of expressions may be presupposed (*TLP* 3.33).

The meaning (*bedeutung*) need not be mentioned or said because it is ardeady shown in the syntax. Besides, the sense or thought-content is also mirrored in the syntax. Thus in a certain sense semantics goes ineffable[39] in Wittgenstein's system.

The post-Tractatus writings do not discontinue the idea that the sense-space is holistic and has a predominantly syntactic character. The predominance of syntax is evident in the treatment of a language-game as a rule-governed linguistic system wherein the rules and meaning are internally located. Sense or meaning is still syntactically mirrored in the network of propositions called the language-game.[40] It is in the use of the system that meaning is manifested. That is to say meaning is shown in the use or the application of the propositions (cf. *PI* sects. 43, 120, 558).

Wittgenstein's meaning holism clashes not only with the Fregean contextualism and molecularism but also with Quine's empirical holism of the sentence-corpus. As Dummett[41] points out, Frege's semantic theory results in a molecularism that accounts for sentence-meaning only as a compositional entity. This leads further

into the idea that meaning is explainable by the truth-conditions of the sentences concerned. Frege has not resolved the basic paradox as to how the sentence-sense which is timeless and eternal can itself be compositional. It is an irreconcilable notion in Frege that sense defies the temporality of language and yet it is only syntactically expressed in the sentences. It would not have appeared paradoxical had Frege not claimed that sense is pre-grammatical and therefore independent of the cognitive grasp in language. Wittgenstein makes Frege's sense stand on the grammatical pillars and thus makes it a holistic notion rather than a dimly realized pre-semantic thought content.

Quine's holism which appears to make sentence-sense a matter of empirical experience cancelling altogether the Fregean intensionality is at best externalist in form and local in effect. His claim that sentences as a corporate body[42] face the sense-experience is not holistic in the sense considered here. It is a holism in the sense that language can be taken as a single system but it does not tell that there is a meaning as a single whole. For Quine, meaning remains compositional since there is a hierarchy of sentences and all sentences are not equally determined by experience. Besides, meaning remains indeterminate for most of the theoretical sentences.[43] Thus there results what may be called the lack of any theoretical justifiction for semantics as such since there is no fact of the matter for consideraton.[44] In spite of Quine's best effort no meaning holism follows in his framework as it remains wedded to a discountinuous grammatical space. Davidson[45] has lately claimed that meaning goes holistic but as long as he is committed to the empiricist framework of Quine' there is no hope of making meaning holistic either in Wittgenstein's or Bhartṛhatri's sense. Meaning can go genuinely holistic if there is a *priori* grammatical space that can account for how sentences are meaningful without being subjected to the externalist pressure. Wittgenstein and Bhartṛhari fare better in their holistic semantic endeavour.

VI. Concluding remarks

The theories of meaning holism in the two perspectives discussed here agree on the following points :

1. Meaning is a fully grammatical entity. It is manifest in the grammatical space.

2. Sentences are grammatically prior to the words in that sentence-meaning is ontologically prior to the word-meanings.

3. Meaning is autonomous in that syntax under no conditions fails to express it internally.

4. Meaning is self-manifesting since the symbols speak for themselves.

These points bring Wittgenstein and Bhartṛhari closer in spite of their differences on other methodological and non-methodological presuppositions which are as follows :

1. Grammar for Wittgenstein, contributes to the sanity of the human mind by liberating it from conceptual puzzlement. For Bhartṛhari, it is the means of salvation - a way to the realization of mokṣa.

2. Bhartṛhari's approach is predominantly metaphysical and he is concerned with the establishment of a monistic theory of ultimate reality. Wittgenstein prefers to consider language and grammar for their own sake even if the metaphysical issues emerge in the sequel.

The differences in approach do not rule out the fact that both Wittgenstein and Bhartṛhari are engaged in a "Homeric struggle" against empiricism, naturalism and conventionalism in the understanding of language and meaning.

Notes and References

1. See Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961) 4.111.
2. The debate is between those who espouse meaning as an

external fact and those who maintain that it is an internal one. For externalist discussion see D. Follesdal, "Meaning and Experience" in *Mind and Language* ed. G. Guttenplan (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975) PP. 24. 44).

3. W.V. Quine, *Word and Object* (The MIT Press, Cambridge and Massachusetts, 1960), Chapter II.

4. See Frege, "The Thought : A Logical Inquiry" in *Philosophical Logic,* ed. P.F. Strawson (Oxford University Press, Oxford. 1969, pp. 17. 33).

5. Cf. Quine, *Word and Object,* Chapter II. See also his *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1969).

6. Quine, "On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma" in *Theories and Things* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1981, pp. 38-42).

7. Noam Chomsky, "Linguistics and Adjacent Fields : A Personal View" in *The Chomskyan Turn,* ed. A. Kasher (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991). See also his *Rules and Representations* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1980).

8. The "fact" mentioned here is transcendental for the reason that it is not a mere causal or natural fact. Meaning in this sense is a non-temporal aspect of language-use. For a contrary view, see Colin MacGinn *Wittgenstein on Meaning* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1980)

9. See Merril B. Hintikka and J. Hintikka, *Investigating Wittgenstein* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986) for a discussion on the idea of language as a universal medium.

10. Such a science of meaning is possible according to the theory of mental representations. See Fodor, *Psychosemantics* (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1987).

11. Cf. Follesdal, "Meaning and Experience"

12. See my "Meaning Experience and Understanding" *International Philosophical Quarterly,* Vol. xxiiii (1983), also included in my *Truth, Meaning and Understanding : Essays in Philosophical Semantics* (Indus Publishing Hosue, New Delhi, 1992).

13. Ibid. For discussion on the autonomy of the rules of grammar see Baker and Hacker, *Rules, Grammar and Necessity* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1990).

14. The Fregean position on the third realm of sense implicitly tells about the status of rules. See his The Thought in *Philosophical Logic,* ed. P.F. Strawson.

15. Cf. Chomsky, *Rules and Representations.*

16. For a discussion on the communitarian view of rules and rule-following, see *Wittgenstein : To Follow a Rule* eds. Steven H. Holtzman and Christopher M. Leich (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981).

17. See Harold G. Coward. *The Sphoṭa Theory of Language* (Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1980). See also David B. Zilberman, *The Birth of Meaning in Hindu Thought,* ed. Robert S. Cohen (D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1988) Chapter 4.

18. Cf. Coward, *The Sphoṭa Theory of Language.*

19. *Ibid.*

20. Satyakama Verma, *Vākyapadīyam of Bhartṛhari* (Munshilal Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1970) p. 77.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.* See also Coward, *The Sphoṭa Theory Language.*

23. See B.K. Matilal, *The Word and the World* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990) for a discussion on *sabdabrahman.*

24. See Frege, The Thought and Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* for their anti-psychologistic thesis.

25. See Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* trans. G.E.M.

Anscombe (Blackwell, Oxford, 1953) for a demarcation between grammar and psychology.

26. N. Chomsky, Topics in the Theory of Generative Gammar in *The Philosophy of Language,* ed. J.R. Searle (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971).

27. Chomsky, *Language and Mind* (Harcourt Brace Jevanovich, New York, 1972)

28. *Ibid.*

29. See E. Itkonen, *The Grammatical Theory and Metascience* (John Benjamins, Amsterdam, 1978). See also A. Das Gupta, In Defence of Autonomous Linguistics *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research* vol. xi (1994), pp. 96-110.

30. Frege, The Thought.

31. Matilal, *The Word and the World.*

32. *Ibid.*

33. Matilal and Sen, The Context Principle and Some Indian Controversies over Meaning *Mind* (1988) pp. 73-94.

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.*

37. Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic* Trans, J.L. Austin (Blackwell, Oxford, 18) sect. 60.

38. *Tractatus* 3.21-3. 221.

38. See Hintikka and Hintikka, *Investigating Wittgenstein* for ineffability thesis.

40. *Ibid.*

41. Dummett, *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy* (Duckworth, London, 1981).

42. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism in *From a Logical Point of*

view (Harvard University Press, Reprinted, 1980).

43. Quine, *Word and Object,* Chapter II.

44. See Quine, *Ontological Relativity and other Essays.*

45. Donald Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984).

Abbreviations

TLP : Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

PI : Philosophical Investigations

PR : Philosophical Remarks

PG : Philosophical Grammar

VP : Vākyapadīyam

Sphoṭa Theory Vis-a-Vis Picture Theory

M. Srimannarayana Murti

0.0 Philosophers of all the different schools agree unanimously with the sentence as the unit of expression, the sentence as consisting of components like morphemes and phonemes, and no component as capable of communicating a complete thought.[1] Again every philosopher has taken the psychical comprehension of the sentence sense by the listener as the result of the linguistic communication and hence as the basis of investigation. The physical units of sentence, namely the morphemes - the minimum meaningful units forming into sentences, and the phonemes - the phonological units of each speech concatenating into morphemes, are taken as the starting point for the semantic, phonological and phenetic inquiries. Thus the whole inquiry is evolved from physical structure to psychical phenomenon. But in this analysis the formation of phonemes, of the form and meaning of morpheme, word and sentence, their relationships, etc., have overshadowed the psychical phenomena. The two main theories called the *anvitābhidhānavāda* and the *abhihitānvayavāda* are the best examples for this development.

0.1 According to the *anvitābhidhānavāda* (word-concordance theory), the words express their respective meanings after they are grammatically related in concordance. The syntactic relation is brought about by case-relations. Now we find in the sentence there is a sequence of words and also a verb. The concordance can be in three ways : 1) The first word gets connected with all the other words and thus the first word itself is called sentence. 2) The verb gets connected with all the words, as the verb is the main component, because of which the case-relations are determined. 3) Each and every word is connected with others which are in concordance.[2] The first word is normally a noun in the nominative case and the Naiyāyikas

have adopted this definition of sentence. Prābhākaras have taken the verb as the sentence. Punyarāja remaks that some ancient Mīmāṁsakas have adopted the third definition of the sentence.

0.2 According to the *abhihitānvayavāda* (word-syntax theory) the words convey first their individual meanings and then these meanings are connected to form a sentence sense. Hence this inter-connection of the meanings is called sentence. As in the above interpretation here also we can interpret that the interconnection among meanings arises either one after another (*krama*) or simulataneously (*saṃghāta*). Both may be held; for, this interpretation is based on the mutual relations of the meanings. This view is held by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas.[3]

0.3 Without any reference to the naturalistic and conventionalistic presuppositions regarding the origin of language, all these (five) theories lead to the admittance of the divisibility of the sentence. Just as the *Saṃhitā-pāṭha* is reconstructed from the *Pada-pāṭha,* the sentence and its sense are to be structured from the phological and morphological components as a concatenation in a particular order of permutation and combination. Notwithstanding the acceptability of the divisibility of the sentence and its sense, logical inconsistency persists somewhere or other in formulating a comprehensive theory of sentence against the ontological and epistemological considerations.

1.0 Against this conventional treatment, the grammarian has taken a different stand (in fact by the extension of the word-syntax theory) that the psychic phenomenon itself is the basis of communication. In other words the communication of the mental disposition of the speaker to the listener is the purpose of language. All the metaphysical inquiry on the basis of language begins and ends with only the psychosis (*vṛtti*) of the intellect (*buddhi*). Hence there can be no world outside the ream of comprehension. Even if any thing exists outside the comprehension, it produces neither pain nor pleasure. Hence the object that appears in the psychosis of intellect

alone is the meaning and also the reality.[4] What we physically experience as the speech and material objects are only an appearance (*vivarta*) of the intellect.[5] The physical components of the speech comprising phonemes, and morphemes and sentences is only an appearance, but forms a bridge between the speaker and the listener in transmission of the psychic power. The language represents thus the integration of the personality and ability to relate others of what is contemplated.

1.1 The grammarian's theory of sentence is an outcome to overcome the difficulty in the cognition of sentence sense on the presupposition that the sentence and its meaning are indivisible. The sentence sense is indivisible and comprehended at one time without involving any sequence. So also the sentence is indivisible and incapable of classification into words. To circumvent the problem of segmentation of the sentence into components,the grammarian has evolved *sphoṭa-śabda,* a new category unknown and unacceptable to other schools of philosophy. The *sphoṭa-śabda* is the expressive word over and above the articulated word in a sentence. As regards the status of the *sphoṭa-śabda* in comparison with the word in a sentence, there are three explanations suggested by Bhartṛhari. Firstly the *sphoṭa* is an indivisible individual (*vyakti*) without any reference to the words (*ananvayaḥ śabdaḥ*), the total denial of any causality between the articulated words and the expressive *sphoṭa-śabda.* Secondly it is universal (*jāti*) prevading in the aggregate of words (*samghātavartinī jātiḥ*). Thirdly it is only a conceptual reality residing in the mind (*buddhyanusaṃhṛti*). Indivisibility of the sentence is the core principle of the grammarians to bring the psychic phenomena to the forefront subordinating the linguistic criteria.[6]

1.2 To bring a correlation between the *sphoṭa-śabda* - a mental image, and the physical sounds articulated by the organs of speech, Bhartṛhari gives a vivid account called '*sphoṭa* theory' to explain the process from the conception of the object or idea in the mind of the speaker upto the comprehension of the meaning by the listener. The process of commuication has three stages. In the first stage the

speaker conceives in his mind the sentence in an indistinct way, soon after the idea flashes in his mind. In the second stage he constructs in his mind the sentence in a pattern with a specific sequence. And in the third stage he translates the sentence he has constructed in mind into speech sounds through articulation.[7] The listener has also to pass through these three stages in a reverse order. So he listens first the articulated speech sounds of the speaker. Then he gets a complete impression of the sentence. In the thirld stage he cognises a single and indivisible sentence by which he gets the meaning.[8]

1.21 Bhartṛhari describes these three stages of externalisation with three self explanatory names - *paramopāmśu, upāmśu* and *saṁhṛtakrama.*[9] In the *paramopāṁśu* stage the *sphoṭa-śabda* is still in the mind and the process of articulation has not yet started. These words can be grasped only by the mind of the speaker. And hence the *sphoṭa* in this stage is also called *paśyantī.* (Vṛtti on VP. 1.134). In the *upāmśu* stage, the word in the speaker's mind is externalised by the functioning of *prāṇa* and the articulation of the word begins.[10] But this utterance of the word cannot be heard by others. It is audible only to the speaker. The speaker is conscious of time sequence and the phonological pattern. The vowel sounds take the distinction of short, long and extra-long.[11] This is called *prākṛtadhvani* and *madhyamā vāk.* In the third stage of externalisation the word is called *saṃhṛta-krama* because the sentence takes the distinct form and becomes audible to the listener also. It is the actual speech sounds pronounced by articulation by the speaker and heard by the listener. Therefore the vowels in this stage take also the distinction as *druta* 'fast', *madhya* 'medial' and *vilambita* 'slow' on the basis of rapidity, medium and slowness respectively in their pronunciation. Thus this is called *vaikṛtadhvani*[12] and *vaikharī vāk.*[13] The *vaikṛtadhvani* is transitory in contradistinction to the indestructible *sphoṭa.* The eternal *sphoṭa,* however, does not differ in its nature from the destructible *dhvani.*[14]

1.3 Segmentation of the sentence sense into parts of speech or the sentence into words, morphemes and phonemes is an artificial device employed to the *prākṛtadhvani,* following the principle of

copresence and coabsence. The limitations to this segmentation is manifold. For example, all the sense that is known from the sentence cannot be distributed as lexical meanings as certain meanings cannot be assigned to any component. Therefore whatever that is found conveyed over and above the sum total of the lexical meanings put together has to be taken as the sentence sense.[15] For example, the relation of subject and predicate or qualifier and the qualificand cannot be attrributed to any part. Therefore to show that the sentence sense is pervading all through the segments, Bhartṛhari says that both the words *nīla* and *utpala* in the compound *nīlotpala* or in the phrase *nīlam utpalam* denote blue lotus. He also observes that it is only then the relation of collocation (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) can be established.[16]

1.5 The celebrated grammarian philosopher Bhartṛhari formulizes the *sphoṭa* theory with illustrations of unrivalled and outwitting poetic imagery. For example he justifies the mental object as the meaning for the mental word called *sphoṭa* with the example of the illuminator and the illuminated. An external light as illuminator can illuminate only an external object. In other words, the relation of the illuminator and the illuminated can exist between two things only when they both belong to the same plane. The expressive word called *sphoṭa* is the illuminator and something mental. So the object, what it illuminates is the thing expressed and must also be some thing mental. Therefore it is not even necessary that the meaning of a word should have a corresponding external object. It can exclusively be a mental one, or it may never have an external object at all. But the actions signified by the sentences cannot be accomplished unless the mental objects are again related with external objects. So Bhartṛhari holds that the mental object conveyed by the word is superimposed on the external object and is understood as external;[17] it is also understood as susceptible to action. Following Bhartṛhari Nāgeśa sharply observes that if a person uses the word *ghaṭa* intentionally for *paṭa* in the sentence *ghaṭam ānaya* the listener has to decide the meaning of *ghaṭa* as *paṭa*.[18]

1.52 As to how the *sphoṭa* is manifested by the speaker and comprehended by the listener, Bhartṛhari takes the example of a picture. A painter observes first the whole and then each and every part of the object to be represented in a picture. After getting a comprehensive knowledge of the object as a whole and of the parts he begins his work. First he draws a sketch on a can as or paper. Then he paints it with different colours.[21] While painting he sees each and every colour separately. When once the picture is ready the painter does not see the colours distinctly. If each colour is seen separately then there is no difference from one picture to the other.[22]

1.521 From the point of view of the listener also the same picture example holds good. Each colour of the painting is very important for the man of the world also to differentiate one picture from the other and hence each one plays individually a significant role in making the comprehension of the picture. But in the perception of the picture he does not see each colour separately but all the colours at one time and the whole knowledge is only one and indivisible. So also the distinct speech units found in the *prākṛtadhvani* provide a basis for the comprehension of the *sphoṭa.* In other words all of them together give the indivisible and single congnition of the *sphoṭa.*[23] This *sphoṭa* flashes the meaning called *pratibhā.*[24]

1.53 Again to show the *prākṛtadhvani* as an appearance of the *sphoṭa* Bhartṛhari draws a distinction between representational picture and the concrete object. The concrete object is that which is seen and experienced by the man of the world and the representational picture is what is painted by an artist. The ups and downs in the mountains are represented in the picture against a beautiful secenery by a landscapist. Even though both the concrete and the representational forms of the mountain are very much similar in the knowledge[25] produced in the mind, but the physical experience differs. The ups and downs on the spatial mountain causes trembles, falls, hits and pain while walking.[26] But the same ups and downs in the picture do not prqduce pain, for there one cannot have strolls or strides.[27]

2.1 It is very interesting to find similarities of the *sphoṭa*-theory with the picture theory propounded by the twentieth century Western philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (26.1889-29.4.1951). He is the first philosopher in the west who developed a metaphysical system from the considerations of language and meaning (PI. Sect. 109).[28] Thus for a proper understanding of his theory of how a sentence conveys its meaning we have to know his ideas about the world, and the composition and nature of language. He does not consider that a complete list of things tells us what the world is like, a provide a complete description of the world. From a list of all the objects that there are, one can derive only a very inadequate idea of what the world is like. Therefore what is wanted is not just a list of objects, but also an account of what they are alike and how they are arranged (T. 4.26).[29] Then it is not a list but a lot of facts. Therefore he observes : "The world is all that is the case. The world is the totality of facts and not of things. The world divides into facts (T. 1.1.1.2).[30] Objects make up the substance of the world (T. 2.021)."[31] The truth about the world is that there are such and such facts not that there are such and such objects.

2.2 Fact is a kind of complex entity existing in the world in which a group of things are arranged or combined in a certain way. For example the fact that `the cat is on the mat' is a complex consisting of 'the cat and the mat are arranged so that the former is on the latter.' Facts alone can exist of themselves, independent of anything else. These facts are pictured and described by language. Language consists of propositions and the propositions again can be divided into elementary propositions, which no longer can further be divided. A proposition is a picture of reality and "the sum total of reality is the world (T. 2.063).[32] It asserts the existence of a state of affairs (T.4.21).[33] So if a proposition is understood the situation that it represents is known.

2.3 Just as Bhartṛhari speaks of the *sphoṭa* and *dhvani,* Wittgenstein recognises two categories of meaning bearers namely

the proposition and the propositional sign. The propositions are the thoughts or ideas which are expressed by the sentences. Thus the propositional signs are the sentences and different from propositions. Sentences are composed of words in accordance with syntactic rules and belong to some definite language. The propositions, on the other hand, are not composed of words and do not belong to any language. Furthermore propositions are the sort of thing that can be true or false, but sentences cannot be true or false.[34]

2.31 While Bhartṛhari recognises indivisibility of the sentence sense and form, Wittgenstein holds that the proposition is divisible into parts called elementary propositions. The elementary proposition is the simplest kind of proposition and asserts the existence of a state of affairs (T. 4.21).[35] As Pitcher observes, it is one that cannot be analysed into any further more basic propositions.[36] An elementary propositions consists of names and is a picture of a state of affairs. It is a nexus, a concatenation of names (T. 2.22).[37] A name cannot be divided any further by means of a definition : it is a primitive sign (T. 3.26).[38] A name means an object (T. 3.203)[39] and hence in order for a term to be a name, there must be no possibility whatsoever of defining it or analysing it in a purely verbal way. Thus the propositions are analysed into elementary propositions and the latter into names.

2.4 What is the difference between the meaning of a name and the meaning of a proposition? A proposition may have a meaning even though there is no fact corresponding to it (i.e. it is false). A name cannot have a meaning if there is no object corresponding to it, becaue the meaning of a name is the object it names.

2.41 Wittgenstein marks the difference between the meaning of a name and that of a proposition by saying that a name has *Bedeutung* 'meaning' and a proposition has *Sinn* 'sense'. So he says : "Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning (T. 3.3)".[40] The sense of a proposition is the situation it describes. He sharply remarks : Instead of 'this proposition has such and such a sense', we can simply say 'this

proposition represents such and such a situation (T. 4.031 (2).".[41] The sense of a sentence is rather a strange kind of objective entity, which is apprehensible by minds.

2.5 Thus the linguistic metaphysics of Wittgenstein is characterised with the psychic categories of propositions, elementary propositions and names, and the physical constituents of propositional signs or sentences and words. Now he has to account against this metaphysical stand, for the two important features of language, namely, 1) many previously unknown sentences are created by the speakers by using the words from the known sentences and 2) the listener is able to understand the new senses from the sentences newly created by the speaker without any difficulty (T. 4.027).[42] In other words the problem perculates to as to how the meanings of the words produce the sense of propositions. In Wittgenstein's terminology we may ask the question : how can an elementary proposition consisting of only names tell us any thing, as a mere list of names cannot state a fact? For example what could be the list of "Socrates, Aristotle, Athens, living"[43] or "*bhāryā rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ devadattasya*"[44] possibly assert?

2.51 Wittgenstein thought that there is only one possible way of explaining this vital and puzzling feature of language : the proposition must be a picture of situation it describes and asserts to exist. He holds that a picture has just the features which a proposition has.

2.52 What does constitute a picture? The marks themselves cannot be a picture. But it should be a representational picture; i.e. it should depict some thing. Further it should be a definite representational picture by depicting certain definite individuals.[45] Therefore the marks necessarily represent more or less certain kinds of things in reality, and in addition the agent corelates the component marks with definite elements of reality. Thus a definite representational picture includes a correlation of its elements with elements of reality.[46] Thus Wittgenstein uses the word picture, in the

context of the 'picture theory' in the sense of only a definite representational picture. As such a picture represents some situation beyond itself one can tell which situation it is, merely by looking at the picture. No one need explain what situation it depicts and one can 'read it of' from the picture itself. Thus the picture is a fact.[47] The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way. In a picture objects have the elements of the objects corresponding to them. Thus the elements of the picture are the representation of the objects.

2.53 A proposition and a picture are compared in all details to prove that the same procedure could be adopted in the understanding of propositions as in the reading of pictures. A proposition shows its sense similarly as a picture shows what it represents. It is true that a proposition does not at once appear to be a picture of situation. Ordinary pictures look like what they represent, and a proposition certainly does not look like a situation. Hence Wittgenstein differentiates them by holding that the difinite representational picture of a proposition is a logical one, while the definite representational picture of a painting is a spatial type. But both of them give a definite representational picture of a certain determinate situation. "In order for one thing, A, to be a logical picture of another, B, three conditions must be fulfilled : 1) there must be a one-to-one correspondence between the components of A and those of B; 2) to every feature of the structure or form of A there must correspond a feature of the structure or form B; and 3) there must be rules of projection connecting the components of A and those of B. Rules of projection are rules where by given A (or B), B (or A) can be reconstructed from it."[48]

2.55 Now Wittgenstein compares the rules of logical picture with the rules connecting a musical score or an actual performance of it; given either the score or the performance, the other can be reconstructed from it. Wittgenstein observes : "There is a general rule by means of which the musician can obtain the symphony from the score ..... And the rule is the law of projection which projects the

symphony into the language of musical notations ..... (T. 4.0141)."[49]

2.6 Then what is the relation between a proposition and a propositional sign? A propositional sign is that in it its elements, namely the words, stand in a determinate relation to one another (T. 3.14).[50] It is only because it is a fact that a propositional sign can represent some thing and can be used to describe a state of affairs. "It is not the sentence (propositional sign) *qua* mere string or words that represents a situation, any more than it is the patches of paint in an ordinary spatial picture *qua* a mere set of patches, that represents the situation depicted; rather, just as it is the fact that the patches are arranged in the way they are, that represents the situation, so it is the fact the words of the propositional sign are related in the way they are that represents the situation described."[51] Thus a proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world, just as a spatial definite representational picture is cerain marks or patches of paint in their projective relation to the world. The proposition is not a third entity over and above the propositional sign and the situation; it is just the propositional sign in a projective relationship to the situation described. Wittgenstein says that it is propositions that are pictures of reality and not the propositional signs.

2.7 When an elementary proposition is a series of names, how can a series of names present a state of affairs? This happens by correlating the components of the picture with objects. The correlating element of the components of a picture with the components of reality is a mental act. There is a definite relationship among the component names and that they are arranged in a certain way just as the patches of a paint in a picture are arranged in a certain way. "One name stands for one thing, another for another, and they are combined with one another. In this way the whole group-like a *tableu vivant* present a state of affairs (T. 4.0311)."[52]

3.1 Here certain similarities and differences are found between the *sphoṭa* theory of Bhartṛhari and the picture theory of Wittgenstein. Both of them have recognised the conceptual object as the referent of

the word.[53] They differ as regards the status of the components of the sentence. For Bhartṛhari the expressive word *sphoṭa* and the expressed sense *pratibhā* are psychic and of the nature of knowledge. And the physical sounds in the form of *prākṛta* and *vaikṛta dhvanis* and their referents are unreal in the final analysis,[54] but appear as constituents because of the superimposition of the *sphoṭa* and the *pratibhā* on the words and sentences. The analysis of the sentence is an unreal means adopted by the grammarians. When analysed, there are only two methods namely *anvitābhidhāna* and *abhihitānvaya.* In other words the *anvitābhidhāna* and the *abhihitānvaya* are only two modes of analysis. While the divisibility of the sentence is viewed as unreal by the grammarians, all the other schools of philosophy take it as real. Hence they have developed a system of argument in their favour. The theory of *vṛtti* 'denotation of meaning of another (*parārthābhidhānam*)' is a forceful argument to account for the extra-sense denoted by the sentence over and above the meaning brought out by concatenation of words or word meanings. But because of liberalism inherited from Patañjali, Bhartṛhari gives all the alternative views in full with an ardent belief in arriving at solution to any given problem without pride and prejudice.[55]

3.11 For Wittgenstein concept of appearance does not figure in his metaphysics. He recognises the propositions, the elementary propositions, names, propositional signs and words as real. However he is largely successful in identifying the sense of the proposition is conceptual and as a fact. But he failed to keep at distance the propositional signs from the propositions.[56] Thus he assigns a certain status to the words and their meanings in the formulation of the sentence sense.[57] Because of viewing the propositions as composed of elementary propositions, and the latter of names, Wittgenstein has to explain the syntactic relations. Thus a blend of the *sphoṭa* theory and the *abhihitānvaya* theory of Indian grammarians is seen in Wittgenstein's theory of sentence sense.

3.2 Both Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein explain the psychic

phenomena in the communication of the sentence sense with the example of picture. But Bhartṛhari does not draw the similarities of the *sphoṭa* with picture in all details; for, similarities for the Indian thinkers presuppose differences also. Bhartṛhari discusses indeed the relation between the *upameya* 'the object of comparison' and the *upamāna* 'standard of comparison', while commenting on the rules : *upamānāni sāmānyavacanaiḥ* (Pan. 2.1.55) and *upamitaṃ vyāghrādibhiḥ sāmānyāprayoge* (Pan. 2.1.56), wherein he has clearly shown that the *upamāna* and the *upameya* are bought under collocation, by which they are related as identical on the basis of only some common characteristics.[58] But Wittgenstein draws one to one correspondence between the logical picture and the spatial picture.[59]

3.21 Both Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein show the negative sentence as an instance supporting the conceptual objectivity. A positive or a negative sentence can neither bring into existence nor negate the existence of an object of empirical world. But what is related in the mind can be spoken of with reference to both existence and nonexistence. So Bhartṛhari says that the existence as well as nonexistence is denoted by each and every word.[60] But by convention the existence strikes to the mind at once, and hence to avoid a chance of doubt or misapprehension for the listener a negative particles indicative of negation of existence is included in the sentence.[61] So also Wittgenstein says : "The positive proposition necessarily pre-suppose the existence of the negative proposition and vice versa (T.5.5151 (3))."[62]

3.22 Because of the admittance of the conceptual objectivity, Patanjali and Bhartṛhari could hold *samsarga* 'association', *bheda* 'dissociation' and *bhedasaṃsarga* 'association-dissociation' as the sentence sense.[63] But Wittgenstein is not very clear about such association and dissociation. For example he says : "States of affairs are independent of one another (T. 2.061)"[64] and "From the existence or nonexistence of one state of affair it is impossible to infer the

existence or nonexistence of another (T. 2.062)."[65]

3.3 Both Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein believe in that the analysis of language leads to the analysis of the world,[66] as all knowledge that is manifested is associated with language.[67] Therefore the whole world is understood or described by knowing the language.[68] While Wittgenstein holds that the language is to describe the facts in the world, Bhartṛhari goes one step further and holds that the whole universe is a manifestation of the language; it has in fact evolved out of Chandas 'the Vedic language'.[69]

Bibliography and Abbreviations

Vyakarana-Mahabhasya of Patanjali with the commentaries of Kaiyata and Nagesa. Gurukula Jhajjar, Rohtek Dt. Haryana Sahitya Samsthanam, 1962-63.

Vakyapadiya of Bhartṛhari

Kanda I, with the commentary *Vrtti* of Bhartṛhari and subcommentary *Paddhati* of Harivrsabha, ed. by Kh. A. Subramania Iyer, Poona, Deccan College Monograph series 32, 1966.

Kanda II, with the commentary *Tika* of Punyaraja, ed. Raghunathasarma, Varanasi, Sampurnananda Sanskrit Vishva-Vidyalaya 1980. Sarasvatibhavanagranthamala 91.

Kanda III, pts. 1 & 2, with Helaraja's commentary *Prakirnaprakasa,* ed. K.A. Subramania Iyer, Poona. Deeccan College 1963, 1973. Deccan College Monograph Series 21.

Pitcher, George. *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein.* Prentice-Hall of India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1972.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus T

Philosophical Investigations PI

REFERENCES

1. Bhartṛhari gives eight definitions of sentence taking into consideration of the factors : divisibility and indivisibility of sentence, physical units of language - nouns and verbs, the physical constituents of meaning. They are :

   1. The verb is a sentence (VP. 2. 7-14, 326, 414). The action is understood at first and thus it is said as sentence sense.
   2. The first word is a sentence (VP.2.47). The noun in the nominative case occurs normally in the first place, except in poetic expressions. So the noun is said as sentence.
   3. Each and every word in concordance is a sentence (2. 48).
   4. The sequence of words is a sentence (VP. 2.34-37).
   5. The aggregate of words is a sentence (VP. 2.41-45).
   6. One indivisible expressive word is sentence (VP. 2.19-27).
   7. The universal inhering in the aggregate of words is a sentence (VP. 2.7-18)
   8. The unification of words in the mind is a sentence (VP. 2.30-33).

   [1]*ākhyātaśābdaḥ* [2]*samghato* [3]*jatīh samghātavartinī/*

   [4]*eko 'navayavah sabadah* [5]*kramo* [6]*buddhyanusamhrtih//*

   [7]*padam ādyam* [8]*prthak sarvam padam sākankṣam ity api/*

   vākyamprātimatir bhinna bahudhā nyayavadinam // VP. 2. 1-2.

2. The first three definitions of sentence are offered according to this logic.

3. The fourth and the fifth definitions are offered according to this interpretation. These two schools of word-syntax are suggested by Patañjali in the interpretation. These two schools of word-concordance and word-syntax are suggested by Patañjali in the interpretation of the compound *savadi* in the

rule *śarvadinī śrvaṇamani* (Pan. 1.1.27). The compound *sarvadi* can be taken as a *karmadhāraya* type of *tatpurusa* according to the word-concordance theory and as a *bahuvṛhī* according to the word-syntax theory.

4. *api prayoktur ātmānam śabdam antar avasthitam*/VP. 1.122. Bhartṛhari recognises the existence of correspondence between the mental object and the physical object in the world. But it is only the mental object with which the language is concerned. For Bhartṛhari the relationship of the word and meaning is that of the expression and the expressed and both are the mental entities; of.

   yo vārtho buddhiviṣayo bāhyavastunibandhanaḥ/

   sa bāhyavastviti jñātaḥ śabdārthaḥ kaiśid iṣyate // 2. 132.

5. *śabdasya buddhyuparuḍwasya vaikalpikasya yo buddhyupārūḍho bāhya-vastunibandhanaḥ bāhyaṃ vastu vikalpajananadvāreṇa nibandhanaṃ vasya sa tathābhūtaḥ. sa ca vaikalpiko 'rtho bramāvaśād dṛśyavikalpaikākārenābahīrūpo' 'pi bahirupatayadhyasto 'dhystam eva vastvavagacchāmi śabdad iti śabdanimittam iti śabdārtha isyate,* Punajāja's *Tīka* on VP. 2.132.

6. Of the eight definitions given by Bhartṛhari, the last three, namely *eko 'navayavah śabdah, saṃghatavartinī jātiḥ* and *buddhyanusamhrti* are according to the grammarians.

7. *vitarkitaḥ purā buddhyā kvacid arthe niveśiaḥ /*

   karaṇebhyo vivṛttena dhvaninā so 'nugrhyate // VP. 1.47.

8. *yathaiva prayoktā śabdaviśeṣaviṣayaṃ prayatnam abhipadyamānaḥ pratiśabdaṃ paritaḥ paricchinnāñ śabdātmanaḥ saṃpṛśann iva manaḥ praṇidhatte, tathaiva pratipattāpi śabdarūpaparicchedā-dhīnam arthagrahaṇaṃ manyamānas taṃ taṃ śabdaṃ sarvaiḥ saṃ-bandhibhir viśeṣaṇair aśritasaṃsargānugrahaṃ nirdhārayati, Vṛtti* on VP. 1.53.

The three stages in the process of communication are called by different names, each one describing a particular characteristic feature. In the first stage, with reference to the speaker, the expressive word is called *sphoṭa,* and in the second and third stages it is called *dhvani* or *nāda.* The *sphoṭa* and the *dhvani* are the two forms of the word; the *sphoṭa* is the underlying cause of the *dhvani* and the latter is the cause of communication of meaning; cf.

dvāv upādānaśabdeṣu śabdau śabdavido viduḥ /

eko nimittaṃ śabdānām aparo 'rthe prayujyate // VP. 1. 44.

The *dhvani* in the second stage gets the distinctions of duration called short (*hrasva*), long (*dīrgha*) and extra-long (*pluta*) and it is called *prākṛtadhvani;* cf.

svabhāvabhedān nityatve hrasvadīrghaplutādiṣu /

prākṛtasya dhvaneḥ kālaḥ śabdasyoty upacaryate // VP. 1.76.

The same *dhvani* is the third stage gets the distinctions of rapidity (*druta*), medium (*madhyama*) and slowness (*vilambita*) and it is called *vaikṛtadhvani.* Therefore the same *sphoṭa* is in fact called distinctly on the basis of the extra characteristic features acquired in the process of externalisation.

9. *upādhimato hy ekasya śabdasya vibhāgā ivāvasthitāḥ saṃhitāsāṃhitayor drutamadhyamavilambitāsu vṛttiṣu śanair uccair upāṃśuparamopāṃśu- saṃhṛtakramaṃ ceti, Vṛtti* on VP. 2.19.

10. *avyaktaḥ kramavān śabdaḥ upāṃśv abhidhīyate /*

akramas tu vitaty eva buddhir yatrāvatiṣṭhate // VP. 2.19.

11. *svabhāvabhedān nityatve hrasvadīrghaplutādiṣu /*

prākṛtasya dhvaneḥ kālaḥ śabdasyopacaryate // VP. 1.76.

12. *śabdasyordhvam abhivyakter vṛttibhedaṃ tu vaikṛtāḥ /*

dhvaneyaḥ samupohante sphoṭātmā tair na bhidyate // V.P. 1.77.

13. *vaikharyā madhyamāyāś ca paśyantyāś caitad adbhutam / anekatīrthabhedāyās trayyā vācaḥ paraṃ padam //* VP. 1.134.

14. How can the indestructible *sphoṭa* be not different from the destrictible *dhvani?* Bhartṛhari resorts to the philosophical doctrine of change called *vivarta* 'appearance', which is the very foundation of the Śabdādvaita. He defines *vivarta* as "the assumption of one thing as some thing else without loosing its inherent nature (*tattva*) through apparent diversity of different unreal forms; *ekasya tattvād apracyutasya bhedānukāreṇasatyavibhaktānyarupopagrāhitā vivartaḥ, Vṛtti* on VP. 1.1.

Note : The same definition with a slight modification in wording is repeated by Prakāśātman in his *Pañcapādikā-vivaranā : ekasya tattvād apracyutasya pūrvaviparītāsatyanekarūpāvā-bhaso vivartah,* Srī Padmapādācarya's *Pañcapādikā* with commentaries, ed. by S. Subrahmanyasastri, Mahesh Reserach Institute, Varanasi, 1992, *Varṇaka* 5, p. 532, 1. 11.

The *sphoṭa-śabda*, which is nothing but the consciousness of the speaker (VP. 1.122) appears in the form of *prākṛtadhvani* and *vaikṛtadhvani* which are destructible (VP. 1.47 *Vṛtti*). Therefore the indivisible *sphoṭa* appears as divisible in the stages of *prākṛtadhvani* and *vaikṛtadhvani* by taking on it the qualities of the sound (VP. 1.48). Just as the reflection of the moon in water appears to be moving because of the movement of water, the *sphoṭa-śabda* also appears to have divisibility, duration and speed;

pratibimbaṃ yathānyatra sthitaṃ toyakriyāvaśāt /

tatpravṛttim ivānveti sa dharmaḥ sphoṭanādayoḥ// VP. 1.49

15. *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvaṃ padayor upajāyate/*

na prātipadikārthaś ca tatraivaṃ vyatiricyate // VP. 3.14 (*Vṛtti*). 6.

16. M. Srimannarayana Murti, *Sanskrit Compounds : A*

Philosophical Study, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 93, 1974, pp. 196-213.

17. *yo Vārtho buddhiviṣayo bāhyavastunibandhanaḥ /*
sa bāhyavastv iti jñātaḥ śabdārthaḥ kaiścid idyate // VP. 2.132.

18. *yat tu tatra tatra vākye 'ghaṭam ānaya' ity ādau ghaṭakarmakānayanabodhecchayoccaritatvabhavajñāne .... idaṃ vākyaṃ etadartha-pratītīcchayā vaktroccāritam ity ākārakatatparyagraho hetuḥ, Laghumañjūsuā,* p. 524. Also see M. Srimannarayana Murti, 'Intention of the Speaker according to Grammarians', *S.V.U. Oriental Journal,* vol. 30-31, p. 21ff. The lead for this is found in VP. 2.285 :
atyantaviparīto 'pi yadā yo 'rtho 'vadhāryate/
yathāsaṃpratyayaṃ śabadas tatra mukhyah pratīyate //

19. *āṇḍabhāvam ivāpanno yaḥ kratuḥ śabdasaṃjñakaḥ /*
vṛttis tasya kriyābhūtā bhāgaśo labhate kramam // VP. 1.51.

20. *sarvavibhāgodgrāhapratisaṃhāreṇa bāhyo vyāvaharikaḥ śabdo 'ntaḥkaraṇe mayūrādyaṇḍarasavat pūrvavibhāgodgrāhabhāvanāmātrām avyatikrāman pratilīyate, Vṛtti* on VP. 1.51.

21. *yathaika eva sarvārthapratyayaḥ pravibhajyate /*
mūrtyantarasya tritayam evaṃ śabdo 'pi dṛśyate// VP. 1.52.

22. *yathaika eva sarvārthapratyayaḥ pravibhajyate /*
dṛśyabhedānukāreṇa vākyarthānugamas tathā //
citrasayaikasvarūpasya yathā bhedanidarśanaiḥ/
nīladibhiḥ samākhyānaṃ kriyate bhinnalakśanaiḥ// VP. 2.7-8.
citrajñānaṃ sarvākāram ekam eva. pravibhāgas tv āsya dṛsābhedasamāśrayena kriyate. Nīlapītadyānekākāram eva vijñānam upajātam iti. vastusthityā tatra jñāna ākārabhedo nāsti, Punyarāja's *Tīkā* on VP. 2.7.

23. Even though theoretically each word or morpheme in a sentence is held as signifying the whole sentence sense, Bhartṛhari holds

that every component is essential. He explains this with the example of memorisation of the texts. A text which is to be memorised has to be read time and again. Just as each reading strengthens memory, each component in a sentence supports the final cognition of the sentence sense. The first component gives rise to the cognition vaguely, the second one little clearly, and so on until the last one, helped by the impressions left by the previous cognitions, reveals it in all its clarity and distinctness.

yathānuvākaḥ śloko vā sodhatvam upagacchati /
āvṛtyā na tu sa granthaḥ pratyāvṛtti nirūpyate //
pratyayair anupākhyeyair grahaṇānuguṇais tathā /
dhvaniprakāśite śabde svarūpam avadhāryate // VP. 1. 82-83.

24. *vicchedagrahaṇe 'rthānāṃ pratibhānyaivopajāyate/*
vākyārtha iti tām āhuḥ padārthair upapāditām //
idaṃ tad iti sānyeṣām anākhyeyā kathaṃcana /
pratyātmavṛttisiddhā sā kartrāpi na nirūpyate // VP. 2. 143-144.

25. Cf. Punyarāja takes it as knowledge : *nīlapītady anekākām eva vijñānam upajātam iti. vastusthityā tatra jñāna ākārabhedo nāsti, Punyarāja's Tīka* on VP. 2.7.

26. *yacca nimnonnataṃ citre sarūpaṁ parvatādibhiḥ /*
na tatra pratighātādikāryam tadvat pravartate // VP. 2.290.

27. *parvatādibhiḥ sarūpaṃ nimnonnataṃ citrabhittau dṛśyate, na ca tāvatā tatra pratighātādikāryabhedo jñānāntareṇa tatra bhedāvagatir evety arthaḥ, Puṇyarāja's Tīkā on ibid.*

28. Pitcher, p. 229

29. Ibid. p. 102.

30. Ibid. p. 18, 19.

31. Ibid. p. 48.

32. Ibid. p. 22, 46.
33. Ibid. p. 46.
34. Ibid. p. 28.
35. Ibid. p. 31.
36. Ibid. p. 32.
37. Ibid. p. 45.
38. Ibid. p. 45.
39. Ibid. p. 32.
40. Ibid. p. 45.
41. Ibid. p. 45.
42. Ibid. p. 76.
43. Ibid. p. 75.
44. MB. 2.1.1., p. 497.
45. Pitcher. p. 91.
46. Ibid. p. 90.
47. Ibid. p. 82.
48. Ibid. p. 78.
49. Ibid. p. 49.
50. Ibid. p. 83
51. Ibid. p. 85.
52. Ibid. p. 81.
53. *Śabdapramāṇākā vayam. yac chabda āha tad asmākam pramāṇam,* MP. 2.1.1., p. 529.

    tathā hi buddhyā nirūpitavastuviṣayāḥ śabdāḥ, Helārāja's Padamañjarī on VP. 3. 3 (Sambandha). 39, p. 150.
54. *anvayavyatirekābhyām arthavān parikalpitaḥ /*

    eko dhātvarthavigamād varṇatvenopacaryate // VP. 3. 14 (*Vrtti*). 19.

55. *ācāryā hi parasminn akrame 'ntaṃ saṃniveśini śabdatattve praty adhikaraṇam āgamabhedaparigraheṇa bhinnāni darśanāni śritaḥ sāstravyavahāram anugācchanti, Vṛtti* on VP. 1.74.

Vṛṣabhadeva adds : *tatra kaḥ panthā na sakya āsthātum iti saṃvyavahārārthaṃ sarvāni darśanānyaśritaḥ, Padhati* on ibid.

For example Bhartṛhari discusses the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* in VP. 3. 14 (*Vṛtti*). 7-27 from the points of view of the theories of sentence concordance, sentence syntax and sentence indivisibility. See also M. Srimannarayana Murti, *Sanskrit Compounds : A Philosophical Study,* pp. 196ff.

56. Cf. "Here, as elsewhere, Wittgenstein confuses proposition with propositional sign. It is not a proposition, but a propositional sign - a sentence - which communicates a sense to the hearer (reader), for that is all that the hearer herars (reader sees). Propositions may *have* new senses, but they cannot be said to communicate them', Pitcher on 4.027 : It belongs to the essence of a proposition that it should be able to communicate a *new* sense to us, Pitcher. p. 76.

57. Ibid. p. 81.

58. Patañjali says that the prerequisite of a comparison is that some *sāmānya* 'common attribute' and some *viśeśa* 'distinctive attribute' should exist between the *upamāna* and the *upameya* (*evam tharhi yatra kiṁcit sāmānyaṁ kaścic ca viśeśas tatropamānopameye bhavataḥ,* MB. 2.1.55, p. 620). Here the rule 2.1.55 enjoins the compounding of the *upamāna* with the *sāmānyavacana* 'word expressive of the common attribute'; e.g. *śāstriśyāmā devadatta.* The rule 2.1.56 enjoins the compounding of the *upameya* with *upamāna* when the *āmanyavacana* is not expressively stated in the sentence; e.g. *puruṣavyāghraḥ.* Here the very mention of *sāmānyavacana* implies the existence of contradictory attributes against the common attributes. Further the preposition *upa* in the words

upamāna and *upameya* also signify the existence of prominent differences. As defined by Patañjali *upamāna* is that which determines something approximately but not accurately (*tatsamipe yan nātyantāya mimite tad upamānam,* MB, 2.1.55, p. 621). In spite of the differences the standard of comparison determines the object of comparison through the common attributes alone.

nātyantāya mimite yat sāmānye smavasthitam/
śadṛsyād upameyārthaḥ samīpe parikalpyate// VP. 3.14 (*Vṛtti*). 387.

Not only that the rules of compounding confirm that the *upamāna* and the *upameya* are identified through the relations of *viśeśaṇaviśeśyabhāva* and *sāmānādhikaraṇya.* Therefore the *upamāna* and the *upameya* are compounded just as the qualifier and the qualificand as in *nilotpalam.* Further there shall be no purpose served when the *upamāna* and the *upameya* are identical in all respects (*yadi yad evopamānaṁ tad evopameyam, ka ihopamārthaḥ - 'gaur iva gauḥ' iti,* MB. 2.1.55, p. 620.

tatrābhinnavyapekṣāyām upamārtho na vidyate /
yo hi gaur iti vijñāne hetuḥ so 'sti gavāntare// VP. 3.14.394.

In the same way when the *upamāna* and the *upameya* are absolutely different from each other because of the presence of the mutually exclusive qualities in both, no purpose is served by the comparison as in *gaur iva aśvaḥ.* The question of comparison does not arise in such cases because the cognition of the attributes of the *upamāna* does not help the cognition of the attributes of the *upameya* in any way.

vyāvṛttānāṁ viśeṣaṇaṁ vyapārs tu vivakṣite /
na kaścid upakāro 'sti buddher buddhyantaram prati // VP. 3.14.395.

M. Srimannarayana Murti, *Sanskrit Compounds : A Philosophical study,* pp. 213-243.

59. Pitcher, p. 81, "In a proposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable parts as in the situation that it represents (T. 4.04)", Pitcher. p. 79. "The pictorial relationship consists of the correlations of the picture's elements with things (T. 2.1514)", ibid. p. 86.

60. *tathā hi — sarvasādhāraṇyāt padāntaropādhīyamānarūpaviśeṣasahaḥ kācābhrasphaṭikādivat so 'rtha iti yathāyatham asti nasti iti bhāvābhāvasamānvayavaśena niyataḥ pratīyate,* Helaraja's *Padamañjarī* on VP. 3.3.41, p. 151.

Therefore the grammarians postulate a different type of existence (*sattā*) applicable to the conceptual objects, which is similar to the existence of the empirical objects (VP. 3.3.39, p. 150).

61. *buddher viṣayatām prāpte śabdād arthe pratīyate/ pravṛttir vā nivṛttir vā śrutya hy artho 'nusajyate//* VP. 3.14.279.

62. Pitcher. p. 61. This view goes in conformity with his views :

"The world is the totality of facts, not of things" (T. 1.1)", ibid. p. 47. "In order for a proposition to be capable of being true it must also be capable of being false (Note Book entry for 5.6.15).", ibid. p. 61. "Every proposition is essentially true-false. Thus a proposition has two poles (corresponding to case of its truth and case of its falsity). We call this the sense of a proposition (Note Book, p. 94)", p. 53.

63. For example, in the sentence *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ,* by virtue of *saṃsarga* (association) all those that belong to the king like servant, wife and house are referred to by the word *rājñaḥ* and all those who can be masters of a servant are referred to by *puruṣa* (*iha 'rājña' ity ukte sarvam svam prasaktam; 'puruśa' ity ukte sarvaḥ svāmī prasaktaḥ,* MB. 2.1.1, p. 521). Because of the mutual expectancy between the servant and the master, the word *puruṣa* denotes the sense of servant and the master

is comprehended in an indefinite way. Here it should be borne in mind that the servility of the man should have already been known by some other means of knowledge, otherwise the denotation of servant by *'puruṣa'* is impossible because the word *puruṣa* by itself denotes only the existence of the man and not his relationship with the master. Now by *bheda* (dissociation) all the referents excluding the servant are eliminated in the sense of *rājan*, and so also all the masters excluding the king in the sense of *puruṣa* are excluded. Thus the sentence gives a comprehensive idea of 'servant of the king'.

64. Pitcher. p. 71.

65. Ibid.

66. "If all true elementary propositions are listed, the world is completely described. A complete description of the world is given by listing all elementary propositions, and then listing which of them are true and which false (T. 4.26)", ibid. p. 58, 102.

67. "The world is *my* world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) means the limits of my world (T. 5.62 (3))", ibid. p. 145.

68. *na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte /*
anuviddham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate // VP. 1.115.

69. Cf. Pitcher, p. 21 : T. 4.03; 5.0311; 4.032.

śabdasya pariṇāmo 'yaṃ ity āmnāyavido viduḥ/
chandobhya eva prathamam etad viśvaṃ vyāvartata //
VP. 1.112.

According to Bhartṛhari's 'sphota' theory, what the speaker utters and the listener hears is the sentence as a whole, the Vākya-sphota; the division of the sentence into words and the words into phonemes have no absolute reality, but are abstracted from the sentence, for help in understanding the utterance. Those who know the language will speak and hear only complete, meaningful sentences, the Vākya-sphota. Thought and language are the expressions of one deep spiritual impulse to know and to communicate. Both Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein explain the pyschic phenomena in the communication of the sentence sense with the example of the picture. But Bhartṛhari does not draw the similarities of the sphota wth picture in all details; for, similarities for the Indian thinkers presuppose differences also. But Wittgenstein draws one to one correspondence between the logical picture and the spatial picture. Moreover, by juxtaposing two great masters, it is hoped that putting the two perspectives in dialogue would enable the readers to see the limitations and possibilities of each of them. This would pave the way to a meaningful use of the text, the perspective in our teaching and research.

Sibajiban Bhattacharyya (b. March 1 1926), M.A. (Philosophy) from Calcutta University, started his career as Assistant Professor in Philosophy, Saugar University. Honoured with D. Litt. (Honoris Causa) by Rabindra Bharati University. Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Law, Burdwan University, (1971-73) and Visiting Fellow and Professor of many national as well as foreign universities. Authored six books and more than 100 research articles and edited five books.

ISBN 81-260-1414-8